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INTRODUCTION: LEGAL QUESTIONS AT STAKE AND PREMISES ON
WHICH A Memorial for Bosnia Is BASED
A. Overview of the Legal Questions at Stake
This Memorial seeks to present a framework of legal arguments
with respect to the validity and legal effects of an arms embargo im-
posed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 in September
1991 on the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia),
before its dissolution, and since treated as being in force with respect to
the new states that have succeeded Yugoslavia. More particularly, the
Memorial addresses the legality of maintaining (or, at least, having
maintained during the crucial time period) the arms embargo in force,
either de jure or de facto, against the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Bosnia) in light of evidence that the arms embargo's
maintenance vis-A-vis Bosnia has contributed to the inability of the
Government of Bosnia to prevent the perpetration on Bosnia's territory
of acts of genocide by Bosnian Serb forces as well as combined acts of
genocide and aggression by the neighboring state of Serbia and
Montenegro (Serbia).'
The operative clause of Resolution 713 provides that the Security
Council:
Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace
and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general
and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides
otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General
and the Government of Yugoslavia.2
The purpose of the resolution was to prevent external interference in
Yugoslav affairs (as well as the regional escalation that such interference
1. As will become evident, this Memorial does not argue that the initial imposition of the
arms embargo by the Security Council was either invalid or produced an immediate conflict
of obligations for Members. Rather, the Memorial calls into question the legalities related to
the maintenance of the arms embargo after changes in the initial situation resulted in a
conflict between Members' obligations to uphold the arms embargo on the one hand and
Bosnia's (and other states') obligation to prevent genocide and Bosnia's right to self-defense
in response to aggression on the other hand.
2. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(Readex 1991).
[Vol. 16:1
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could potentially cause) and to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia.'
The resolution came at the request of the then-Yugoslav Government.4
Indeed, the decision to impose the arms embargo upon Yugoslavia was
influenced by the view that such a measure was requested by Yugosla-
via itself.5 Without the express request and consent of Yugoslavia, it is
unlikely that the arms embargo would have been imposed by the Securi-
ty Council. 6 While the resolution has been "reaffirmed" in subsequent
resolutions, 7 Resolution 713 itself clearly states that the arms embargo
applies to "Yugoslavia," an entity no longer existing 8 and which is
entirely distinct from the successor states, including Bosnia.9 Resolution
713 was adopted only a month before the collapse of Yugoslavia. De-
spite the fact that this collapse drew into question the international legal
status and capacity of "Yugoslavia," to which Resolution 713 applies,
most Security Council Members have treated the embargo as continuing
to apply to post-Yugoslavia Bosnia.10
3. See id.
4. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the President 'f the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23069 (Readex 1991).
5. See Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 64,3317,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009 (1991).
6. This may be gleaned by reference to the statements of the representatives of Zimba-
bwe, Yemen, Cuba, China, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, Zaire, and France. See id. at
28, 36, 38, 49, 52, 55, 64, 66.
7. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 727, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3028th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES//27
(Readex 1992) ("Reaffirms the embargo applied in paragraph 6 of resolution 713 (1991) and in
paragraph 5 of resolution 724 (1991)"); S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023rd mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/724 (Readex 1991) ("Determined to ensure that the general and complete embargo on all
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia imposed by resolution 713 (1991) is
effectively applied"); see also S.C. Res 871, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3286th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/871 (Readex 1993); S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3241st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/844
(Readex 1993); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (Readex
1993); S.C. Res 821, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3204th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/821 (Readex 1993); S.C.
Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (Readex 1993); S.C. Res. 819,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Readex 1993); S.C. Res. 808, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Readex 1993); S.C. Res. 802, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3163rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/802 (Readex 1993); S.C. Res. 762, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3088th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1762 (Readex 1992); S.C. Res. 758, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3083rd
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES758 (Readex 1992); S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082nd mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/757 (Readex 1992); S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3075th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES1752 (Readex 1992); S.C. Res. 749, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3066th mtg., U.N. Dc. S/RES/749
(Readex 1992); S.C. Res. 740, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3049th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/740 (Readex
1992).
8. See S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/777
(Readex 1992); G.A. Res. 47/2, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 28th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/2 (Readex 1992).
9. Bosnia has continuously protested that the arms embargo does not apply against it.
The argument that the arms embargo is formally inapplicable to Bosnia will be considered
infra part IV, wherein the legal significance of S.C. Res. 727, supra note 7, will be discussed.
10. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325,,
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B. Situating A Memorial for Bosnia in the Context of the Ongoing
Case in the International Court of Justice Brought by Bosnia
Against Serbia Under the Genocide Convention
1. The Case Brought by Bosnia Against Serbia and the Alleged Facts
with Respect to Serbia's Responsibility for Conduct in
Breach of the Genocide Convention
It is necessary to situate this Memorial in relation to the ongoing
contentious case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court)
brought by Bosnia against Serbia, Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia). This case
was initiated on the basis of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court by
virtue of Article IX's compromissory clause in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Con-
vention)." Bosnia has sued Serbia both for acts of Serbian forces in
Bosnia and for Serbian support of genocide carried out by Bosnian Serb
forces, support which Bosnia argues to be sufficient to engage Serbia's
state responsibility under the Genocide Convention. 12 Given the urgency
437-38 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia II] (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
Judge Lauterpacht argued that the arms embargo must apply to Bosnia and to other post-
Yugoslavia states based on the intention seemingly manifested by the Security Council in the
period after Bosnia's admission to the U.N. Judge Lauterpacht felt that:
[the] most compelling evidence of the Council's view in this regard is the record of
the debate held on 29 June 1993 when six members sought, without success, to
persuade the Council expressly to raise the embargo in relation to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The vote was 6 in favour, none against, with 9 abstentions.
Id. at 438.
II. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]. Art. IX provides for ICJ jurisdiction in the following terms:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application
or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibili-
ty of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III,
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the
parties to the dispute.
Id. For a discussion of art. IX as the basis for a suit against a state other than Serbia, see
infra Introduction, part B.3.
12. The Genocide Convention seeks to render genocide a crime under international law
for which individuals, whether or not acting on behalf of state actors, can be punished. In this
respect, art. II provides:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
[Vol. 16:1
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of the situation, Bosnia sought an indication of provisional measures
from the ICJ twice in 1993. At the first Provisional Measures stage in
April, the Court ruled in Bosnia's favor, ordering that Serbia cease and
desist from all genocidal actions. Bosnia filed its second request in late
summer of 1993, claiming that Serbia was not complying with the first
order; again, the Court ruled in Bosnia's favor.'3
2. The Attempt to Raise the Arms Embargo
Issue in the Current Case
While Bosnia's central claim at each stage of the case was that
Serbia was legally responsible for acts of genocide, Bosnia also sought
to persuade the Court to consider the legal status and effects of the arms
embargo in the context of Serbian responsibility. Bosnia, notably at the
Bosnia v. Serbia II stage, recognized that the case was not ideally suited
as a springboard to raising the issue of the arms embargo. The respon-
dent state, Serbia, arguably was not engaging in positive acts to main-
tain the embargo; rather, Serbia was breaching the embargo by provid-
ing arms to Bosnian Serbs. Serbia therefore was in violation of the
Genocide Convention, and Serbia would not (and did not) raise obliga-
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra note 11, art. I1.
Art. III of the Genocide Convention then lists the modes of committing genocide for
which individuals can be punished under international law:
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Id. art. III.
While the primary focus of the Genocide Convention is the facilitation of the prosecu-
tion of individuals, it is clear that states can incur state responsibility not only for failure to
meet their obligations with respect to the punishment of individuals, see id. arts. IV-VII, but
also for states' conduct causally connected to the perpetration of genocide, see id. art. IX,
supra, and art. I ("The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent
and to punish").
13. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8)
[hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia I]; Bosnia v. Serbia 1I, 1993 I.C.J. at 325.
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tions flowing from Resolution 713 as a defense against Bosnia's claim.
Thus, the legal force of obligations stemming from Resolution 713 was
not a necessary issue in deciding whether or not Serbia had breached the
Genocide Convention in the manner alleged by Bosnia. 4 Despite the
awkward fit between the substantive claims being made against Serbia
and the logical necessity (or lack thereof) of addressing the arms embar-
go, Bosnia attempted nonetheless to convince the Court to use the
occasion of the provisional measures request to "clarify the legal situa-
tion for the entire international community." 5 Specifically, Bosnia
wished to know whether it had rights of access to the means (including
arms) to prevent genocide and whether these rights prevailed over
Security Council obligations to uphold an arms embargo.' 6 Bosnia was
clearly not seeking a binding order on nonparties, whether states or the
Security Council itself,'7 but rather was seeking something resembling
an expression of judicial opinion on the matter. Bosnia hoped in part to
justify the Court's stepping out of the pure bilateral jurisdictional con-
text of the case (Bosnia versus Serbia) by pointing to the existence of
latitude for judicial courage within Article VIII of the Genocide Con-
vention."
However, in both Bosnia v. Serbia I and Bosnia v. Serbia II, the
Court declined to adhere to this line of argument based on its interpreta-
tion of the interaction between the wording of Article 41(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) and the juris-
dictional nexus (or lis) of the case. Article 41(1) states that "[t]he Court
shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so
14. The reader may recognize the structure of the case Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Lib. v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14) [hereinafter Lockerbie]. State X sues State Y for
breach of a treaty obligation, and Y raises as a defense obligations to obey a Security Council
resolution, which in effect "trump" the obligation to abide by the treaty to the extent the
resolution and treaty conflict. The Lockerbie structure and the potential for replicating it in the
context of a contentious case under the Genocide Convention will be discussed infra Introduc-
tion, part C.
15. See Bosnia v. Serbia I1, 1993 I.C.J. at 344-45, for the Court's discussion of the way
Counsel for Bosnia, Prof. Francis Boyle, framed the issue for the Court.
16. Id.
17. Of course, the Security Council is never directly bound by an ICJ judgment, as will
be discussed infra part III.A.2.
18. Genocide Convention, supra note 11, art. VIII. Art. VIII states that "[a]ny Contract-
ing Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under
the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppres-
sion of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III." Id. Art. VIII
possibly should not be interpreted as a jurisdictional clause in the same sense as art. IX, supra
note 11, although it clearly does serve to acknowledge an erga omnes "jurisdiction" (in the
sense of standing) in all State Parties to raise issues of genocide in international fora. See
infra part I.A.2.b.
[Vol. 16:1
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require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve
the respective rights of either party."19 The Court clearly saw its power
to issue provisional measures as limited to preservation of rights which
could be the subject of binding legal judgment at the eventual Merits
stage of a case. Since the Court's eventual judgment at the Merits stage
is only binding on the states before it, it was not free to issue provision-
al measures with respect to the "rights of either party" if the Court did
not have jurisdiction over a state with the correlative obligation to
respect those same rights. 20 Greater willingness to relate the arms embar-
go to Serbia's alleged responsibility for genocide in Bosnia under the
Genocide Convention is evident in Judge Lauterpacht's opinion in
Bosnia v. Serbia H.2 1 However, Judge Lauterpacht also voiced concern
that the particular bilateral relationship of the case made it difficult for
the Court directly to assess the legal status of the arms embargo im-
posed by Resolution 713 in terms of legal effects on obligations directly
at stake in the litigation.22 Thus, while there was still the possibility that
the Court might view the matter differently at the Merits stage, it was
tolerably clear that the ideal respondent was not before the Court if the
arms embargo was to come up for any judicial consideration by the
Court as a whole.
3. ICJ Cases Contemplated by Bosnia in Late 1993
Bosnia, while not abandoning the arms embargo argument at the
Merits stage of the case, hoped to present the issue of the arms embargo
to the ICJ'in a jurisdictional setting more conducive to addressing the
question. Two avenues, apart from the ongoing case, were contemplated.
19. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 41(1) [hereinafter ICJ
STATUTE].
20. See Bosnia v. Serbia II, 1993 I.C.J. at 344-45. As early as the first request for
provisional measures, the Court declined to read art. VIII of the Genocide Convention as
having any jurisdiction-conferring character and also seemed unwilling to use art. VIII
interpretively, stating that "the Court considers [that] Article VIII ... appears not to confer on
it any functions or competence additional to those provided in its Statute" and that "accord-
ingly the Court ... is not required to do more than consider what provisional measures may
be called for under Article 41 of the Statute." Bosnia v. Serbia I, 1993 I.C.J. at 23.
21. Judge Lauterpacht's suggestion is relatively soft:
I would be prepared to say that the Applicant may have an indication of a provi-
sional measure in the following terms: that as between the Applicant and the
Respondent the continuing validity of the embargo in its bearing on the Applicant
has become a matter of doubt requiring further consideration by the Security
Council.
Bosnia v. Serbia II, 1993 I.C.J. at 442 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
22. Id. at 441-42.
Fall 1994)
Michigan Journal of International Law
a. Contentious Case Against
the United Kingdom
On November 15, 1993, Bosnia's Ambassador to the U.N. issued a
public statement which was circulated to all Members:
[Bosnia] hereby states our solemn intention to institute legal pro-
ceedings against the United Kingdom before the International
Court of Justice for violating the terms of the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide .... We
have already issued formal instructions to that effect to our Attor-
neys-of-Record before the World Court. They are currently drafting
an Application and a Request for Provisional Measures against the
United Kingdom. We have instructed our lawyers to file these
papers with the World Court as soon as physically possible.23
The Statement of Intention indicates that the United Kingdom, as a party
without reservation to the Genocide Convention, could be sued under
Article IX. The two most clearly articulated grounds invoked by Bosnia
under the Genocide Convention were an alleged breach by the United
Kingdom of its "duty to prevent" genocide, found in Article I of the
treaty, and its duty under Article III(e) not to engage in "complicity with
genocide. 24
On December 23, 1993, before proceedings could be initiated before
the ICJ, a joint statement was released at the U.N. by the Ambassador
of Bosnia and the Ambassador of the United Kingdom. The joint state-
ment referred to an "agreement" between Bosnia and the United King-
dom that Bosnia would not pursue its stated intention to implead the
United Kingdom. It is not unlikely that the Government of Bosnia had
been faced with a Hobson's choice of proceeding with the case or
compromising Bosnia's already precarious political position at the peace
negotiations, the success of which depended in significant measure on
the role played by the United Kingdom.
23. Mission of Bosnia, Statement of Intention by the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to Institute Legal Proceedings Against the United Kingdom Before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice 1, November 15, 1993 (on file with the Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law) [hereinafter Statement of Intention]. The Statement of Intention also mentions art.
22 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation as another basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 2-3.
24. Id. at 1-2.
25. See Bosnian Government Not to Press Genocide Charges Against Britain, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US
File. The joint statement came six days after Bosnia's Ambassador to the U.N. addressed a
letter to the President of the Security Council conveying Bosnia's decision not to proceed. See
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/26908 (Readex 1993).
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b. Advisory Opinion Sought Through a Request to the
ICJ from the General Assembly
Diplomatic and media sources report that while a contentious case
was being considered against the United Kingdom, Bosnia succeeded in
having one of the three drafts of General Assembly resolutions, 26 which
were being negotiated in December 1993, include a request for an
advisory opinion on the issue of the legal status and effects of the arms
embargo resolution(s). At a very late stage, Bosnia asked that the clause
requesting the advisory opinion be dropped; observers noted that the
clause had more than enough support to be adopted.27
c. The Ongoing Case and the Arms Embargo Argument
In late 1993, the authors of this Memorial were asked to explore the
arguments relating to the arms embargo under the Genocide Convention.
In early 1994, however, the Bosnian Government decided not to include
any arguments pertaining to the arms embargo in its Memorial on the
merits.28 Especially in light of the cool reception that the majority of the
Court gave the arms embargo arguments at the two Provisional Mea-
sures stages, it seems that Bosnia has quite sensibly decided that the
best course of action is to secure a Court judgment that Serbia has
violated the Genocide Convention and not to cloud the Court's inquiry
with the controversial and jurisdictionally uncertain issue of the arms
embargo.
26. These three resolutions were G.A. Res. 48/88, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 84th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/88 (Readex 1993); G.A. Res. 48/143, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/143 (Readex 1993); G.A. Res. 48/153, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/153 (Readex 1994).
27. See G.A. Res. 48/88, supra note 26; G.A. Res. 48/143, supra note 26; G.A. Res.
48/153, supra note 26. All three resolutions were adopted on December 20, 1993, which was
virtually the same date as the decision by Bosnia to withdraw its intention to sue the United
Kingdom - three days after the Bosnian Ambassador's letter to the Security Council
President and three days before the December 23 joint statement by Bosnia and the United
Kingdom.
28. On April 15, 1994, Bosnia submitted its Memorial to the Court; Serbia has one year
in which to submit its reply. Bosnia has, however, reserved its right to reinvoke various
elements of its initial requests, which include those related to the status of the arms embargo,
in response to the course of argument.
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C. A Contentious Case Brought Under Article IX of the Genocide
Convention Against a State Engaged in Maintaining the Arms
Embargo Would Create, According to a Structure Similar to
Lockerbie, the Possibility for the ICJ to Address the Legal
Status of Resolution 713 and Its Effect on States' Obligations
It is clear that an application against the United Kingdom or other
similarly situated party to the Genocide Convention would have squarely
raised the issue of the validity and legal effects of the embargo. The
United Kingdom could be sued for breach of the Article I duty to pre-
vent genocide and perhaps the Article III(e) obligation not to be
complicit in genocide. The basis for the Article I claim was clearly
articulated in the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in Bosnia v.
Serbia H:
The duty to "prevent" genocide is a duty that rests upon all parties
and is a duty owed by each party to every other .... First, there is
the duty of the Respondent [and thus of any state party] both to
prevent genocide and to refrain from conduct that inhibits the
ability of the Applicant itself to prevent genocide or to resist it
.... Third, there is the question of access by the Applicant to the
means to prevent the commission of acts of genocide. The Appli-
cant obviously has here in mind ... the embargo placed by Secu-
rity Council resolution 713 (1991) .... [I]t is not to be contem-
plated that the Security Council would ever deliberately adopt a
resolution clearly and deliberately flouting a rule ofjus cogens"9 or
requiring a violation of human rights. But the possibility that a
Security Council resolution might inadvertently or in an unforeseen
manner lead to such a situation cannot be excluded .... On this
basis, the inability of Bosnia-Herzegovina sufficiently strongly to
fight back against the Serbs and effectively to prevent the imple-
mentation of the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing is at least in
part directly attributable to the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina's
access to weapons and equipment has been severely limited by the
embargo. Viewed in this light, the Security Council resolution can
be seen as having in effect called on Members of the United Na-
tions, albeit unknowingly and assuredly unwillingly, to become in
29. For a more elaborate discussion of the concept of jus cogens, see infra part I. For the
moment, it is sufficient to note that jus cogens refers to a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and, to that extent, is analogous to high constitutional norms in domestic legal
systems.
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some degree supporters of the genocidal activity of the Serbs and
in this manner and to, that extent to act contrary to a rule of jus
cogens.3°
If a suit were initiated based on a claimed violation of Article I (and
possibly Article III(e)) of the Genocide Convention, the Applicant would
not be seeking to establish that the Genocide Convention itself creates
jurisdiction for some form of direct or binding review of the actions of
the Security Council. 31 However, the Article IX compromissory clause,
if purposively and generously interpreted in accordance with the gener-
ally accepted principles of interpretation for human rights treaties, would
seem to create considerable scope for a State Party unilaterally to seize
the Court in a way-that would permit the Court to render an opinion on
how a Security Council resolution may or may not affect the obligations
and rights of a State Party to the Genocide Convention.
Article IX's reference to "responsibility of states" makes clear that
questions of the responsibility of states actively enforcing (or maintain-
30. Bosnia v. Serbia II, 1993 I.C.J. at 436-41 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). It
will be recalled that the Statement of Intention, supra note 23, specifically characterizes the
U.K.'s role as a Security Council member in maintaining the arms embargo (including
"actively opposing all of the efforts by other States to 'lift' the arms embargo") as complicity
in genocide and associates the art. I "duty to prevent" only with an affirmative obligation.
The Statement of Intention refers for support to the reasoning of Judge Lauterpacht in Bosnia
v. Serbia I!. However, it should be noted that Judge Lauterpacht based his above-quoted
argument on the premise that the art. I "duty to prevent" genocide (at least) embodies
negative obligations; Judge Lauterpacht felt there was no strict need, for his purposes, to
consider more positive duties to prevent genocide. The "complicity" argument as a basis for
responsibility of an embargo-maintaining state like the United Kingdom will be discussed
briefly infra note 119, as feeding into the interpretation of the art. I duty to prevent genocide.
The last sentence of Lauterpacht's argument is also particularly worth noting. In virtually
the same breath, it touches both on the Security Council resolution as a juridical act (the
status of which, in terms of validity, is clearly implied) and on the conflict obligations of
states that cannot both obey the resolution and meet their duty to prevent genocide under art.
I of the Genocide Convention. This coming together of the legal status of the resolution as a
juridical act and its legal consequences for states' obligations (and thus for state responsibili-
ty) is discussed infra part IV.B. There, the argument is made that the most appropriate way to
conceptualize Resolution 713's legal status is in terms of a doctrine analogous to what in
some constitutional law systems is called "paramountcy doctrine." Under this doctrine, when
one prima facie valid statute produces an obligation that conflicts with an obligation flowing
from another prima facie valid statute, the result is inoperativeness, not voidness.
31. The Security Council as a nonstate actor cannot be a party before the Court and, as
such, cannot be subject to the Court's binding judgment. ICJ STATUTE arts. 34(1), 59. In
addition, there are very few treaties which have compromissory clauses which provide for
advisory opinions with binding effect. See Question of Treaties Concluded Between States
and International Organizations or Between Two or More International Organizations, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, [1980]
2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 64, 87 n.251, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2)
(listing conventions that have made provisions for advisory opinions with binding effect)
[hereinafter 1980 Draft Vienna Convention]; see also infra part III.B.3 (discussing the near-
binding effect of ICJ judgments on international organizations envisaged by art. 66 of the
1986 Vienna Convention).
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ing through other forms of support) the arms embargo would be raised
by asking the Court to determine whether this kind of enforcement
constitutes involvement in genocide sufficient to amount to a breach of
Article I or Article III(e) of the Genocide Convention. If this interpreta-
tion of the substantive scope of one or both of these provisions is valid,
the question would then become whether the state in question could
raise as a defense (or, phrased in the language of the International Law
Commission (ILC), as a "circumstance precluding wrongfulness") the
Security Council resolution in tandem with Articles 25 and 103 of the
U.N. Charter.32 If the Court were to find initially that assisting in main-
taining an unbalanced situation of arms in a context of genocide infring-
es Article I, a necessary element of the Court's reasoning would then
have to include the legal effects of the resolution and of the obligations
it places on states who are also parties to the Genocide Convention. The
Court would not be reviewing the Security Council in any direct and
binding sense, but it would be determining in a binding fashion the
scope of states' rights and duties under the Genocide Convention.
The above kind of contentious case replicates the basic structure of
Lockerbie, in which Libya sued both the United States and the United
Kingdom for breach of obligations owed to Libya-under the 1971 Mon-
treal Convention. The two respondents raised as defenses two Security
Council resolutions, the earlier one being a nonbinding recommendation
and the later one being a binding decision taken under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter. At the Provisional Measures stage, the ICJ ruled that
the later resolution prevented the Court from indicating provisional mea-
sures because of the trumping effect of Article 103. 33 However, it is
32. Art. 25 provides that Security Council resolutions containing decisions of the Council
create binding obligations for all parties to the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 25 ("The
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter"). Art. 103 indicates that an obligation binding
under art. 25 is to be treated as superior to any non-Charter treaty obligation a party might
have that conflicts with its obligation to obey a Security Council resolution under art. 25. Id.
art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, their obligations under the present Charter should prevail").
For the "circumstances precluding wrongfulness" so far identified by the ILC in its
ongoing work codifying the law of state responsibility, see State Responsibility, in Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, [1980] 2(2) Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 26, 33-34 (arts. 29-34), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.I (Part 2)
[hereinafter .1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility]. Those defenses do not explicitly
mention art. 103, but the ILC commentary on the defense of legitimate countermeasures
seems to suggest that it is implicitly found in art. 30 on countermeasures. See State Respon-
sibility, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-First
Session, [1979] 2(2) Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n 87, 121, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.l
(Part 2) [hereinafter 1979 Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
33. Lockerbie, 1992 LC.J. at 126-27.
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clear that at this stage of the litigation, the Court felt that it only had to
accept that the resolution was prima facie valid in order to establish its
binding effect under Article 25 and its resulting effect under Article 103.
For reasons to be discussed in Part III, Lockerbie leaves open a role for
the ICJ, at least at the Merits stage of a case, in assessing whether a pre-
sumptively valid Security Council resolution is actually valid in terms of
creating obligations for states with respect to which Article 103 can then
be called in aid. It will be argued that the implication of jus cogens
norms (related simultaneously to prevention of genocide and to the right
of self-defense) in the context of a possible contentious case under the
Genocide Convention dealing with the arms embargo creates the possi-
bility, indeed responsibility, of the ICJ to find that Resolution 713 is not
able, if certain facts obtain, to create obligations which enjoy the protec-
tion of Article 103.
D. The Premises upon Which A Memorial for Bosnia Is Structured
1. The Presumed Jurisdictional Context
It is crucial that the reader be clear on the context within which this
Memorial is framed. The arguments set out in this Memorial presuppose
that the respondent is not Serbia but rather an embargo-maintaining state
that is also party to the Genocide Convention. As the foregoing narrative
suggested, the respondent could be the United Kingdom, as a party
without reservation to that treaty, but the Memorial does not depend on
the specific identity of the respondent. Alternatively, it is conceivable
that the issues could be raised in the structure of this Memorial by way
of an appropriately phrased advisory opinion. In either possible jurisdic-
tional context (contentious case or advisory opinion), the normative
arguments found in Parts I to III and the institutional arguments found
in Part IV (relating not to formal ICJ jurisdiction but to scope of re-
view) are equally applicable, at least presumptively.34 Moreover, the
normative arguments involving jus cogens, genocide, and interpretation
of the U.N. Charter found in Parts I, II, and III may be viewed as self-
34. "[P]resumptively" because this Memorial does not purport to be primarily about
jurisdiction, and thus to that extent it is also not primarily about the differences that different
jurisdictional contexts might make for the Court's scope of review once jurisdiction is
established. Thus, arguments exist for bolder pronouncements by the Court on questions that
arise from a request for an advisory opinion than on the same questions arising from a
contentious case. For some comments of a schematic nature about the potential differences
between the Provisional Measures stage and- the Merits stage of a contentious case brought
under art. IX of the Genocide Convention, see infra note 336.
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standing in that they do not depend for their validity upon the ICJ's
institutional competence to address them."
Thus, the Memorial is not grounded in the current case before the
ICJ. It is also appropriate to clarify that it is not being argued that the
ICJ has an implicit inherent jurisdiction, derivable from the U.N. Char-
ter and ICJ Statute in combination, to review the actions of the Security
Council, although such an argument is not new and may indeed be
considered seriously some years hence.
2. The Presumed Facts
It is not the purpose, or the place, of this Memorial to establish the
facts with respect to either Serbia's role in the underlying genocide or
the causal connection, past or present, between the arms embargo and
genocide. Rather, the Memorial is premised on the factual constellation
essentially as pleaded by Bosnia at the two Provisional Measures stag-
es.
3 6
In addition, the presumed facts for purposes of the arguments in this
Memorial are limited to a specific chronological period, namely the
period from the formation of Bosnia as a state in the first half of 1992
to the time of the two missed opportunities to place the arms embargo
before the ICJ in a suitable jurisdictional context, that is late December
1993.
By way of summary, during this period, the Memorial takes as
given that genocide was taking place on Bosnian territory against the
predominantly Muslim population.37 It was also widely, though not
universally, accepted that the imbalance of arms greatly contributed to
this genocide in the way described by Judge Lauterpacht, quoted in Part
C of the Introduction. For example, in Resolution 47/121 of December
18, 1992, the General Assembly cited with approval the findings of
35. For example, the normative issues could be debated within the Security Council,
within the General Assembly, between states, or in international society at large.
36. See James Gow, One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, RFE/RL RES. REP.,
June 4, 1993, 1, 1-13. The reader should also note two collections to be published in the near
future, the purpose of which is to reproduce all the primary documentation relevant to the
fragmentation of Yugoslavia, especially as it relates to Bosnia. See FRANCIS BOYLE, THE
BOSNIAN PEOPLE CHARGE GENOCIDE (forthcoming 1995); MARC WELLER, THE YUGOSLAV
CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PART 1, GENERAL ISSUES (forthcoming 1995). Francis Boyle
was counsel before the ICJ at the two Provisional Measures stages. The case at the Merits
stage has since been taken over by a new legal team of which Marc Weller is a member.
37. The facts are by now well known to the general public. There are approximately
200,000 dead, many more wounded, 2.6 million refugees, 20,000 women raped, scores of
towns and villages in ruins, and major cities under constant siege and sniper fire. The victims
are predominantly civilians, with rudimentary weapons if any.
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U.N. Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Tadeuscz
Mazowiecki, stating that "another factor which had contributed to the
intensity of 'ethnic cleansing' in areas under Serbian control was the
marked imbalance between the weaponry in the hands of the Serbian
and the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ' '38 Resolution
47/121 also equated so-called "ethnic cleansing" to a campaign of
genocide for which the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of
the Republic of Serbia bore primary responsibility.39 In this same resolu-
tion, the General Assembly, by a vote of 102 in favor, none against, and
57 abstentions, "urge[d] the Security Council ... [t]o exempt the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo as imposed
on the former Yugoslavia under Security Council resolution 713
(1991)." '4° One year later, almost to the day, the General Assembly
repeated its request for an arms embargo exemption in Resolution
48/88.
4 1
Despite the fact that the Security Council has, in the summer of
1993, itself voted against the lifting of the embargo,42 there are signs
that its Members are aware of the causal relationship between the em-
bargo and genocide. In a letter from the President of the Security Coun-
cil to the Secretary-General, the Members implicitly acknowledged the
disastrous effects of the imbalance of arms by requesting that interna-
tional observers be deployed on the borders of Bosnia, "with priority
being given to the border between the Republic of Bosnia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" in order to facilitate the implementa-
tion of the "relevant" Security Council resolutions. 43 Given that the
border between Bosnia and Serbia has been the site of significant flows
38. G.A. Res. 47/121, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 91st plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/121 (Readex 1992).
39. See id. G.A. Res 47/121 was re-affirmed in G.A. Res. 48/143, supra note 26, in
which the General Assembly also drew specific attention to rape as genocide. Rape was
referred to as a "systemic practice" and "an instrument of 'ethnic cleansing"' against the
women and children in the areas of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Id. at 3. Rape
was termed "a deliberate weapon of war in fulfilling the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' carried
out by Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Id. at 2.
40. G.A. Res. 47/121, supra note 38, at 3-4.
41. G.A. Res. 48/88, supra note 26, states that the Assembly "urges the Security Council
to give all due consideration, on an urgent basis, to exempt the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from the arms embargo." Id. at 5. The resolution further urges Member States,
"as well as other members of the international community, from all regions, to extend their
cooperation to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exercise of its inherent right of
individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of Chapter VII of the
Charter." Id.
42. See Bosnia v. Serbia Ii, 1993 I.C.J. at 437-38.
43. Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/26049 (Readex 1993).
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of troops and arms to the Bosnian Serbs, one can conclude that the
Council was seeking to enforce an embargo that had been effective
against only one party - the victim of genocidal aggression." Not only
the sanctions applied by the Security Council against Serbia but also the
belated agreement of Serbian President Milosevic in early summer 1994
to seal the border with Bosnia must be taken as a recognition by the
U.N. and by Serbia that material support for the Bosnian Serb military
had been reaching the Bosnian Serbs from Serbia despite the arms
embargo.
To the extent that an arms imbalance continues to exist and the
effects of the imbalance are to perpetuate genocide, the normative argu-
ments in this Memorial retain their force. Therefore, if the current
situation is judged to be sufficiently similar to the pre-December 1993
facts, then this Memorial's arguments would be as applicable now as
they were when Bosnia first raised the issue of the validity of the em-
bargo before the ICJ in April 1993. The authors, however, do not pur-
port to make any statement about the existence of genocide as a result
of the embargo today. The relative balance of military capacity in
Bosnia as an ongoing matter and its relationship to genocide are factual
and legal issues for the Security Council, the ICJ, and Member States of
the U.N. to consider as the occasion may permit. This Memorial is thus
limited temporally to the period before the Government of Bosnia con-
sidered including arms embargo arguments in its official written submis-
sions to the Court and to the period shortly thereafter, when it was
considering alternative cases that could be placed before the ICJ which
might raise the issue more directly. The normative and institutional
features of the Memorial assume specific factual and jurisdictional
contexts, described above, that are beyond the scope of the current
litigation between Bosnia and Serbia at the ICJ.
E. The Plan and Format of the Memorial
1. Plan of Memorial
The foregoing introduction has set out the factual background to the
Memorial and the premises upon which it rests. Part I of the Memorial
44. Interestingly, another Security Council member, the United States, even considered
the embargo in its domestic affairs. In June 1994, the majority of the House of Representa-
tives voted to lift the embargo against Bosnia unilaterally, while the minority approved this
action only in consultation with other Security Council members. In late November 1994, the
United States announced that it would not enforce the embargo against the Bosnian Govern-
ment forces.
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will seek to demonstrate that the maintenance of an arms embargo on
Bosnia, whether or not justified as being in conformity with obligations
that Resolution 713 and subsequent resolutions purport to create for
Member States of the U.N., conflicts with jus cogens obligations of
states related to genocide, notably the duty to prevent genocide. Part II
will then seek to establish that the maintenance of the arms embargo by
and under the authority of the Security Council is ultra vires the Securi-
ty Council's powers under the U.N. Charter because this maintenance
overly fetters Bosnia's Charter-protected right to self-defense. Parts I
and II, therefore, are primarily concerned with the normative state of
affairs, putting aside, for the most part, questions of institutional authori-
ty. Thus, it is Part III that will canvass the institutional powers and- re-
sponsibilities of the ICJ to pass judgment on the status of the implicated
Security Council resolutions and their effects on the obligations of
states. The institutional question having been addressed, Part IV then
will address the legal effects, within the jurisdictional realm of the ICJ,
of the unlawfulness established in Parts I and II. Brief submissions will
conclude the Memorial.
2. Symbolic Format of the Memorial
Finally, a word should be said about the title and format of the
Memorial. The arguments are presented in the format of a memorial for
symbolic reasons. Research and formulation of the arguments were
initially undertaken with a view to integrating them in the official
Bosnian Memorial in the current Bosnia v. Serbia case. When the
Bosnian Government decided that it was counterproductive to pursue the
arms embargo issue in its current case before the ICJ, the authors con-
tinued to utilize the argumentative (and explicitly advocatory) format as
they wished to present the arguments concerning this most critical issue
in the form in which they could have been (and still could be) presented
in a judicial context to the intemational community.
With the foregoing setting the context for the reader, the authors'
arguments thus take the form of A Memorial for Bosnia - a memorial
to Bosnians.
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I. STATE CONDUCT IN ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS' OBLIGATIONS TO MAINTAIN
AN ARMS EMBARGO PLACES STATE PARTIES TO THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION IN CONFLICT WITH THEIR
Jus Cogens OBLIGATION TO PREVENT GENOCIDE
A. Genocide, Jus Cogens, and the Genocide Convention
1. The Principle of Jus Cogens Is Established in International
Law as the Highest Form of Law
a. International Law Recognizes the Existence of Jus Cogens
According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969 Vienna Convention),4 5 jus cogens are "peremptory
norm[s] of general international law ... accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted. 46 Leading publicists have more specifically
defined jus cogens as "an inherent part of every legal system ...
[which] include those rules whose nonobservance would affectthe very
essence of the system, 47 as rules which "involve ... considerations of
morals and of international good order,, 48 and as "overriding principles
of morality or of paramount international interest.,
49
The concept of jus cogens has been virtually universally accepted by
states, courts, and publicists alike. The Members of the Sixth Committee
of the U.N. General Assembly that discussed the inclusion of jus cogens
in the 1969 Vienna Convention welcomed the introduction of the jus
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Vienna Convention].
46. Id. art. 53; see also id. arts. 64, 66, and 71 (dealing with the legal implications of jus
cogens norms).
47. George Abi-Saab, Introduction to THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS [hereinafter CONCEPT OF JUS COGENs] 7, 9 (1967).
48. Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, Third Report on Law of Treaties, [1958] 2(1) YB. Int'l L.
Comm'n 20, 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1960/Add.l.
49. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT 113-14 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (4th ed. 1990); Gordon. A. Christenson, Jus Cogens:
Guarding Interest Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA J. INT'L L. 585, 592 (1988);
Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International
Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 949 (1967); Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and
Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 58 (1966).
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cogens articles into the ILC's draft without exception.5 ° Article 53 was
considered " 'a very constructive contribution to the progressive devel-
opment of international law.' "5' After the formulation at the ILC's 1963
session of what is now Article 53, fifty-one Member States commented
on the draft in writing or in statements to the General Assembly. Of
these, forty-three went on record as favoring the concept of jus cogens
as part of the draft, the majority of them without reservations. 2 Two
years later at the Lagonissi International Law Conference on jus cogens,
more than thirty participants, representing all parts of the world, were in
agreement on the concept, at times even on the content, of jus cogens.53
Although some ambiguity remains as to which rules of international law
qualify as jus cogens,54 "the concept has penetrated the consciousness of
public international law discourse." 5  Moreover, "the concept of jus
cogens ... finds reception and recognition in all the principal legal
systems of the world. 56
Over the past fifty years, various courts have also acknowledged the
existence of peremptory norms of international law. As early as the
Nuremberg Trials, discussion of absolute rules of morality or public
order was prevalent. In the Krupp case, for instance, the Tribunal deter-
mined that an agreement between Germany and the Vichy Governments
for the use of French prisoners of war in the armaments industry was
void under the law of nations as being manifestly contra bonos mores.57
Although never directly dealt with by the ICJ, 58 dicta in the opinions of
50. "The most striking feature of the record of the Commission's debates is the unanimi-
ty with which the members of the Commission accepted the idea of jus cogens." Erik Suy,
The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public International Law, in CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS, supra
note 47, at 17, 54.
51. Id. (quoting Jacovides of Cyprus).
52. See Schwelb, supra note 49, at 960.
53. See Suy, supra note 50, at 11. Professor Lissitzyn went so far as to remark that all
the participants agreed on the jus cogens character of arts. I and 2 of the U.N. Charter, see
id., a position which seems, with the passage of time, to overstate the scope of jus cogens
norms.
54. See Georg Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEx. L. REV. 455 (1964).
55. Christenson, supra note 49, at 586.
56. V. Nageswar Rao, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 3
INDIAN'J. INT'L L. 362, 385 (1974).
57. United States v. Krupp, in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1, 1395-96 (1950).
58. The ICJ has shown caution in defining certain norms as peremptory. In its judgment
in North Sea Continental Shelf, however, the Court gives implicit recognition to the existence
of the concept itself by referring to it, even while it chooses to refrain from pronouncing on
it. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20);
see also Diplomatic and Consular Staff (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 1, 42 (May 24) (referring to
the "imperative character" of Iran's human rights obligations that cannot be altered by the
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the Court have shaped what some consider a particular ideological
vision of jus cogens. 9 In Barcelona Traction,6° for example, Judge
Ammoun associates self-determination with imperative norms of jus
cogens he believes were sanctioned by representatives of most states at
the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties. 61 Similarly, in Reserva-
tions to the Convention on Genocide, the Court stated that conventions
like the one before it have both civilizing and purely humanitarian "high
purposes.62 In this case, despite the absence of an explicit reference to
jus cogens, the Court leaves no doubt as to the limitation on the contrac-
tual liberty of states when "high purposes" are at stake.63 Such a posi-
tion distinctly parallels the provisions of Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention, which also delimits the ability of states to contract by ren-
dering void any treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm.
b. Jus Cogens Norms Entail Obligations of a Special Nature
In keeping with their universal and general import, rules which
derive from principles of jus cogens bind the international community as
a whole; that is, even countries not signatories to the 1969 Vienna
Convention are nonetheless bound by the content of its jus cogens
provisions, most notably Articles 53, 64, and 71.64 In light of the fact
that nonobservance of the body of jus cogens rules may affect the very
essence of the legal system to which they belong, universal applicability
diplomatic tensions between the United States and Iran)[hereinafter Tehran Hostages].
Theodor Meron agrees that this statement by the Court is a version of jus cogens. See
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 222
(1989).
59. Christenson, supra note 49, at 619.
60. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
61. See id. at 304 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun) (implying that the U.N. Charter
contains principles ofjus cogens in its preamble).
62. Reservations to the Genocide Convention (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23
(May 28).
63. Suy, supra note 50, at 60.
64. Karen Parker & Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights,
12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 436 (1989). It is not clear whether nonparties to
the 1969 Vienna Convention would be bound to a customary law equivalent of art. 66
because that provision is of a procedural nature and thus, as part of the supervisory machinery
of the treaty, may be less apt to reflect or generate custom. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua] (commenting that the reporting procedure in art. 51 of the U.N. Charter is specific
to the treaty regime and has no customary analogue). That being said, the normative signal
sent by art. 66 in permitting unilateral submission of jus cogens disputes to the ICJ would
appear to be of significant corroborative relevance in assessing the special role that the ICJ
should play in cases involving genocide when those cases get to the Court by a jurisdictional
route other than art. 66 (for example, by way of the Genocide Convention).
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is inherently necessary. Professor (now Judge) Ago further stipulates
that peremptory norms are those "'rules which, while embodied in a
treaty, [are] still valid as customary rules for States not bound by the
treaty, and hence for States in general."'
65
Existing as they do "in the higher interest of the whole international
community" as opposed to "satisfying the needs of individual states, 66
jus cogens norms dictate that states and other international actors depart
from the absolute sovereign-state paradigm. Just as pure voluntarism is
curbed by the limits imposed by Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention, so too are states obliged to act without self-interest and
with regard to the welfare of the international community when jus
cogens obligations are at issue. Hence, when principles of jus cogens
have been or are in the process of being violated, a universal interna-
tional reaction is justified.
Jus cogens rules, "by reason of the importance of their subject-
matter for the international community as a whole, are - unlike the
others - obligations in whose fulfillment all States have a legal inter-
est., 67 Indeed, it has been generally posited that jus cogens norms in the
area of human rights must by their very nature be owed erga omnes, 68
due to their fundamental importance to the international community as a
whole.69 In the spirit of this movement towards a global consciousness
where primary legal and moral values are simultaneously at stake, it
follows that the observance of jus cogens principles can be demanded
and enforced by all members of the international community.7"
65. Suy, supra note 50, at 53.
66. Verdross, supra note 49, at 58.
67. State Responsibility, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
its Twenty-Eighth Session, [1976] 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 69, 99, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.4/1976/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1976 Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
The ILC is here referring to Barcelona Traction, in which the Court declared that "all States
can be held to have a legal obligation in [erga omnes rights'] protection." Barcelona Traction,
1970 I.C.J. at 33.
68. MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 163 (1992); 1976 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 67, at 95 (art.
19(3)(c)).
69. While jus cogens norms comprise a narrower category than erga omnes norms, it is
clear that all jus cogens norms are also erga omnes norms even if not all erga omnes norms
are jus cogens norms. See MERON, supra note 58, at 194.
70.
The quality of such norms of jus cogens may be attributed to only those legal
provisions which are firmly rooted in the legal conviction of the community of
states, which are indispensable for the existence of international law as an interna-
tional legal order and the observance of which can be demanded by all members of
the community of states.
Schwelb, supra note 49, at 951 (quoting an unidentified German Federal Constitutional Court
decision in 1965) (emphasis added).
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Ultimately, jus cogens principles represent the most powerful,
compelling, and fundamental of expectations in a humane internal order.
As such, they must necessarily involve duties among states to respect
and protect these principles. Rules which truly express foundational
norms are essential for the evolution and progress of world public order
and must therefore be guarded by members of this order. In the end,
giving effect tojus cogens norms would be "a step further in strengthen-
ing international law, by underlining the great importance of these
principles and by recognizing that derogation from them constitute[s] a
great danger to the international community as a whole and to the
effectiveness of international law in international relations."7
2. The Genocide Convention Codifies the Jus Cogens Prohibition
Against Genocide, as well as the Corollary
Obligations Which Flow from This Prohibition
a. The Prohibition Against Genocide Is the Quintessential
Example of a Jus Cogens Norm
There is overwhelming evidence to support the fact that genocide is
an act in violation of jus cogens principles. Both the preparatory work
behind the Genocide Convention and subsequent judicial and scholarly
opinion substantiate genocide's position among the most universally
condemned acts in international law. Its prohibition represents the
quintessehtial jus cogens norm, in conformity with the latter's function
as guardian of the most fundamental moral and legally essential princi-
ples in the international system.
Article I of the Genocide Convention confirms that genocide is a
crime under international law (that is to say, a crime for individuals) and
therefore clearly expresses the consensus of the U.N. General Assembly
concerning the codificatory nature of the document. Genocide has
always been prohibited by international law, according to the Pream-
ble.72 This interpretation is authoritatively supported by the U.S. Restate-
71. B. S. Murty, Jus Cogens in International Law, in CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS, supra
note 47, at 79, 111.
72. Before the Genocide Convention, genocide was considered to be a crime against
humanity under art. 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. Nigel S. Rodley, Human Rights and
Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 321,
322 (1989); see also Louis R. Beres, International Law, Personhood and Prevention of
Genocide, 11 Loy. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 25, 28 n.15 (1989) ("For as long as we have recog-
nized the validity of laws of land warfare, which is certainly since ancient times, genocidal
action against enemy nationals during wartime has been illegal").
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ment, which declares that the Genocide Convention "is generally accept-
ed for purposes of customary law. 73
That the Convention embodies a universally compelling principle is
further evidenced by its unanimous adoption and wide ratification. Work
on the Draft Convention was completed in only two years and was
adopted by the General Assembly without a dissenting vote as the
U.N.'s first major human rights instrument.74 Although there is some
differences of opinion, all were in favor of adopting the Convention.75
The collective resolve to formulate and adopt the Convention is repre-
sentative of the unequivocal abhorrence of genocide common to all
cultures and legal systems.
The ICJ itself made this universal condemnation and prohibition of
genocide concrete in its advisory opinion in Reservations to the Geno-
cide Convention:
The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the
United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as "a crime under
international law" ..... [T]he principles underlying the Convention
are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding
on States, even without any conventional obligation. A second
consequence is the universal character both of the condemnation of
genocide and of the co-operation required "in order to liberate
mankind from such an odious scourge" (Preamble to the Conven-
tion).76
This language invites the interpretation that the provisions of the Geno-
cide Convention move beyond customary law and acquire the character
of peremptory norms in light of the Convention's dual "universal char-
acter."
Following the adoption of the Genocide Convention, eminent jurists
considered the jus cogens character of the prohibition contained within
the treaty. Members of the ILC, in their discussion on the Vienna Con-
vention, stated that there are "obvious and best settled rules of jus
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702, cmt. d (1986); see also id. n.3.
74. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 27 (1960).
75. Id. It is also interesting to note that, as recently as 1988, there have been some
voices of dissent coming from the U.S. Senate, where ratification of the Genocide Convention
was hotly debated for several years. Even those in the minority who voted against ratification
in 1988 acknowledge that the prohibition of genocide "was a moral imperative and symboli-
cally important." LAWRENCE T. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CON-
VENTION 8 (1991).
76. Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. at 23.
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cogens," among them the prohibition against genocide.77 In 1976, the
ILC put forward its view that genocide is not only a crime under inter-
national law for individuals (per Article I of the Genocide Convention)
but also is an "international crime," that is, a crime for a state. The ILC
adopted on first reading Article 19(3)(c) of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, reiterating its view that "international law now in force
includes obligations of essential importance for safeguarding the human
being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide, and apartheid. 75
Similarly, the U.S. Restatement lists the prohibition against genocide as
an example of jus cogens.79 Finally, there is substantial consensus
among individual scholars that the prohibition against genocide consti-
tutes one of the few uncontested peremptory norms. 80
b. The Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Are Central to the
Genocide Convention, as Evidenced by the
Travaux Priparatoires and Opinio Juris
It is perhaps axiomatic at this point to state that the rules of jus
cogens are those rules which derive from principles that the legal con-
science of humankind deems essential to coexistence in the international
community. The prohibition against genocide, as one of the most estab-
lished of peremptory norms, represents the wish of the collective legal
and moral conscience to condemn and suppress an act which is the
antithesis of coexistence. As its aim is to exterminate whole populations,
including whole peoples, the act of genocide not only violates the
sanctity of life, but also undermines the international system itself by
systematically destroying its constituent parts. It was in recognition of
this reality that the Member States of the newly formed U.N. sought, as
the organization's first major achievement, to draft a convention that
would consolidate international action against this "odious scourge."
77. Law of Treaties, in Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work
of its Fifteenth Session, [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 198-199, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1963/Add.1 (discussing draft art. 37, which became art. 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention).
Sir Humphrey Waldock also cites "conspicuous instances of treaties that are void by reason of
their inconsistency with a jus cogens rule," including genocide. Sir Humphrey Waldock,
Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 36, 53, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/156 and Add. 1-3.
78. 1976 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 67, at 95 (art. 19(3)(c))
(emphasis omitted).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702,
cmt. d and n.3.
80. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 49, at 515;
Stanislaw E. Nahlik, Jus Cogens and the Codified Law of Treaties, 33-36 TEMIs: REVISTA DE
CIENCIA Y T9CNICA JURfDICAS 85, 102 (1973).
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That the Genocide Convention's objective was to initiate action against
genocide rather than simply to codify symbolic international condemna-
tion of it is demonstrated in the Preamble and in Article I:
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an
odious scourge, international co-operation is required, [the State
Parties]
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:
Article I
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."'
In the words of Raphael Lemkin, the lawyer who coined the term
"genocide" and who was the prime mover behind the development of
the Genocide Convention, by declaring genocide a crime under interna-
tional law and by ensconcing it in the sphere of international concern,
"the right of intervention on behalf of minorities slated for destruction
has'been established .... The usefulness of a future international treaty
on genocide lies in facilitating the prevention and punishment of the
crime and apprehension of criminals. 8 2 While it is clear that suppres-
sion of genocide is an integral component of the Genocide Convention,
the content of that obligation remains to be elucidated. For this purpose,
it is necessary to examine the travaux as well as scholarly opinion and
judicial statements on the matter.
The ICJ and the U.S. war crimes tribunal confirmed the status of
Resolution 96(1) of the General Assembly, the Convention's point of
conception, as the authoritative pronouncement on the status of genocide
as a component of customary international law.83 The resolution, adopt-
ed unanimously, stressed that "international co-operation be organized
between States with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and
81. Genocide Convention, supra note 11, preamble and art. 1.
82. Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
145, 150 (1947).
83. See Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. at 23; United States v.
Alstoetler, in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
954, 979 (1951) (stating that the General Assembly is "the most authoritative organ in
existence for the interpretation of world opinion. The General Assembly's recognition of
genocide as an international crime [in Resolution 96(I)] is persuasive evidence of the fact").
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punishment of the crime of genocide .. . ."" The use of U.N. mecha-
nisms to this end was introduced later in Article XII of the Secretary-
General's Draft Convention: "The State Parties are to do everything in
their power to give full effect to the intervention of the United Na-
tions. ' 5 The commentary to the Secretariat's draft explains that Article
XII was intended to facilitate preventive action by the U.N. "before the
harm is done or before it has assumed wide proportions. ' 6 However, it
is also clear from the draft, according to Professor Matthew Lippman,
that Article XII was "intended to supplement, rather than to preempt, the
application of other mechanisms of prevention, suppression and redress.
The draft text specified that Article XII was applicable 'irrespective of
any provision in the foregoing articles."'' 7 It is necessary, then, to take
note of the "other mechanisms" that exist in the Convention.
During the General Assembly's consideration of the Genocide
Convention, Gerald Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom stressed that the
Convention involved not only rights for peoples but also obligations on
governments - not only toward their own peoples, but also toward
other states.88 It is obvious that the implementation and enforcement of
domestic legislation criminalizing acts of genocide (Article V) fulfills
the internal obligation of a government to its people. It is equally obvi-
ous, therefore that individual state governments have the affirmative
obligation to prevent genocide within their own borders. Fitzmaurice's
comment, however, displays an acknowledgment of the existence of
"international" acts of genocide, that is, genocidal acts of one state
against the people of another. Consistent with the nature of the prohibi-
tion against genocide as jus cogens, the affirmative obligation to prevent
it extends beyond a state's territorial boundaries. The awareness of the
necessarily nonterritorial quality to the suppression of genocide was also
recognized in the General Assembly's discussion; for example, Mr.
Perez Perozo of Venezuela stressed that the "signatory States would
pledge themselves to prevent and punish genocide whenever it was
committed and in whatever conditions."8 9 The question of the
nonterritorial applicability of the Genocide Convention was raised in
connection with the draft: "[I]t was the opinion of the Secretary-General
84. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(I), at 189 (1946).
85. Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess. at 23, U.N.
Doc. E/447 (Readex 1947) [hereinafter Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide].
86. Id. at 45.
87. Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMPLE INT'L CoMp. L.J. 1, 66 (1994).
88. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th mtg. at 838, U.N. Doc. A/760, A/760/Corr.2 (1948).
89. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., I10th mtg. at 504 (1948).
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and the experts involved that universality of repression seemed to have
been the intention of the General Assembly's Resolution 96(l)." 90
Universality of application was eventually abandoned in the final
text of the Convention (Articles VI and VII), but only with respect to
punishment. This was due to the fear that the sovereign rights of a state
would be abused by permitting a foreign state's court to punish acts
committed outside its territory or by foreigners. 9' This fear further
resulted in the formation of the international Nuremberg tribunal and
continues to reappear in the call for an international criminal court. The
abandonment of universal application with respect to punishment, how-
ever, does not affect the universal preventative aspect of the Genocide
Convention, preserved in the adopted wording of Article I, as evidenced
by the statements of Fitzmaurice and Perez.
Statements by the ICJ in Reservations to the. Genocide Convention
and in Barcelona Traction strengthen this position of universal applica-
tion with regard to prevention. In the former case, the ICJ noted "the
clearly universal character of the United Nations under whose auspices
the Convention was concluded and the very wide degree of participa-
tion"9 envisaged by the Convention. It further specified that, in this
Convention, "the States do not have any interests of their own; they
merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplish-
ment of those high purposes which are the raison d'etre of the conven-
tion. As the Convention contains no restriction on universal applica-
tion of the prevention of genocide, as it does for punishment in Articles
VI and VII, the ICJ lends credence to the position that the preventative
"high purpose" is to be universally accomplished, irrespective of any
self-interest. Furthermore, the Court has clearly given further support to
this interpretation by ascribing to genocide erga omnes obligations in
Barcelona Traction.94
Despite the overriding purpose of the Genocide Convention to
prevent the recurrence of genocide, the only explicit provision to this
90. ROBINSON, supra note 74, at 31. See also Draft Convention on the Crime of Geno-
cide, supra note 85, at 18.
91. ROBINSON, supra note 74, at 31.
92. Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. at 21.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32. While, as already noted, erga omnes is not
equivalent to jus cogens, Meron has noted that the ICJ perhaps intended its particular exam-
ples of erga omnes norms to be jus cogens examples as well: "[tlhe examples of basic human
rights mentioned by the Court, protection from slavery and racial discrimination, may well
reflect the Court's conception of jus cogens norms which it did not explicitly articulate."
MERON, supra note 58, at 194. The examples of "basic rights" in the judgment included
genocide and aggression which, a fortiori, must be caught by Meron's comment.
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effect apart from Article I is contained in Article VIII, which allows a
state to "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take
such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.
95
However, prevention is also implicit in the deterrent effect of the pro-
visions relating to punishment. Given, inter alia, the clear reference in
Article I to the duty of states to prevent genocide, given the commen-
tary by and intentions of State Parties, given the negotiating history of
Article VIII's precursor (draft Article XII), and given dicta by the ICJ,
Article VIII cannot be construed as elucidating the only means by which
genocide is to be prevented.96 That is to say, states are not entitled to
take the view that their duties to prevent genocide are met simply by
virtue of calling upon U.N. organs to act in accordance with Article
VIII; the generality of Article I and its positioning as the lead clause for
the entire treaty preclude such a restrictive position.
Yet while it could clearly be contended that prevention generally is
nonterritorial, the question of what specific measures are to be taken by
individual states remains to be answered. The alarming failure of U.N.
institutions to prevent genocide gives particular currency to this issue.
This ineptness was envisioned, ironically enough, by the Yugoslav
representative at the Sixth Committee discussion of the Draft Conven-
tion. The former Yugoslavia was one of the few states to abstain from
voting on the Draft Convention, based on the belief that "the draft was
not sufficiently strong and that, as a result, it would prove ineffective in
combatting genocide. 9
7
Given the lack of specific, substantive provisions dealing with
preventative action, therefore, the answer to the question of individual
states' obligations to prevent genocide perhaps cannot be found within
the black letter of the Convention and must be sought in the realm of
purposive treaty interpretation, including the interpretive effect of jus
cogens norms which exist parallel to the treaty.
95. Genocide Convention, supra note 11, art. VIII.
96. This does not mean that art. VIII is devoid of all relevance for this case. Rather, it
will be argued infra part III.B.2 that it should be taken as an important interpretive baseline
for the ICJ in determining both its jurisdiction in cases brought before it under art. IX and its
scope of "review" once jurisdiction has been established.
97. Lippman, supra note 87, at 53. The Yugoslav representative, Mr. Kacijan, regretted
that his delegation had to refuse to vote for a text which fell short of achieving the "real aim
of the convention, namely, the prevention of genocide." U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess.,
133d mtg. at 707 (1948). That the Convention fell short in the view of one of the delegates
does not mean that the text, purposively interpreted in light of evolving customary norms, is
not conducive to an interpretation that includes significant preventative elements.
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c. Properly Interpreted, the Genocide Convention Must Necessarily
Codify the Universal Obligation Under General
International Law to Prevent Genocide.
As has been shown, the principles underlying the Convention are
principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on states,
even without any conventional obligation. The universal character of
both the condemnation of genocide and the cooperation required "to
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge" gives rise to a distinctly
universal obligation to prevent it - an obligation towards the interna-
tional community as a whole rather than simply vis-A-vis another state,
as in the field of diplomatic protection.9" At this highest level of
ddoublementfonctionnel, states must consolidate their efforts and take
preventative action on behalf of the community as a whole before
genocide occurs, or at the very least, before it takes its final, annihilistic
toll. As Shabtai Rosenne affirms, "the ICJ has established the jus cogens
duty of all States to cooperate in the suppression of genocide."99 It
would seem, therefore, that in addition to the duty of a state to prevent
genocide within its own borders, there is the duty of all states to take
action against perpetrators of genocide in other states, in fulfillment of
their "duty owed to the international community as a whole."
In order to reach this conclusion, it is necessary to make use of
tools of treaty interpretation and developing doctrine on humanitarian,
notably human rights, treaties in particular. The humanitarian object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention and the international community's
desire to ensure universal protection from genocide dictate that the
Convention should be accorded a broad and purposive interpretation.
The principle of effectiveness as well as the integrity of the treaty must
be considered in the process of interpretation. A rigid or textualist
approach to the treaty would be inconsistent with the 1969 Vienna
Convention, which requires that the terms of the treaty be assessed "in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose."' ° This is espe-
cially so in the case of a treaty with a purely humanitarian purpose,
where a noncontextual approach may fail to "contribute to the fulfilment
of an inclusive or common interest in the maintenance of minimum
98. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 47.
99. Summary Records of the Fifteenth Session, 685th mtg., [1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 74, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1963/Add.1 (emphasis added).
100. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45. art. 31.
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world order."'' The Inter-American Human Rights Court endorsed this
approach to interpretation of human rights documents in Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, wherein it stated that "the 'ordinary' meaning of terms
cannot of itself become the sole rule, for it must always be considered
in light of the object and purpose of the treaty."' 02 As a result, courts
must interpret such documents in order "to give effect to the objectives
of the [human rights treaty], for it does not advance the protection of the
individual's basic human rights and freedoms" to do otherwise. 103
Several members of the ICJ also have emphasized the necessity of
according a broad, purposive interpretation to human rights treaties. In
Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the majority of the Court
observed that the Genocide Convention embodied principles of natural
law that transcend particularistic state interests. Such principles guide
any interpretation of the Convention:
The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The
Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and
civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention
that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its
object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain
human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most
elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the con-
tracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely
have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment
of those high purposes which are the raison d'etre of the conven-
tion .... The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide,
101. W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold
War World. Practices, Conditions and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER 26, 45 (Lori F. Damrosch and David J. Scheffer eds., 1991). Note that this favorable
citation of Prof. Reisman on the normative issue must be read with the understanding that
Prof. Reisman has different views from those expressed in this Memorial on the institutional
question of the role of the Court. See infra part III.A.3 (discussing Reisman's work).
102. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa
Rica, 1984 Inter-Am. Court H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, at para. 23 (Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of
Jan. 19). See generally Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American
Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L LAW 1 (1985); see also Effect of Reservations on the
Entry into Force of the American Convention, 1982 Inter-Am. Court H.R. (ser. A) No. 2, at
para. 29 (Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24) (stipulating that the traditional concept of
reciprocity is irrelevant for the application and interpretation of human rights instruments in
that "[m]odern human rights treaties in general ... are not multilateral treaties of the tradi-
tional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights"). Consequently, the
purposes of the treaty are to be emphasized and the travaux made less important than in the
context of other treaties.
103. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, 1984 Inter-Am Court H.R. at para. 26.
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by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and
measure for all its provisions.""
Indeed, this Convention may be the example of a purely humanitarian
treaty as well as the quintessential case of a jus cogens norm; in their
joint dissenting opinion in Reservations to the Genocide Convention,
Justices Guerrero, McNair, Read, and Mo noted that "the enormity of
the crime of genocide can hardly be exaggerated, and any treaty for its
repression deserves the most generous initerpretation. ' ' Beyond the
necessary focus on the interpretive implications of the humanitarian
content of a multilateral treaty like the Genocide Convention, these
implications are reinforced when a treaty is categorized as dealing with
the public interest of the world community as a whole. In general,
multilateral conventions created in recognition of world-communitarian
interests in international law are markedly different from ordinary mul-
tilateral conventions. As Judge Alvarez has stated in a now classic
passage:
To begin with, they have a universal character; they are, in a sense,
the Constitution of international society, the new international
constitutional law. They are not established for the benefit of
private interests but for that of the general interest; they impose
obligations upon States without granting them rights, and in this
respect are unlike ordinary multilateral conventions which confer
rights as well as obligations upon their parties. H
It is thus clear from Reservations to the Genocide Convention that
considerations of sovereignty and the reciprocity of sovereign wills in
the usual course of international relations must cede to more pressing,
imperative obligations in the human rights context. The case of geno-
cide, then, as the most egregious of such human rights violations, dic-
tates particularly strong considerations of effectiveness and pur-
posiveness as interpretive principles.
104. Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. at 23 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 47 (dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read, and Mo).
106. Id. at 51 (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez) (emphasis added). There is a remark-
able similarity between Alvarez's approach to this species of universal treaties and the
approach of the Inter-American Human Rights Court to human rights treaty interpretation.
Interstate reciprocity of rights and obligations cannot serve as the baseline for interpretive
principles or application of those principles.
Note also that Judge Tanaka has similarly pointed to the need for effectiveness in
dealing with humanitarian treaties, stating in South West Africa that "[t]here must be no legal
vacuum in the protection of human rights." South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S.
Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 298 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka).
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B. States Have a Duty to Prevent the Genocide
Occurring in Bosnia
Article I of the Genocide Convention confirms "that genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which [parties] undertake to prevent and to punish.'' . 7
Thus, it is not simply the prohibition of genocide which is affirmed in
the Convention; rather, states have undertaken positive obligations to
prevent and punish genocide. It is, at a minimum, a delict in internation-
al law for states to fail to prevent and punish genocide. 8 Furthermore,
the failure to prevent and punish genocide would be an international
crime if the omission amounted to either conspiracy or complicity in the
genocide itself.
The extent of the duty to prevent genocide contained in Article I of
the Genocide Convention requires a broad interpretation, given the
Convention's object and purpose as an effective instrument in the elim-
ination of the "odious scourge" of genocide. The minimum content of
the duty to prevent genocide must be that a state has an obligation to
take positive action to stop genocide which is imminent or ongoing
within its territory or within territory subject to its control. Moreover,
the undertaking to prevent genocide arguably includes within it an
extraterritorial component even without the need to show general control
over territory other than that of the state.
Under a broad and purposive interpretation, the meaning of "pre-
vention" in the Genocide Convention must include a universal, collec-
107. Genocide Convention, supra note 11, art. I (emphasis added).
108. General principles of state responsibility would of course apply, including circum-
stances precluding wrongfulness. In particular, art. 23 of the Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility is applicable:
Article 23. Breach of an international obligation to prevent a given event
When the result required of a State by an international obligation is the prevention,
by means of its own choice, of the occurrence of a given event, there is a breach of
that obligation only if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve that
result.
1979 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 32, at 93.
This Memorial suggests that in order to breach a duty of prevention, a state's own
actions and omissions must be culpable (either through intention or negligence, presumably).
Duties of result, contrary to the opinion of some, are not to be equated with absolute respon-
sibility; the specific standard of-care associated with a given duty of result must always be
determined on a norm-by-norm basis. Thus, Bosnia would not be responsible for failing to
prevent Serbian genocidal practices, since the failure has not been caused "by the conduct
adopted" by Bosnia. Duly diligent efforts to prevent an event would not result in the breach
of an obligation under art. 23.
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tive obligation to suppress acts of genocide. As a jus cogens norm, the
prohibition against genocide cannot be perceived as applicable to only
the individual state within which genocide is being perpetrated. This is
particularly compelling in a world where genocidal acts often occur at
the hands of a government against its own citizens. If the "duty to
prevent" is restricted to the containment of genocide domestically, then
systematic extermination of a people would go normatively unchecked.
Such an absurd result would be contrary to both the spirit of the Con-
vention and to its characterization as a (perhaps the) fundamental human
rights instrument, as well as antithetical to basic rules of human rights
treaty interpretation, as discussed above. It follows, therefore, that there
must exist some element of collective action within the definition of
prevention.
As the object of the Genocide Convention is ultimately to protect
people against extermination, the treaty must be interpreted with a view
to individuals as subjects of international law. The doctrinal field of
human rights has forced the international system to query the notion of
the state as the supreme actor in international law.' °9 Consequently,
territorial boundaries lose rigidity, and the human family becomes a
focus of international attention. Assumptions about treaty interpretation,
the role of states, and the function of judicial institutions require concep-
tual rethinking and doctrinal adjustments in the context of human
rights.1"° Treaty interpretation must therefore achieve effectiveness
relative to its subject; an obligation owed to the "international communi-
ty as a whole," such as the jus cogens duty to prevent genocide, requires
that states protect individual communities against genocide, regardless of
territorial boundaries.
1. States Have a Positive Obligation to Intervene or Offer
Assistance to Prevent the Genocide in Bosnia
While a state clearly has an obligation to prevent genocide within its
territory, this is not the sole purpose of Article I of the Genocide Con-
vention. Nowhere in the Genocide Convention is a state's duty to pre-
vent genocide expressly limited to its territory or to persons within its
jurisdiction.' This fact distinguishes the Genocide Convention from
other international human rights instruments. For example, the Interna-
109. "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory
was never matched by reality." An Agenda for Peace, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/47/277 (Readex 1992).
110. Thomas Buergenthal, supra note 102, at 26.
111. See supra part I.
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly limits the scope
of the undertaking "to respect and to ensure" the rights therein recog-
nized "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion." ' 12 The absence of such a potentially restrictive aspect to the
undertaking clause reflects the importance of the prevention of genocide
to the international community and the understanding, stated in the third
preambular paragraph of the Convention, that international cooperation
is required in order to prevent genocide effectively.
In particular, the third preambular paragraph of the Secretary-Gen-
eral's Draft Convention is illuminating on this point."13 In the draft, the
parties "pledge themselves to prevent and to repress such acts wherever
they may occur."' 1 4 That the duty to prevent genocide was moved from
the Preamble to a justiciable obligation in Article I strengthens this
interpretation.
With respect to an affirmative duty to prevent genocide, however, it
is not necessary on the facts at hand to decide whether an independent
right of unilateral "humanitarian intervention" exists under the Genocide
Convention or customary international law. Indeed, a lesser affirmative
duty of a conventional nature can be argued for in accordance with a
vigorously purposive interpretation of Article I of the Genocide Conven-
tion. If the representative government of a state in which the population
is the victim of genocide requests assistance necessary to prevent geno-
cide within its territory, it is submitted that states, under the Genocide
Convention, would be obligated to respond to this request if they are,
materially, in a position to do so.
An interpretation of the duty to prevent as the duty to respond to the
victim of a breach of a jus cogens norm can be derived from a progres-
sive interpretation of the law of nonrecognition as it has developed in
recent decades." 5 Such an interpretation would involve viewing states'
"duty not to recognize" as, at least in some contexts of utmost necessity,
an affirmative "duty to deny recognition" to circumstances furthered by
violations of the norm. In the terms in which current ILC Special Rap-
porteur Arangio-Ruiz has touched on this issue, there is a hint that the
112. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2(1), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
113. Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 85, at 5.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)
(Advisory Opinion), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 54-56 (June 21) (discussing principle of nonrecognition)
[hereinafter Namibia]; see also JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
132-63 (1987).
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duty of nonrecognition can entail positive duties: "The Special Rappor-
teur drew attention to the problem of obligations to react on the part of
injured states. Foremost among them was ... the duty of non-recogni-
tion. ' 1
6
It is clear from the 1992, 1993, and 1994 Annual Reports of the
ILC to the General Assembly that the draft articles proposed by the
former Special Rapporteur Riphagen on Part II of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility have relatively little presumptive weight in the mind
of the new Rapporteur and perhaps the ILC as a whole. Nevertheless,
the form in which former Special Rapporteur Riphagen phrased the
duties of all states in response to an international crime like genocide in
his proposed article 14(2) is suggestive:
An international crime committed by a State entails an obligation
for every other State: (a) not to recognize as legal the situation
created by such a crime; and (b) not to render aid or assistance to
the State which has committed such crime in maintaining the
situation created by such a crime; and (c) to join other states in
affording mutual assistance in carrying out the obligations under
subparagraphs (a) and (b).' 7
If the duty of nonrecognition amounts to a duty to deny recognition, and
if some states are denying recognition, inter alia, by lawfully assisting
the victim state (or state seeking to protect the victims) through the
provision of arms, then it could be said that other states have a positive
duty within the logic of subparagraph (c) affirmatively to join that effort
of mutual assistance.
2. In the Alternative, States Have a Duty to Refrain from Interfering
with Cooperative Efforts to Prevent the Genocide in Bosnia
In the alternative, the norm suggested by Article 14(2)(b) of the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, as well as the crisp reasoning of
Judge Lauterpacht in Bosnia v. Serbia II, quoted in the Introduction,
makes clear that even if the duty to prevent does not require every state,
individually, to take positive steps to prevent genocide within the territo-
ry of another state, it must at a minimum require states not to impede
116. State Responsibility, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Draft Articles on State Responsibility] (emphasis added). Note of course
that all states are "injured states" when a jus cogens norm is violated.
117. Willem Riphagen, Fifth Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of International
Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Articles), [1984] 2(l) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 4 (art.
14(2)), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/380.
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discretionary efforts by third party states to assist a state which is the
victim of genocide. This principle is the necessary corollary of the
sovereign right of a state whose population is the victim of genocide to
seek and receive assistance to prevent this crime and the corresponding
right of the requested state to provide such assistance. Such an interpre-
tation of "prevent" is consistent with a state's inherent right of self-
defense of its territorial integrity, political independence, and popula-
tion. B The duty not to interfere with another state's consent-based
intervention to prevent genocide is concomitant with the duty to refrain
from complicity in genocide." 9 Furthermore, this approach to noninter-
118. See infra part H.A.
119. On complicity as a general principle of state responsibility, see State Responsibility,
in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirtieth Session, 1978
2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 74, 99-104, A/CN.4/SER.AI1978/Add.l (Part 2) [hereinafter 1978
Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
Article 27 reads:
Aid or assistance by a State to another State, if it is established'that it is rendered
for the commission of an internationally wrongful act, carried out by the latter,
itself constituted an internationally wrongful act, even if, taken alone, such aid or
assistance would not constitute the breach of an interational obligation.
id. at 99. The commentary by the ILC on art. 27 extensively relies on the example of the
provision of weapons to other states engaged in international crimes such as genocide or
aggression, including a reference to a note written by Elihu Lauterpacht (later Judge
Lauterpacht) that argued that the key element in State X's complicity in State Y's illegal use
of arms was knowledge of the use to which the arms would be put. See id. at 99-104; Elihu
Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International
Law: Survey and Comment, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 514 (1958). The ILC distills its discussion
of doctrine and practice into the following statement of two key elements in complicity
through aid or assistance: "(a) the aid or assistance must have the effect of making it materi-
ally easier for the State receiving the aid or assistance in question to commit an international-
ly wrongful act; [and] (b) the aid or assistance must have been rendered with intent to
facilitate the commission of that internationally wrongful act by another .... 1978 Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, supra, at 104 (emphasis in the original). The ILC com-
mentary contains some tensions in terms of how it understands these material and mental
elements of complicity. However, two passages suggest art. 27 complicity is triggered in a
situation such as that of the case at bar, where blocking arms to d victim of genocide can be
viewed as an indirect provision of arms to the perpetrator of the genocide if the party
blocking the arms has knowledge of the use to which the blocked arms would be put by the
victim and of the use to which the military advantage is being put by the perpetrator. The first
of these two passages speaks to the material element: "The aid or assistance provided may
consist in the provision of material means, but there can also be aid or assistance of a legal or
political nature such as the conclusion of a treaty that may facilitate the commission by the
other party of an internationally wrongful act." Id. at 102. The words "aid or assistance of a
legal or political nature" are clearly capable of covering an embargo on another state as a
form of assistance to a state acting unlawfully. Nowhere does the ILC require that direct
material aid is necessary to trigger complicity, only that the assistance make it, per element
(b), "materially easier" for the perpetrator to commit the unlawful act. The second of the two
passages makes clear that the mental element of "intent to facilitate" includes "knowledge of
the specific purpose for which the State receiving certain supplies intends to use them." Id. at
103. States that blocked arms to Bosnia knew, at a certain point, that Serbia and the Bosnian
Serbs intended to use the military advantage that they were assisted in achieving for the
purpose of committing aggressive and genocidal acts.
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ference is consistent with the jus cogens status of genocide and the
incumbent obligation of nonrecognition and the obligation not to further
violations of jus cogens norms. Finally, to return to principles of treaty
interpretation, interpretation of a treaty with a human rights character
must actively seek to make the treaty protections effective and
nonillusory.120 This is limited only by the principle that the interpretation
in question does not produce a distortion in the possible meanings which
the text can bear. The interpretation of the "duty to prevent" as the duty
not to obstruct (or impede, frustrate, or preclude) others from preventing
or others from assisting in the prevention is not such a distortion of
Article I's ordinary language. Indeed, it is arguably a minimalist inter-
pretation when compared to more wide-ranging interpretations that could
be advanced, such as a duty to prevent through humanitarian interven-
tion (an interpretation which itself would not necessarily distort the text
of Article I).
II. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS THAT MAINTAIN THE ARMS
EMBARGO FETTER THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN A MANNER
Ultra Vires THE, SECURITY COUNCIL
A. Aggression and the Content of the Right of Self-Defense
It is the position of Bosnia that, at least up to the point that the
Government of Serbia purported to seal the border between Serbia and
Bosnia, Serbia has been responsible for acts of aggression against the
territory and population of Bosnia'. Both by transferring units of the
Yugolav People's Army (JNA) to Bosnian Serb forces and by continu-
ously providing material and logistical support to such forces, Serbia has
Lastly, it should be noted that in drawing on the doctrine of complicity to interpret
art. l's "duty to prevent" genocide, the argument has avoided taking the position that complic-
ity in genocide equates to genocide itself. The ILC states in this regard:
The conduct of a State which supplies, for example, weapons or other means to
another State in order to facilitate the commission of an act of aggression or
genocide by that other State does not necessarily, and in every case, constitute
conduct that can also be classified as aggression or genocide .... [T]he determina-
tion of such equivalence can only be a question of degree, since in the final
analysis it depends on a variety of factors and above all, on the extent and serious-
ness of the aid or assistance actually furnished to the author of the principal
wrongful act.
Id. at 103-04. While it need not be contended that states maintaining the arms embargo
themselves committed genocide, the assistance provided to Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs has
been of such a degree that at minimum it amounts to a failure to prevent genocide.
120. On this principle, see J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 98-122 (1993).
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maintained the international character of the Bosnian conflict, thereby
engaging the right to individual and collective self-defense as recognized
by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that "[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations ....
The facts of Serbia's involvement in the Bosnian conflict demon-
strate such a degree of forceful intervention that it is impossible not to
conclude that an "armed attack" has occurred against Bosnian territory
for which Serbia is internationally responsible. Nonetheless, it may be of
assistance to address two issues related to the application of the right of
self-defense to this case. First is the question of whether Serbia's inter-
vention constitutes an armed attack, that is, whether Serbia's involve-
ment in support of Bosnian Serb forces is substantial enough or other-
wise of sufficient gravity to meet the threshold of aggression, thereby
justifying the disregard by the victim state of the general prohibition on
the international use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter.
Second, the content and boundaries of the right of self-defense must be
considered in light of the circumstances of the conflict. It is the position
of Bosnia that the support provided by Serbia to Bosnian Serb forces is
sufficient to engage Bosnia's right of self-defense, even in light of the
decision of the ICJ in Nicaragua,122 and that Bosnia was justified in
taking all measures, on an individual or collective basis, which are
necessary and proportionate to counter Serbia's intervention.
1. Serbia Has Committed an Illegal Use of Force, Which Constitutes
Aggression and an "Armed Attack" Against Bosnia
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits states from using force
against the political independence or territorial integrity of other states.
Although the boundaries of the categorization are controversial, serious
violations of the principle of nonuse of force amount to "aggression" or
"armed attack."' 2 3 After extensive negotiation, the General Assembly
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
122. In Nicaragua, the Court concluded that, although Salvadoran rebel forces may have
received some support from the Nicaraguan Government and may have made use of Nicara-
guan territory in their conflict with the Government of El Salvador, the involvement of
Nicaragua was not sufficient to give rise to a right to take collective self-defense action
against the territory and government of Nicaragua. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 4.
123. A distinction between "aggression" and "armed attack" is of questionable cogency.
In particular, the equally authoritative French. text of art. 51 of the U.N. Charter substitutes
the phrase "agression armde" for "armed attack." See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D.
WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 51-52 (1992).
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adopted Resolution 3314 (Definition of Aggression), which is generally
regarded as declaratory of the meaning of aggression in customary
international law. Since it was intended to serve as a guide to the Se-
curity Council in the exercise of its functions regarding the maintenance
and restoration of international peace and security, the Definition of
Aggression does not purport to be exhaustive. In particular, the discre-
tion of the Security Council to determine other acts which constitute
aggression is recognized. 2 4 Aggression is also an international crime
under Article 12 of the ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind.
25
a. By Transferring Units of the JNA to the Bosnian Serb Forces,
Serbia Committed an Act of Aggression Against Bosnia
On May 4, 1992, Serbia purported to renounce authority over units
of the JNA which remained in Bosnia, without the consent of the
Bosnian Government. Yet the Security Council recognized the ongoing
interference by JNA units, leading it to adopt certain provisions in
Resolution 752 on May 15, 1992, demanding that Bosnia's neighbors
immediately cease all forms of interference in Bosnia, including by JNA
units, and that those units of the JNA within Bosnia be withdrawn,
placed under the control of the Bosnian Government, or disbanded and
disarmed. 126 Serbia failed to comply with these demands, leading the
Security Council to return to this matter on May 30, 1992, in Resolution
757.127 Noting that Serbia had not complied with the demands of Reso-
lution 752, the Security Council adopted a comprehensive embargo
against Serbia under its Chapter VII powers. 2
8
124. See G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg. at 3 (art. 4), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3314 (Readex 1975) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression] ("The acts enumerat-
ed above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute
agression under the provisions of the Charter").
125. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of the
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Fortieth Session, [1988] 2(2) Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 55, 71-73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1988/Add.I (Part 2) [hereinafter 1988
Draft Code].
126. S.C. Res. 752, supra note 7.
127. S.C. Res. 757, supra note 7.
128. S.C. Res. 757 states:
The Security Council ...
1. Condemns the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to take
effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752(1992) ...
3. Decides that all States shall adopt the measures set out below, which shall apply
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By placing these units of the JNA at the disposal of Bosnian Serb
forces, Serbia committed an act of aggression against Bosnia, an act
which continues to the present, due to the noncompliance of Serbia with
Security Council Resolution 752.129 Article 3(e) of the Definition of
Aggression confirms that "[t]he use of armed forces of one State which
are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the re-
ceiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond
the termination of the agreement,"' 130 constitutes an act of aggression.
Bosnia did not consent to the continued presence of these units in
Bosnia, much less to their transfer to the Bosnian Serbs. This prohibited
action also constitutes an international crime against peace, as recog-
nized in the ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind.' 3' Serbia is internationally responsible for this act of ag-
gression and for the subsequent conduct of these JNA units in Bosnia, in
particular with respect to the commission of genocide. 13 2
b. Serbia Has Committed Further Acts of Aggression Against Bosnia
Through Its Proxy Forces, the Bosnian Serbs
Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression prohibits, as an act of
aggression, "[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed
above, or its substantial involvement therein."'' 33 The ICJ has recognized
until the Security Council decides that the authorities in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army
(JNA), have taken effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution
752(1992).
Id. at 3.
129. The extent of foreign involvement in this situation goes well beyond the more
limited training, funding, and arming that was determined by the ICJ in Nicaragua to fall
short of aggression (although it still constituted a prohibited use of force). Nicaragua, 1986
I.C.J. at 103.
130. Definition of Aggression, supra note 124, at 3 (art. 3(c)).
131. Doudou Thiam, Seventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, [1989] 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 81, 86 (art.14(4)), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/419 and Add.l.
132. See 1979 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 32, at 91 (art. 9) ("The
conduct of an organ which has been placed at the disposal of a State by another State or by
an international organization shall be considered as an act of the former State under interna-
tional law, if that organ was acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority
of the State at whose disposal it has been placed").
133. Definition of Aggression, supra note 124, at 3 (art. 3(g)).
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that Article 3(g) reflects customary international law. 34 Article 8 of the
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, regarding actions taken "on
behalf of' a state, confirms the general applicability of this type of
"agency" responsibility in international law.'35
Bosnian Serb forces have been armed and supported by the Gov-
ernment of Serbia; they have made use of Serbian territory to coordinate
their strategic movements; and the Government of Serbia has tolerated
and actively participated in the recruitment of irregular forces from the
Serbian population, as well as returned Bosnian Serbs from Belgrade to
the front to fight for "the Fatherland." These acts amount to the direct
sending of armed bands, groups, and irregulars. At minimum, they must
be taken to amount to "substantial involvement therein." 36 Serbia has
thereby continued to commit aggression against Bosnia.
c. In the Alternative to (b), the Continued Material, Logistical, and
Other Support Provided by Serbia to the Bosnian Serb Forces Consti-
tutes an Act of Aggression Against Bosnia
In the alternative, if the facts of Serbia's "substantial involvement"
in the sending of armed bands cannot be proved, or if Serbia's in-
volvement is found not to meet the particular wording of Article 3(g) of
the Definition of Aggression, it is submitted that the provision of arms
and other support to the Bosnian Serb forces nonetheless constitutes an
act of aggression against Bosnia. Such support clearly constitutes an
illegal military intervention amounting to a use of force in the internal
affairs of Bosnia. 137 It is Bosnia's contention that, in light of the scale of
the support and the gross detrimental impact it has had on the political
134. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
135. 1979 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 32, at 91 (art. 8).
136. This aspect of art. 3(g) was not explored by the majority in Nicaragua. But see
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 344 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel). See also YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 190 (1988) ("But when the overall policy
of the Arcadian Government discloses that it conspires with armed bands fighting against
Utopia, Arcadia is definitely committing an armed attack").
137. The prohibition of the use of force contained in art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, of
which the prohibition of military intervention is a component, has been recognized by the ILC
as a jus cogens norm. Law of Treaties, in Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 173, 246-47. General
Assembly resolutions have repeatedly affirmed the principle of nonforcible intervention. See,
e.g., G.A. Res. 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/193 (1948); G.A. Res. 290, U.N. Doc. A/1521 (1949);
G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966); G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations]. In addition, the ICJ recognized the illegality of intervention in
support of oppositional forces in another state in Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 4. Intervention is
recognized as a crime against peace by the ILC in the Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 17, 30 I.L.M. 1584 (1991).
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independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia, the provision of arms
and other support is of such a grave nature as to constitute an act of
aggression.
In Nicaragua, the ICJ recognized that the provision of support by a
state to opposition forces within a foreign state constituted prohibited
intervention in the affairs of the foreign state. The Court went on to
conclude that "acts constituting a breach of principle of non-intervention
will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, consti-
tute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in international rela-
tions."' 38 The prohibition on "sending armed bands" contained in Article
3(g) of the Definition of Aggression was also recognized as reflecting
customary international law, constituting an act of aggression which
raises the right of self-defense. However, the Court went on to draw a
distinction between the provision of support and the sending of armed
bands:
[Tihe Court does not believe that the concept of "armed attack"
includes not only acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a
significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of provi-
sion of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may
be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in
the internal or external affairs of other States.
39
Thus, the acts of the Nicaraguan Government were found to constitute a
breach of the prohibition on the use of force, yet they did not constitute
an "armed attack" sufficient to give rise to the right of collective self-
defense claimed by the U.S.
The distinction between the sending of armed bands and the provi-
sion of arms to such bands may have been warranted on the facts of
Nicaragua. However, this paragraph is open to the interpretation that the
provision of weapons or logistical or other support can never constitute
an "armed attack" or an act of aggression. Such an interpretation casts
an overly broad restriction on the right of self-defense. The question is
not whether the provision of weapons and other support is included in
the meaning of "armed attack" but whether it is necessarily excluded in
all cases. Given the magnitude of the Serbian support for the Bosnian
Serb forces, Serbia's direct interest in the conflict, and the Serbs' stated
goal of becoming part of a Greater Serbia, this provision of weapons
and support is tantamount to an armed attack on the territorial integrity
and political independence of Bosnia.
138. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 109-10.
139. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 10 (emphasis added).
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As Judge Schwebel noted in his dissenting opinion in Nicaragua,
the arming of insurgent forces, when coupled with other involvement,
could constitute aggression, particularly in the case of "pervasive and
prolonged support ... [which] has been a major, perhaps the critical,
factor in the transformation" of the nature and scale of the insurrec-
tion."o Judge Sir Robert Jennings echoed this position in his dissenting
opinion:
[T]he provision of arms may, nevertheless, be a very important
element in what might be thought to amount to armed attack,
where it is coupled with other kinds of involvement. Accordingly,
it seems to me that to say that the provisions of arms, coupled with
"logistical or other support" is not armed attack is going much too
far.14
1
The Court itself may not have intended to apply a rigid categorical
approach to the question of aggression. In Nicaragua, the Court noted
that the gravity of the breach of the principle of the nonuse of force was
significant, stating that "such activities may well constitute a breach of
the principle of the non-use of force and an intervention in the internal
affairs of a State, that is, a form of conduct which is certainly wrongful,
but is of lesser gravity than an armed attack."'' 42
If indeed it is the gravity of the armed intervention, rather than the
particular mode of its execution, which is determinative of the question
of whether aggression has been committed, by any reasonable standard
Serbia's actions amount to gross acts of aggression against Bosnia.
Serbia's intervention on the side of the Bosnian Serbs has been a deci-
sive factor in the unfolding of events in Bosnia. The JNA units provided
the Bosnian Serbs with an ongoing supply of arms and other support
that drastically shifted the balance of power between the factions within
Bosnia. This military support was given in direct contravention of the
terms of the U.N. arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, an embargo
which has been rigorously enforced against Bosnia. This one-sided
impact of the arms embargo makes Serbia's flagrant violations of it all
the more serious: the Bosnian Serbs received an advantage from Serbia
which could not be balanced by the Bosnian forces. The imbalance of
arms has been the critically decisive factor in the success of Serb and
Bosnian Serb military and genocidal activities.
140. Id. at 346 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
141. Id. at 543 (dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings).
142. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
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2. Bosnia Has an Inherent Right of Individual and Collective Self-
Defense to Respond to Serbian Aggression and Genocide
Self-defense is a concept common to all legal systems which, in
broad terms, "can be defined as a residual form of direct self-help
permitted to a private individual whenever timely intervention by the
centralized authority is impossible."'43 With the advent of the U.N.
Charter, and the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article
2(4), self-defense remained a legitimate basis upon which individual
states could use force outside of U.N. collective security actions. Given
the barriers to effective collective security inherent in the Charter sys-
tem, the scope of the right of self-defense is of fundamental significance
to the proper functioning of the modern international legal regime:
These primary rules, in order to work, must therefore be readily
perceivable, by people bearing the actual responsibility of govern-
ment, to reflect the practical requirements of the world in which
states must survive and conduct their affairs. It is not enough that
they be internally coherent: they must be intrinsically compel-
ling.'44
The customary right of self-defense preserved in Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter must be interpreted in light of Article 2(4). It should first
be noted that not all exercises of the right of self-defense involve the
use of force against the territory of another state but might involve
forcible measures strictly limited to the territory of a victim state re-
pulsing an attack, even where such an attack did not amount to an
"armed attack." The right of self-defense thus consists of two compo-
nents: the right of a state to take defensive measures within its own
territory and the right of a state to take measures involving the use of
force against the territory of an aggressor state. It is only the second
component which falls within Article 51, since the first component does
not involve a use of force prohibited under Article 2(4).
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter declares:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
143. ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 53
(1993).
144. John L. Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force
and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 137 (1987) (emphasis added).
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has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Coun-
cil and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 45
a. Bosnia Has an Inherent Right of Individual and Collective
Self-Defense to Secure Its Territorial Integrity
and Repel Serbian Aggression
There are two general schools of thought regarding the scope of the
right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter. Under the first, applied by
the ICJ in Nicaragua, states may only take actions in self-defense when
an "armed attack" has occurred. 146 Under the second, the phrase "if an
armed attack occurs" is not interpreted to restrict the customary right of
self-defense, which is understood to include the right to respond in self-
defense even to uses of force not sufficiently grave to amount to aggres-
sion. 147 Under either interpretation, Bosnia possesses the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defense to take necessary and propor-
tionate measures in response to Serbian aggression.
As argued above, Bosnia has been the victim of Serbian aggression
and thus of an "armed attack," even under the restrictive Nicaragua ap-
proach to self-defense, as a result of the transfer of JNA units to the
Bosnian Serb forces and continued provision of arms and other support
to the Bosnian Serb forces by Serbia. 148 Bosnia thus has the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense to take necessary and
proportionate measures to secure its territorial integrity and political
independence. Such measures in this case could include: the reception of
arms and other military aid from other states, including direct foreign
145. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
146. The Court left open the question of anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent
armed attack. As indicated already, the Court assimilated the concepts of "armed attack" and
"aggression;" the French text reads "aggression armde." See supra note 123.
147. This view is adopted by Judge Schwebel in his dissent in Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at
348. See also Claud Humphrey Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 495 (1952-1l); JULIUS STONE, AGGRES-
SION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION
(1958); Reisman, supra note 101; DEREK W. BOWETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1958); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINE P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961);
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984).
148. See supra part II.A.1.
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armed involvement; the neutralizing of Serbian intervention; the reasser-
tion of control over the territory of Bosnia; and the prevention of further
Serbian interference in its affairs, including necessary strikes against
Serb supply lines, bases, and command centers within Serbian territory.
If, however, Serbian involvement is held not to constitute an "armed
attack" due to a restrictive interpretation of that term, it is submitted that
Bosnia nonetheless has the right to take necessary and proportionate
measures within its inherent right of self-defense. It must be noted that
Article 51 of the Charter does not define the right of self-defense;
rather, it is declaratory in nature. Even if dispositive weight were given
to the term "armed attack" in Article 51, it is fallacious logic to suggest
that the declaration "[n]othing in this Charter shall impair . . . until an
armed attack occurs" implies that something in the Charter in fact does
impair the right of self-defense in situations short of an armed attack.149
An overly textual approach to the phrase "armed attack" in Article
51 cannot be supported:
Article 51, as is well known, was not inserted for the purpose
of defining the individual right of self-defence but of clarifying the
position in regard to collective understandings for mutual self-
defence, particularly the Pan-American treaty known as the Act of
Chapultepec. These understandings are concerned with defence
against external aggression and it was natural for Article 51 to be
related to defence against "attack." Article 51 also has to be read
in the light of the fact that it is part of Chapter VII. It is concerned
with defence to grave breaches of the peace which are appropriate-
ly referred to as armed attack. It would be a misreading of the
whole intention of Article 51 to interpret it by mere implication as
forbidding forcible self-defence in resistance to an illegal use of
force not constituting an "armed attack."' 50
This approach was adopted by Professor Schachter in interpreting the
interrelation between Article 51 and Article 2(4).' The significance of
149. Prof. McDougal suggests that the right to use force in self-defense was implicitly
preserved by art. 51. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 147, at 235-36 ("The unilateral
use of force or similar coercive measures is not authorized or admitted. The use of arms in
legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired").
150. Waldock, Regulation of the Use of Force, supra note 147, at 496-97, cited in
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 348 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
151.
The main interpretive difficulty with this is that the words "if an armed attack
occurs" then become redundant, a conclusion which should not be reached without
convincing evidence that such redundant use was in keeping with the drafters
intention. The link with the Chapultepec Treaty provides a reason for the inclusion
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the term "armed attack" to the scope of the right of self-defense under
the Charter system is further eroded by the fact that the U.N. has not
attempted to define "armed attack" but has instead undertaken an ex-
tensive process to agree on a definition of "aggression."
Thus, the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" was not intended to
restrict the scope of the right of self-defense by limiting it to a rigid
category of response to an armed attack. The form which an attack takes
should not determine what sort of response is lawful under the U.N.
system.1 52 Rather, it is the seriousness of the threat to the security of a
state, coupled with the principles of necessity and proportionality, which
should determine what level of response is appropriate. It would be
unfruitful to search for evidence in the practice of states that refrain
from exercising necessary action in "self-defense" when their funda-
mental security concerns were imminently threatened, even in situations
short of "armed attack."
State practice following the adoption of the Charter, however,
supports the proposition that, in some circumstances where force, partic-
ularly indirect force, is used against a state, forcible measures against
the territory of the attacking state are not justified. The proper explana-
tion for this restraint from armed response is that it is not strictly nec-
essary in all cases. Intervention, for example, is not contained in the
Definition of Aggression, although if forcibly exercised, intervention
will constitute a prohibited use of force; however, in many if not all
cases, intervention may be countered by completely internal, self-de-
fensive measures. If a state, in responding to acts of forcible interven-
tion, responded with force against the territory of another state, such
action would not constitute an exercise of the right of self-defense if
wholly internal measures would have been sufficient to repulse the
intervention; rather, by disproportionately responding to the intervention,
the victim state itself would be responsible for an unlawful use of force.
Although in many situations, of which the facts of Nicaragua are
particularly representative, an alleged intervention could be repulsed by
the taking of internal measures, it should not be inferred that interven-
of the words "if an armed attack occurs" and explains why it was not said that
self-defence is limited to cases of armed attack.
Schachter, Right of States, supra note 147, at 1634; see also BOWETT, supra note 147, at
187-95; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 147, at 229-241.
152. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 147, at 95 ("For such an
organisation could only become a protective shield for those States whose predatory and
imperial interests could sufficiently realise themselves without the need for 'armed attack'
upon other Members, and whose plaintive motto of self-assertion is, 'This is a very wicked
animal; when we attack it, it defends itself").
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tion is necessarily precluded from constituting aggression in all cases.
The value of a "mixed" definition of aggression 53 is that it allows for
the categorical condemnation of the worst acts of aggression without re-
stricting the flexibility and ultimate authority of a victim state, the
Security Council, or an international tribunal to determine, on an ob-
jective basis, when the fundamental security of a state has been threat-
ened.
If the term "armed attack" is to have any role in these determina-
tions, it must be given a flexible interpretation to cover all cases of
fundamental threats to security. It cannot seriously be contended that
any state would have consented to subjecting its right to use force to
defend its vital security interests, in situations not constituting "armed
attack," to the specific approval of the Security Council authorizing the
use of force in response to what it determines to be a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" under Article 39 of the
U.N. Charter and thus to the veto of any Permanent Member of the
Security Council. States must be expected to have retained the right to
take unilateral defensive action when grave and imminent threats to their
security, territorial integrity, or indeed very existence occur.
In addition to its support based on a textual analysis to the Charter
and the travaux prdparatoires, this flexible interpretation of the right of
self-defense is compelling from a principled approach. It is well ac-
cepted that all actions taken in self-defense must be necessary and
proportionate to the security interest being threatened. Indeed, the prin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality, strictly applied, generate a basis
upon which to determine when armed response is legitimate.' 54 Simply
put, armed response is permitted when other means of protecting fun-
damental security interests are ineffective. Any categorical approach can
only serve as a rough guide to determining when force is necessary;
rigid application of a categorical approach to self-defense would lead to
the dangerous (and absurd) legal conclusion that an armed response,
vitally necessary to the survival of a state, against an illegal attack
which does not, however, meet the requirements of the category "armed
attack," would be illegal under international law. As Judge Jennings
153. By "mixed" it is intended that the definition be a nonexhaustive enumeration of
categories of aggression.
154. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 205 (1963); 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 217 (John B. Moore ed., 1906) (discussing the destruction of the ship the Caroline).
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noted, such an interpretation should be avoided.'55 Judge Jennings
differed from the majority in Nicaragua, primarily on the jurisdictional
question and the findings of fact. Unlike the situation found by the
majority in Nicaragua, the facts of the Serbian activities in Bosnia
demonstrate a grave and immediate threat to the security of Bosnia and
of its people. In such an extreme case, this caution offered by Judge
Jennings should influence the interpretation given to the scope of the
right of self-defense.
The genocidal practice of "ethnic cleansing" carried out by Bosnian
Serb forces is a sufficient threat to Bosnia to engage the right to respond
forcibly in self-defense. Coupled with this threat to its population are the
territorial ambitions of Serbia. If international law is to give any mean-
ing to the term "self-defense," it must recognize the inherent right of a
state to protect its population from forcible expulsion from their territory
and to protect that territory from incorporation into another state. Given
the grave and pressing threat to Bosnia presented by Serbia's interven-
tion in support of the Bosnian Serbs, forcible response in self-defense
would be justified on a strict application of the principles of necessity
and proportionality. The arming and support of the Bosnian Serbs,
coupled with Serbian knowledge of and indeed complicity in the
Bosnian Serb campaign of aggressive genocide and "ethnic cleansing,"
constitute a use of force that would justify strikes against Serbian terri-
tory, at least to the extent that they would be used against Serb supply
lines, bases, and command centers.
56
b. In the Alternative, Bosnia Has the Right to Seek and Receive
Proportionate Counterintervention in Order to
Neutralize the Serbian Intervention
If it cannot be conclusively proved that Serbia, in cooperation with
Bosnian Serb forces, is responsible for engaging in acts of aggression,
155.
This looks to me neither realistic nor just in the world where power struggles are in
every continent carried on by destabilization, interference in civil strife, comfort,
aid and encouragement to rebel, and the like. The original scheme of the United
Nations Charter, whereby force would be deployed by the United Nations itself, in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, has never come into
effect. Therefore an essential element of the Charter design is totally missing. In
this situation it seems dangerous to define unnecessarily strictly the conditions for
lawful self-defence, so as to leave a large area where both a forcible response to
force is forbidden, and yet the United Nations employment of force, which was
intended to fill that gap, is absent.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 543-44 (dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings).
156. Note that the ICJ in Nicaragua left open the use of forcible countermeasures by a
state while ruling that no such collective right existed. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 127.
Fall 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
then Bosnia possesses the right to seek and receive arms and other
forms of counterintervention. This right is a fundamental aspect of
Bosnia's inherent right of self-defense.
In state practice, there is a tendency to consider the provision of
military aid or other intervention to any faction in an internal struggle
illegal under international law, at least when that struggle has reached a
sufficient scale to be categorizable as a civil war.'57 However, in cases
where this rule of nonintervention is violated through the provision of
assistance to rebels, states may intervene on behalf of the government of
the victim state. 158 As Schachter notes, "[d]espite the danger, the law
does not proscribe such counter-intervention."' 5 9
Although the right to request counterintervention is generally rec-
ognized, the decision of the ICJ in Nicaragua could be interpreted as
narrowing this right.'60 If "armed response" is interpreted as meaning an
157. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 321-27
(1963); Derek W. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense, in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 38, 41-46 (John N. Moore ed., 1974); Quincy
Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 529 (1960) ("International law does
not permit the use of force in the territory of another state in invitation either of the recog-
nized or the insurgent government in times of rebellion, insurrection or civil war. Since
international law recognizes the right of revolution, it cannot permit other states to intervene
to prevent it").
158.
When foreign assistance is given to rebels, aid to the government threatened is now
generally assumed to be legal. Whether this is permitted in relation to minor
disturbances caused by foreign propaganda or other forms of interference remains
an open question. It is also uncertain as to whether the foreign assistance must be
a decisive element in the imminent and serious threat to the existing government or
whether it is sufficient if the foreign assistance is a contributory cause. Finally,
foreign assistance to the government will be confined to measures on the territory
of the requesting state unless the foreign aid to the rebels amounts in fact and law
to an "armed attack".
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE, supra note 157, at 327. See also Elihu
Lauterpacht, Intervention by Invitation, 7 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 102 (1958). Lauterpacht
comments as follows:
The fundamental difference between the two hypotheses appears in the magnitude
of the requested intervention. If collective self-defence is invoked, the intervention
may involve the territories of both the target State and the State responsible for the
aggression or infiltration. If the victim State's consent is the sole legal basis, the
intervention may not be extended beyond the borders of the victim State, whose
consent cannot allow more.
Id. at 106. Thus, when the ICJ rules out collective countermeasures, it need not be read as
having ruled out collective counter intervention, limited to the territory of the state suffering
intervention. See also TANCA, supra note 143, at 92.
159. Schachter, Right of States, supra note 147, at 1642.
160. "In the view of the Court, under international law in force today - whether
customary international law or that of the United Nations system - States do not have a right
of 'collective' armed response to acts which do not constitute an 'armed attack.' " Nicaragua,
1986 I.C.J. at 110.
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international use of force directed against the aggressor state, then this
statement fits the Court's general conclusion that an "armed attack" is
required to justify the use of force against another state. If the Court has
determined that the victim state would have no right to make an armed
response, then surely no collective right to do the same could exist: the
rights of states to act collectively cannot be greater- in scope than the
right of the individual victim state, since the legal justification for the
collective countermeasures is the victim state's: right of self-defense. If,
however, the victim possesses the right to make an armed response
against the aggressor, then surely it may do so collectively.16' To hold
otherwise would be to impose arbitrary rules on the use of force which
favor more powerful states which would be inconsistent with the princi-
ples of international cooperation lying at the core of the U.N. Charter
system.
A more dangerous interpretation of the Court's decision in Nicara-
gua would foreclose other measures of collective response which do not
amount to the use of force. In particular, such an interpretation could
limit, indeed eliminate, the right of counterintervention. Since the right
of counterintervention is generally recognized in international law, such
an interpretation is unwarranted. Indeed, the right to request
counterintervention is necessary to give any weight to the norm of
nonintervention. Serbia's complicity in the aggressive genocide occur-
ring in Bosnia makes the right to request counterintervention all the
more imperative. The Declaration on Friendly Relations recognizes that:
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such
forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-de-
termination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive sup-
port in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Char-
ter. 162
If a people has the right to seek and receive support to liberate itself
from foreign domination, it must also possess the same right to prevent
the genocidal domination of its territory. Since self-preservation is a
necessary logical precondition to self-determination, a people must also
possess the right to seek and receive support to prevent genocide against
161. As noted earlier, the ICJ left open the individual right, thereby leaving open the
potential for inconsistency. See supra note 156.
162. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 137, at 8.
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it. Bosnia thus possesses the right, as an element of its right of self-
defense, to seek and receive counterintervention to the extent necessary
to neutralize past and present Serbian intervention on behalf of the
Bosnian Serbs, as well as to prevent the genocidal practice of "ethnic
cleansing" inflicted upon its population by Serb forces. Such measures
of counterintervention could be exercised within the territory of Bosnia
with the consent of the Bosnian Government, irrespective of whether an
"armed attack" has occurred against the State.
B. Article 51 Requires that a State's Inherent Right to Self-Defense
May Be Suspended Only if the Security Council Undertakes Effective
Measures to Maintain International Peace and Security
1. The Right to Self-Defense Is "Inherent" or "Naturel"
As discussed above, the debate over the nature of the right to self-
defense revolves around whether the customary right has been super-
seded by the Article 51 enunciation of the right. 163 For the purpose at
hand, the interesting aspect of the debate is that it has focused upon the
significance of the phraseology of Article 51, namely its reference to the
right to self-defense as an "inherent" right.
Although it has been suggested that the Charter's use of the word
"inherent" is legally irrelevant or anachronistic,164 the generally accepted
view is that the right to self-defense is "inherent," at least in the sense
that Article 51 of the Charter does not impair the pre-Charter customary
right of self-defense. 165 This interpretation is reinforced by reference to
the travaux prdparatoires of the Charter. 166 There was no provision
163. Oscar Schachter, Legal Aspects of the Gulf War of 1991 and Its Aftermath, in LAW,
POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MAXWELL COHEN 1, 5
(William Kaplan & Donald McRae eds., 1993); Schachter, Right of States, supra note 147, at
1635; Stephen M. Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern Interna-
tional Law, 136 R.C.A.D.I. 411, 478-483 (1972-Il).
164. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 791-92 (4th ed. 1964) (using the word "inherent" in art. 51 "is a
theoretical opinion of the legislator which has no legal importance"); DINSTEIN, supra note
136, at 170.
165. JOHN N. MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 151 n.23
(1992); BOWETT, supra note 147, at 184-199; STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER,
supra note 147, at 92-103, 195 ("And beyond doubt, the Charter reserved to them -
reserved, not granted - their 'inherent right of individual and collective self-defence"').
166. Interpretation of the U.N. Charter is governed by the 1969 Vienna Convention,
supra note 45, particularly by art. 31. However, at least one author has argued that sole
recourse to the "ordinary meaning" of the wording of a multilateral treaty concluded in
several languages is inadvisable. Thus, reference to the travaux priparatoires, in accordance
with art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, may be of some assistance. Ian Johnstone, Treaty
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concerning the right of self-defense in the original Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals Concerning the Establishment of a General International
Organization Agreement (Dumbarton Oaks Proposals) because it was
thought unnecessary.167 To reiterate a point made earlier, Article 51 was
included in the Charter under pressure from Latin American states in
order to preserve their regional collective security regime,'68 not in order
to limit the existing inherent right to self-defense in customary interna-
tional law. 1
69
2. The Inherent Right of Self-Defense Is a Jus Cogens Norm
In the view of some commentators, the right of a state to exercise
self-defense when subjected to an armed attack has acquired the status
of a jus cogens norm. 170 Such a status is supported by the jus cogens
status of the corollary prohibition on the kind of force to which self-
defense is a response. There is little question that the prohibition of the
use of force is a jus cogens norm,' 17 at least in a context in which a
state is exercising its right to self-defense against armed attack or ag-
Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 374
(1991).
167. GREAT BRITAIN FOREIGN OFFICE, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 9 (1945).
168. Doc. 576, 111/4/9, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 680 (1945).
169. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 297 (2d ed. 1949). In Nicaragua, the ICJ viewed self-defense
as a customary right, even if confirmed and influenced by the Charter. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.
at 94 ("Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 'natural' or
'inherent' right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a custom-
ary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter"). In
Nicaragua, the Court did not apply the U.N. Charter art. 51 right of self-defense per se due to
a U.S. reservation. Self-defense thus remains an inherent right and influences the interpreta-
tion and content of art. 51, as relevant "external" custom influences the interpretation of
treaties generally. Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,
260 (1989).
170. See, e.g., Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., A Concept of International Law: Protecting
Systemic Values, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 197, 234-37; KELSEN, supra note 164, at 791; Antonio
Cassese, Article 51, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES 769, 788 (J.-P. Cot & A. Pellet eds.,
1985).
171. E. Jimfnez de Ardchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century [General
Course on Public International Law], 159 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 64 (1978-I); see also IAN SINCLAIR,
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 222-23 (2d ed. 1984) ("There is ample
evidence for the proposition that, subject to the necessary exceptions about the use of force in
self-defence or under the authority of a competent organ of the United Nations or a regional
agency acting in accordance with the Charter, the use of armed or physical force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State is now prohibited. This proposition
is so central to the existence of any international legal order of individual nation States
(however nascent that international legal order may be) that it must be taken to have the
character of jus cogens").
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gression (the most grave form of the use of force). 172 Where the right of
self-defense is being exercised to defend a state's territorial integrity and
population against a genocidal use of force, there can be no doubt that
aggression, and thus a jus cogens norm, is implicated.
Given both that the prohibition of aggression (equated, in the Nica-
ragua case, to an armed attack) is a jus cogens norm, and that the pro-
hibition of genocide is also a jus cogens norm, 173 the exercise of the
inherent right to self-defense against genocidal aggression, contextually
analyzed, must be understood as constituting a jus cogens norm of the
highest order. Indeed, one could refer to the right of self-defense in this
context as a "double" jus cogens norm. The fact that the right to self-
defense is styled "inherent" in Article 51 independently confirms that it
is a bedrock right of the international system and thus possesses the
constitutional status of a jus cogens norm, especially given the associa-
tion between the natural law strain of international law and the concept
of jus cogens.174
Despite the foregoing, it might seem unlikely that Article 51 con-
tains a right to self-defense which constitutes a jus cogens norm. The
very fact that the right is limited under Article 51 could be argued to
militate against such an interpretation. However, Article 51 does not so
much limit the right to self-defense as structure or define it within a
system of collective security. That is, the values underlying the right of
self-defense are upheld via the U.N. Charter system.175 It is thus not
inconsistent to view a state's right to self-defense (particularly defense
in the face of aggressive genocide) as being simultaneously ajus cogens
norm and structured by Article 51.
172. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 100-01; see also BELATCHEW ASRAT, PROHIBITION OF
FORCE UNDER THE UN CHARTER: A STUDY OF ART. 2(4) 44-45 (1991).
173. G.A. Res. 96(1) states that genocide "shocks the conscience of mankind, results in
great losses to humanity ... and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations." G.A. Res. 96(I), supra note 84, at 189; see also Reservations to the Geno-
cide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. at 23, and Bosnia v. Serbia I, 1993 I.C.J. at 23 (citing G.A. Res.
96(l)); LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
456-66 (1988).
174. The French version of the phrase "inherent right" in art. 51, "droit naturel,"
expresses the natural law origins of the term and must be considered equally authoritative to
the English version. See 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 33 (concerning interpre-
tation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages).
The creation of a doctrinal linkage between genocide and aggression, as encapsulated in
the terms genocidal aggression or aggressive genocide, in a way that emphasizes the very
.special sense in which the right of self-defense is an "inherent" right in the context at hand, is
not a spurious one. As recently as December 20, 1993, the General Assembly situated
genocide within "the continuation of aggression in Bosnia." See G.A. Res. 48/88, supra note
26, at 2.
175. See infra part II.B.5.
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Given this "inherent" status, it is reasonable to start from the pre-
.sumption that a state's exercise of the right to self-defense may be
suspended by the Security Council only in certain limited circumstances
and then only where the Security Council replaces a state's inherent
right to self-defense with its functional equivalent: effective collective
intervention in lieu of self-defense.' 76 Accordingly, the purpose of the
next section is to demonstrate that it is incoherent to require states to
yield their right to self-defense, especially when styled an "inherent"
right in Article 51, without receiving a corresponding guarantee that the
Security Council will act to protect their interests. The Security Coun-
cil's monopoly on the legal use of force 177 (which some commentators
see as being beyond question, 178 save for the exception of self-de-
fense) 179 carries with it a duty to protect vulnerable states from armed
attack, particularly when it takes the form of genocidal aggression.'
The two incontrovertible exceptions to Article 2(4), collective security
actions and self-defense, must be interpreted symbiotically and not in a
way that would allow one to subsume the other.
3. The Security Council Was Under an Obligation to Take Objectively
Effective Measures to Ensure that Its Maintenance of the
Arms Embargo Against Bosnia Did Not Fetter Bosnia's Inherent
Right to Self-Defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter that
Bosnia Enjoyed from the Moment of Admission into the U.N.
A system of collective security requires that a collective body will
ensure that individual states or nonstate actors need not and therefore
176. Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9, 30 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) ("[T]he logic
behind the Charter is plain to see; it was based on the link between a rule and a guarantee:
the rule (to which self-defence was only a limited exception): that States should give up their
legal right to use force; the guarantee: that a mechanism of collective security, put in motion
by the S.C., in whose favour they gave up this right, would substitute the individual mecha-
nism by which each State had until then been judge of the merits of its own case. The rule
and the guarantee went together, and the success of the latter was a necessary condition for
respect of the former").
177. Ian Brownlie, The U.N. Charter and the Use of Force 1945-85, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 176, at 491, 496 ("the concept of a
system of public order involves a structure pre-disposed to a quasi-monopoly of the use of
force").
178. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE, supra note 157, at 273 ("The
whole object of the Charter was to render unilateral use of force, even in self-defence, subject
to control by the Organization").
179. Waldock, supra note 147, at 496.
180. See GA Res. 48/88, supra note 26, at 2.
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may not resort unilaterally to the use of force.'' This is aptly demon-
strated by the view taken by the ILC of the general relationship between
a principle of self-defense and any monopoly over the use of force
claimed by a central authority. The ILC, in its commentary on the right
to self-defense as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, noted that
self-defense is allowed "where ... the use of force by the agencies of
the central authority cannot be resorted to promptly and efficiently
enough to protect a subject against an attack by another."18 2 This state-
ment of principle must be taken as a baseline for interpreting the scope
of Security Council powers to fetter self-defense within Article 51.
Article 51 provides that a state may exercise its inherent right to
self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."'' 8 3 While the Security Council
clearly has the power to suspend a state's right to self-defense, that
power must be exercised within a legal framework. The central question
to be determined is: what is meant by "measures necessary"? There is
only limited state practice and U.N. practice to assist in the interpreta-
tion of the phrase.8 4
The accepted view would seem to be that not every action of the
Security Council amounts to "measures necessary": only when the Secu-
rity Council adopts effective measures will a state's inherent right to
self-defense be suspended. While this is the consensus on the substan-
tive interpretive question, the crucial issue is that of the locus of legal
authority to make the substantive determination. Debate has surrounded
the issue of who determines whether the Security Council has undertak-
en the "measures necessary." Of course, there is likely to be a difference
of opinion between the self-defending state (which is understandably
concerned that the Security Council should take quick and effective
measures in order to protect it against armed attack) and the Security
181. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 147, at 255.
182. 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 32, at 52 (emphasis added).
The interpretative weight to be accorded the ILC's statement of principle is considerable
given that the ILC clearly regarded their statement as a generally accepted restatement of the
principle of self-defense within any system under which "a central authority has a monopoly
or virtual monopoly on the use of force." Id. This follows from the ILC having made it clear
that it had "no intention of entering into a continuing controversy regarding the scope of the
concept of self-defence" with its brief commentary on art. 34 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. Id. This unwillingness to enter into a controversial exegesis of self-defense
emphasizes just how uncontroversial the ILC viewed the quoted passage to be.
183. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 169, at 304 ("The theory of the Article would
appear to be that the Security Council will take measures which after a time will supercede
those taken in individual or collective self-defense").
184. Colin Warbrick, The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq [Part 11, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
482, 483-88 (1991).
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Council itself.185 However, in its efforts to "maintain international peace
and security," the Security Council does not have an entirely free hand.
On the contrary, the Security Council is under an international legal
obligation to ensure that the measures which it undertakes be effective
before it supersedes a state's inherent right to self-defense.
86
Three views on this matter can be distilled. The first view suggests
that it is for the self-defending state itself to determine whether the
Security Council measures are "measures necessary" such that it is
satisfied that its right of self-defense may be superseded.'87 This ap-
proach has rightly been subjected to sustained criticism. 188 The primary
concern raised by commentators is, of course, that auto-interpretation of
the adequacy of Security Council measures by the state (or states) in
question would vitiate the system contemplated by the Charter of col-
lective security under the aegis of the Security Council.
The second suggests that the Security Council itself may determine,
on purely subjective (albeit partially collectivized) criteria, whether and
when it has taken "measures necessary" such that it may suspend a
state's inherent right to self-defense. 89 This approach also has been
subjected to sustained criticism' 9° and must be rejected. If the Security
Council alone may decide the issue without reference to any objective
criteria, a state may be subjected to the effects of an unlawful use of
force without effective Security Council action. The concern is that the
Security Council will sacrifice the individual interests of a state for
185. Donald W. Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51
Require?, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 366, 390 (1991); Nicholas Rostow, The International Use
of Force After the Cold War, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 416-417 (1991).
186. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 235 (1986).
187. LELAND GOODRICH, ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 352 (3d ed. 1969).
188. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452,
471 (1991) ("The states claiming the right to use of force in collective self-defence cannot be
the final arbiters of its legality"); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 244 n.9 (rev. ed. 1959) ("since, though express provision is lacking, this could
scarcely be left to the attacking State, or the self-defending State").
189. Abram Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 101, at 3, 5-6; Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel,
U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64
(1991).
190. Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, supra note 188, at 458 ("the
right of self-defense would be overridden whenever the Security Council adopted measures
considered necessary in case of an armed attack on a state. This would be an implausible -
indeed, absurd - interpretation"); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or
Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 508-513; Abraham D. Sofaer, Asking the
U.N. is Asking for Trouble, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1990, at A14 ("Otherwise, a state would be
required to lay down its arms as soon as the Council takes any measure, however ineffectu-
al").
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political considerations.' 91 It cannot be an accurate statement of the law
that the Security Council can suspend a state's inherent right to
self-defense (a right which has acquired the status of ajus cogens norm)
merely by passing a resolution.' 92
Apart from policy reasons, this interpretation is unsustainable on a
textual basis because it would make one or the other of the two sen-
tences in Article 51 redundant. Independent meaning must be given to
words used similarly, but not identically, in the same text. The second
sentence's subjective standard ("deems necessary") only refers to the
Security Council's ability to take action but does not provide the test for
ousting or suspending the right of self-defense, found in the first sen-
tence of Article 51. The subjective approach to the interpretation of
''measures necessary" results in an untenable collapsing of the first and
second sentences of Article 51.
The second phrase of Article 51 permits the Security Council to take
any actions it "deems necessary" to restore international peace and
security, although actions so taken must meet the test of being "mea-
sures necessary" in the language of the first sentence of Article 51 in
order to oust the state's inherent right of self-defense. The fact of dif-
ferent.usage of "measures necessary" (first sentence of Article 51) and
"such action . . . as it deems necessary" (second sentence of Article 51)
suggests by implication that as to the term "necessary," the second
sentence constitutes a subjective test and the first sentence an objective
test.
The purpose of the second sentence is clearly to ensure that the fact
that a Member has undertaken action in self-defense does not oust the
ability of the Security Council to take "such action ... as it deems
necessary." However, the second sentence does not state that such action
which the Security Council "deems necessary" on a subjective basis can,
without more, oust the ability of a state to exercise its inherent right to
self-defense; this remains governed by the objective test ("measures
necessary" on the basis of effectiveness) contained in the first sentence
of Article 51. Security Council action must be objectively effective
before it can oust the self-defense action (either individual or collective)
of a state.
191. BowETT, supra note 147, at 197 ("In theory this should not be so, but in fact the
risk of a 'political' decision by the Council is always present").
192. MOORE, supra note 165, at 154 ("surely such an enormously important consequence
[the removal of a State's right to self-defense] could only result from a clear Security Council
action to that effect"). For discussion of positions taken in various concrete contexts, such as
the Argentine intervention in the Falklands, where a purely subjective approach is unaccept-
able, see infra notes 200-17 and accompanying text.
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It has been argued that the second clause of Article 51 is "probably
superfluous"'193 and "without legal effect.' ' 194 The argument advanced
here does not go that far. It is submitted, rather, that the second sentence
represents an excess of caution: to make sure that the proper exercise of
self-defense does not bar the Security Council's power to take action. It
does serve, in that sense, to emphasize the Security Council's primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It
also lends support to the argument advanced above that not every Secu-
rity Council measure will oust a state's right to self-defense. A state
may exercise its right to self-defense, and the Security Council may then
decide on a subjective basis to undertake certain measures which it
"deems necessary" under the second sentence of Article 51. However,
unless these measures are objectively "measures necessary" under the
first sentence of Article 51, they will not affect the ability of a state to
continue to exercise its inherent right of self-defense. 195 What must be
avoided is an overly loose interpretation of the article that reads the
words "deems necessary," found in the second sentence, into the first
sentence.
Thus, neither of these first two approaches is satisfactory, and
neither can be definitively supported by reference to the travaux
prdparatoires of the Charter. 196 Thus, a third approach suggests itself: it
is the Security Council which must decide whether it has taken "mea-
sures necessary" such that a state's inherent right to self-defense may be
suspended, but this decision must be made on the basis of objective
criteria. 97 There is support for this approach in state practice and in the
practice of the Security Council. In 1965, Pakistan asserted a right to
continue to use force in self-defense under Article 51 "until the Security
Council has taken effective measures to restore international peace and
security ... In 1967, Pakistan reiterated this interpretation of
Article 51.' 99
193. BOWETT, supra note 147, at 198.
194. KELSEN, supra note 164, at 795.
195. Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article 51: Limits on Self-Defense?, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L.
336, 350-351 (1992) ("The framers of Article 51 did not intend for defensive action to
become illegitimate upon action by the Security Council, but only if defensive action contra-
dicted Security Council action. Acceptance of this interpretation was nearly unanimous among
those nations providing interpretive remarks").
196. Id. at 344-364.
197. See BOWETT, supra note 147, at 196; KELSEN, supra note 164, at 795.
198. Telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., Supp. July-Sept. 1965, at 283, U.N. Doc.
S/Supplements (1965) (emphasis added).
199. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1360th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc.
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During the Falklands Islands crisis in 1982, the United Kingdom
also argued that the right of self-defense under Article 51 continues until
the Security Council takes "measures which are actually effective to
bring about the stated objective."" ° Given that Security Council Resolu-
tion 502 was demonstrably ineffective, 20' "[t]he United Kingdom's
inherent right of self-defence [was] thus unimpaired. '"202 The United
Kingdom was of the opinion that the determination of whether a mea-
sure adopted by the Security Council under Article 51 must be an
objective one, "reached in light of all the relevant circumstances. 2 3
Argentina had argued that the Security Council's adoption of Reso-
lution 502 had terminated the U.K.'s inherent right of self-defense.2°
However, it is not coherent for such "measures" to be considered ade-
quate to deprive the United Kingdom of its inherent right to
self-defense, "since it cannot by itself be a sufficient alternative to the
victim state's right to meet and repulse the aggression. '20 5 Resolution
502 cannot be considered to have been "measures necessary" effectively
S/PV. 1360 (1967).
200. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/15016 (Readex 1982).
201. Resolution 502 ordered Argentina to withdraw its forces from the Falkland Islands,
which it had not done. The United Kingdom held that this was sufficient evidence "to
indicate that the decision of the Council has not, in fact, been effective to restore international
peace and security because of Argentina's refusal to comply." Letter from the Permanent
Representative of the United Kingdom to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
37th Sess. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/15017 (Readex 1982).
202. U.N. Doc. S/15016, supra note 200, at 2.
203. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2362d mtg. at 103, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2362 (1982). Other statements of the U.K. position can be found at Provisional
Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2360th mtg. at 32-51, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2360
(1982); Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/15041 (Readex 1982).
204. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2360, supra note 203, at 21. The representative argued:
It is known that under Article 51 of the Charter unilateral actions must cease when
the Security Council has already taken measures. There is a legal obligation to
suspend self-defence once the Security Council "has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security". The determination of whether such
measures have been effective must be reached objectively and cannot be left to the
arbitrary judgement of the Government of the United Kingdom itself.
Id. See also Letter from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/15014 (Readex 1982) (arguing
that "[t]hese illicit actions by the United Kingdom are claimed to be justified by a so-called
right of self-defence. Among other reasons, that right cannot be invoked when the Security
Council has adopted measures for the maintenance of international peace and security"). The
representative of Argentina subsequently also rejected the U.K.'s theory of "effectiveness."
See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/15022 (Readex 1982).
205. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 123, at 101.
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suspending the U.K.'s inherent right to act in self-defense. 2 6 The view
of the United Kingdom is more persuasive than that of Argentina.2 °7
Few speeches by Security Council members clearly addressed the
claims of Argentina and the United Kingdom on the issue of whether
Security Council measures must be effective in order to deprive a state
of its right to act in self-defense. It is true that many Latin American
states were opposed to the U.K. claim of self-defense.0 8 Moreover,
those states which supported the U.K.'s general position by and large
tended not to evaluate or comment upon its specific position on the
issue which concerns us here. 209 However, any objections or ambiguities
on this point were decisively met by the following arguments made in
the Council by the United Kingdom:
Undersecretary Ros [of Argentina] also argued that there is an
obligation to suspend self-defence once the Security Council "has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security" [citation omitted]. He went on to say that: "The determi-
nation of whether such measures have been effective must be
reached objectively and cannot be left to the arbitrary judgment of
the ... United Kingdom" [citation omitted].
The United Kingdom accepts that the determination must be an
objective one. It must be reached in the light of all the relevant
circumstances ....
By resolution 502 (1982) the Council demanded the immediate
withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.
Argentina did not withdraw any of its forces: it did quite the oppo-
site ....
206. Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of the Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the
Use of Force, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 176,
at 435, 441-42 ("Such an interpretation would make a mockery of the 'inherent' right of
self-defence. It would affirm that once an invasion - even one declared unlawful - was
successful, it could not be reversed at all speed because the invaded state was under a duty to
settle disputes peacefully. This cannot be a correct view of the Charter generally nor of
Resulution [sic] 502 specifically").
207. See id at 442; Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Self-defence, Enforcement Action and the
Gulf Wars, 1980-88 and 1990-91, 63 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 299, 348-349 (1992); E. Rostow,
supra note 190, at 511-13.
208. Several Latin American states supporting Argentina specifically rejected the U.K.'s
approach. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2362, supra note 203, at 12-35, 51-86; Letter from the
Permanent Representative of Panama to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
37th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/15068 (Readex 1982).
209. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2360, supra note 203, at 51-61; Provisional Verbatim
Record, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2363rd mtg. at 26-27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2363 (1982).
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Accordingly, the breach- of the peace still subsisted despite the
adoption of the resolution. How, then, can it seriously be main-
tained that resolution 502 (1982) amounted to a measure "neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security"?
In my letter to the President of the Council dated 30 April, I point-
ed out that the reference in Article 51 to measures necessary to
maintain international peace could "only be taken to refer to mea-
sures which are actually effective to bring about the stated objec-
tive. Clearly, the Security Council's decision in its resolution 502
(1982) has not proved effective. The United Kingdom's inherent
right of self-defence is thus unimpaired" [citation omitted] ....
A State which has committed an act of aggression is told to stop
its aggression and to withdraw by the Security Council. That State
does not heed the demand. The victim, according to Mr. Ros,
would then be obliged to fold his arms and.allow the aggressor to
continue his aggression and to digest its fruits.
2111
Not only does this passage clearly set out the substantive case that
the Article 51 necessity test must be an objective one, but it also very
effectively lays bare the inconsistency between Argentina's position that
the right of self-defense was ousted by the mere adoption of Resolution
502 and its clear acceptance that the test was an objective one.21" ' Further
evidence of the fragility of Argentina's contention (that effectiveness of
Security Council measures does not have to be objectively established)
can be found in the position that Argentina took before the full conflict
started. After Argentine forces had landed on the British dependency of
South Georgia ("San Pedro" to the Argentines), Argentina itself invoked
a right to self-defense in anticipation of British action to retake the
islands:
The system of collective security set forth in the Charter cannot be
interpreted in a way that would mean that provisions for legitimate
defence would become inoperable ... The Charter has provided
that Members of the United Nations, when complying with its
principles and purposes, should not be left in a defenceless state
against any act of aggression perpetrated against its territory or
population.2"2
210. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2362, supra note 203, at 103-105 (emphasis added).
211. See id. and accompanying emphasized text.
212. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2345th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2345 (1982) (emphasis added).
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Thus, upon analysis, it turns out that both the United Kingdom and
Argentina accepted in the Falklands crisis an objective test for the
phrase "measures necessary.' '"3
Significantly, the United Kingdom took a somewhat similar view
during the 1990-1991 Gulf War.zt4 As the view of a Permanent Member
with power to vote on analogous situations before the Security Council,
the United Kingdom's view may also have some element of independent
legal effect based on a requirement of consistency between the legal
positions taken by a Permanent Member in its own defense and those
taken in judgment of actions by other states. Thus, under Article 51,
"measures" must mean at minimum the use of armed force, the imposi-
tion of economic sanctions, or both.2 5 Even during the debates during
the Gulf War as to whether economic sanctions were preferable to the
use of force, the unarticulated assumption was that the criterion by
which either option was to be measured was effectiveness. 2 6 This third
approach avoids the dangers of auto-interpretation by the state(s) con-
cerned while holding the Security Council to certain objective stan-
dards.217
213. It is worth noting that one of Argentina's strongest supporters on the facts of the
situation supported Argentina in terms that not only hint at an objective test but also empha-
size facts that distinguish the U.K. claim from the current Bosnian claim in a manner favor-
able to Bosnia:
As has been said, one cannot invoke self-defence in this case as [self-defense]
would only apply, following the adoption of a resolution by the Council, if the
state of hostilities continued without interruption - which clearly has not hap-
pened. On the contrary, Great Britain's actions led to a new opening of hostilities.
U.N. Doc. S/PV.2362, supra note 203, at 26 (emphasis added). During the Falklands crisis,
there was a question as to whether the U.K. could invoke the right of self-defense given that
active hostilities had ceased by the time new U.K. forces had travelled the great distance to
the Falklands, whatever the test adopted for art. 51. In the case of Bosnia, there is no question
that hostilities to which it claims the right to respond in self-defense have continued without
significant interruption.
214. Warbrick, supra note 184, at 487-88 (highlighting the U.K.'s view that art. 51's
requirement that the Security Council take measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security "must be related to the aims the Council sets itself, here the withdrawal of Iraq
and the restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait. Since these objectives had not
been attained, the 'measures necessary etc.' had not been taken" (emphasis added)).
215. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 123, at 101-02; see also OPPENHEIM'S INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 423 n.22 (Sir Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("The actions
of Kuwait and its allies in 1990 in responding to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait suggests
that [Article 51] does not prevent continued resort to self-defence even after the Council has
taken some measures (e.g. the imposition of economic sanctions), if those measures have not
had the necessary effect" (emphasis added)).
216. Schachter, Legal Aspects of the Gulf War, supra note 163, at 17.
217. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 215, at 159 ("Unless it is to
become an occasion for licence and lawlessness, an inherent right [to self-defense] must be
controlled by and accountable to a higher authority - provided that that authority is in a
position to act effectively in accordance with its constitution" (emphasis added)).
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4. The Test of Effectiveness in Determining Whether "Measures
Necessary to Maintain International Peace and Security" Have Been
Implemented Is Higher in a Concrete Context in Which a
State Is Exercising Its Inherent Right to Self-Defense
Against Genocidal Aggression
Of what, then, should these objective criteria consist? Certainly, they
must consist of more than "[m]erely being seized of the matter., 218
Various options might include: (i) a direction to participants to stop
fighting; 29 (ii) the imposition of economic sanctions; or (iii) the use of
force to undo aggression. However, it is clear that (i) is unsatisfactory,
and even (ii) will likely be insufficient in many cases. 220 The overall
consideration must be that the "measures necessary" result in action
"that definitely restores and maintains international peace and securi-
ty. ' '22I The measures in question must be effective on some objective
standard.222
The best approach is a purposive one. This is consistent with both
Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and Article 24(2) of the
U.N. Charter. Article 51 has a dual purpose: it reiterates the inherent
right of self-defense while placing it within the U.N. collective security
framework. Read together, this produces (vis-a-vis a self-defending
state) a quasi-monopoly on the use of force in the hands of the Security
Council, but not a complete monopoly. Article 51 must be interpreted to
require that states yield their right to self-defense to the Security Coun-
cil on the understanding that the Security Council will undertake mea-
sures which will have the equivalent effect of individual (or collective)
self-defense. That is, the Security Council measures must actually be
effective in establishing international peace and security, not merely in
freezing the aggression into a stalemate situation or in sacrificing the
territorial integrity of the aggrieved state to political considerations.
218. Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment, and Resolu-
tion of Disputes [General Course on Public International Law], 230 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 333
(199 1-V).
219. N. Rostow, supra note 185, at 416-417.
220. Kaikobad, supra note 207, at 344.
221. Plofchan, Article 51, supra note 195, at 342; Higgins, International Law and the
Avoidance, Containment, and Resolution of Disputes, supra note 218, at 333 ("in a decentral-
ized legal order, Members should be free to act in collective self-defence until the Security
Council was in a position to take over the task and secure the common objective").
222. Nguyen Quoc Dinh, La ligitime difense d'aprs la charte de Nations Unies, 52
REv. G9N. INT'L PUB. 223, 234 ("Le dessaisissement n'aura lieu que le jour ob l'organisme
international aura pris des mesures effectives en vue de faire face . la situation").
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The action required of the Security Council to suspend a state's
inherent right of self-defense must be determined in light of the threat to
international peace and security to which it is a response. To this end,
objective criteria to determine effectiveness may be gleaned from the
very principles which guide a state's exercise of individual or collective
self-defense under customary international law. These principles are
proportionality and necessity.223 But these principles, which ordinarily
serve as limits in the case of an individual state, may also serve as
positive guidelines for the margin of discretion within which the Securi-
ty Council can take what it perceives to be "measures necessary" in
order to invoke the machinery of collective security and suspend a
state's inherent right to self-defense.
Whatever general power the Security Council may have to fetter a
state's right to self-defense, when the state is, in the same instant,
attempting to protect its population from genocide and to defend itself
from aggression, special considerations must apply. The effect of these
considerations is to impose a higher threshold in the determination of
"measures necessary." The Security Council as an agent of the interna-
tional community (and not simply an expression of the views of its
current fifteen members) must ensure that there is an effective substitute
for the right of self-defense, particularly if the result of its actions (here,
the imposition of an arms embargo) would otherwise impede the ability
of the state's population to defend itself from genocidal aggression. It
may only do so if it insures that such defense is carried out on behalf of
the otherwise self-defending state by the organized international commu-
nity. This view is reinforced by the "constitutional" status of the right to
self-defense as an "inherent," "naturel" norm: the right cannot be viewed
as a right with which the Security Council may easily dispense. The
significance of the right necessarily means that the Security Council
may terminate it only by replacing it with its functional equivalent, that
is, collective intervention on behalf of the aggrieved state.
Thus, in the case of self-defense against genocide, the threshold of
effectiveness required to oust the inherent right of self-defense is even
higher than in situations in which genocide does not accompany ag-
gression. There must therefore be a correlation between the degree of
international integration and the limitation of the rights of self-defense
and collective defense.224 If the Security Council is unable, for whatever
223. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHi.
L. REv. 113, 120, 131-132 (1986).
224. Georg Schwarzenberger, Report on Some Aspects of the Principle of Self-Defence in
the Charter of the United Nations and the Topics Covered by the Dubrovnik Resolution, in
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reason, to act effectively, it must not interfere with the inherent right of
a state to defend itself, subject of course to the customary international
law requirements of necessity and proportionality. What the Security
Council must not do is impose measures (such as the arms embargo)
which seriously impair the ability of a state to defend itself from ah
armed attack, without also undertaking effective measures to defend the
state itself. This is particularly important in the case of aggressive
genocide. Given the deeper understanding of the jus cogens nature of
the norm against genocide developed earlier in this Memorial,2 25 it is
essential that the right of self-defense against (jus cogens-prohibited)
armed attack/genocidal aggression be recognized as a jus cogens norm
itself with the highest degree of peremptory force. Thus, as already
indicated, to the extent that the character of self-defense as a legal norm
is partly a function of that to which it responds, we have a "double" jus
cogens norm. This enhances both the certainty with which objective
criteria for effective measures must have been fulfilled before a state's
right to self-defense may be suspended and the strictness of any review
that the role of the ICJ permits, indeed mandates.
The reasoning in the immediately preceding two paragraphs is
premised on the notion that, within Article 51, there is a one-to-one
relationship between what it is necessary for a state to do in self-defense
and what is necessary for the international community to do in order to
impair the state's right.226 That this should be the presumptive starting
REPORT OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE HELD AT NEW YORK 550, 591 (Int'l L. Assn
ed., 1959) ("Awareness of the need for constant correlation of the scope of the rights of
self-defence and collective defencewith the degree of international integration attained, will
assist in avoiding the fallacy of aiming at any further limitations of these rights, without
corresponding advances in an automatic judicial review of the exercise of these rights and an
equally matter-of-course automatic execution of such judicial findings").
225. See supra part I.A.2.
226. Franck & Patel, supra note 189, at 63 ("If states use armed force under the
self-defense rubric of Article 51, their individual activities are subsumed by, or incorporated
into, the global police response once it is activated. That is, the old way is licensed only until
the new way begins to work" (emphasis added)). The problem with this view is that there is
a disparity between beginning to work and actually being effective. That disparity may be
accounted for in terms of a certain margin of appreciation to be accorded the Security Council
by other actors on the grounds that the Council is best-situated to evaluate whether the
measures adopted will work. Such a margin of appreciation follows from the general proposi-
tion that a normative standard (here, that measures taken must effectively substitute for the
ability of a state to defend itself) does not itself allocate institutional competences to make the
appraisal of whether that standard has been met. Thus, as a general matter, it may make a
good deal of sense to take the view that, within the margin of appreciation, states may be
under a duty not to take unilateral measures of self-defense and the ICJ may be under a duty
not to substitute its judgment as to whether the one-to-one relationship between measures
taken and protection from attack has been made out. However, as argued infra part III.A,
where jus cogens norms other than aggression, notably genocide, are implicated, the margin
of appreciation should be narrow indeed, perhaps even non-existent. At minimum, a contextu-
al judgment by the ICJ of the appropriate scope of review is required.
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point for Article 51, as a general matter, is reinforced by the earlier
quoted view of the ILC that the right of self-defense lapses when the
central authority has acted "promptly and efficiently enough to protect"
the subject from attack. 7 However, it might be argued that the wording
of Article 51 itself points to a possible disjunction between "measures
necessary" and what may be necessary to protect a state from attack;
this possible disjunction arises from the fact that the first sentence of
Article 51 allows the right of self-defense to be impaired when "the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security., 228 Thus, it can be seen that there is a textual indica-
tion that a utilitarian trade-off may be contemplated by Article 51, such
that the Council might take measures that effectively protect a collective
interest in peace and security (for example, as here, by cordoning off a
region in an attempt to prevent the spread of conflict) at the expense of
the protection of the substantive interests of the state being attacked.
. As a general interpretive matter, it would seem contrary to the
"inherent" nature of the right of self-defense to allow for such a trade-
off, and accordingly the words "international peace and security" in
Article 51 must be interpreted to give priority to the peace and security
interests of attacked states. That this must be the case can be shown if
necessity as a background norm in international law is called upon to
help interpret what could be called the "interaction of necessities" within
Article 51. One does not have to go so far as to collapse the right of
self-defense into the classical right of necessity for purposes of self-
preservation to see the value of interpreting the right of self-defense as
continuing coterminously with necessity.229 In this respect, the ILC has
recognized a defense of "state of necessity" according to which a state
may plead that the act in question "was the only means of safeguarding
an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril.,
230
One only has to imagine a situation in which genocide occurs
entirely within a state without external involvement, such that there
would be no element of aggression. The question would then be whether
it would be lawful for that state to breach an international obligation not
to acquire arms if those arms were essential to protect people in its
territory from genocide. The ILC gives as a clear example of the neces-
227. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
228. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
229. Note that the ILC in its commentary on art. 34 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility draws attention to the lingering relevance of notions of necessity for the scope
of the right of self-defense. 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 32, at
52-53.
230. Id. at 34-35.
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sity defense a situation in which there is a "grave danger to ... the
survival of part of the . . . population" of a state.23' If the element of
state-to-state aggression is then added, it must follow that the necessity
at issue does not abate, but rather becomes more acute and, at the same
time, merges with the right of self-defense. The only question that
would then arise within the framework of the Security Council's powers
is whether the Council could invoke a higher necessity, such as preven-
tion of regionalization of a conflict, as a justification for depriving the
state of that which remains necessary to resist the genocidal aggression.
While the ILC discussion of the necessity defense is premised on a
framework of state responsibility, the general thrust of the principle of
necessity must be taken to have an independent existence (as either a
general principle or customary norm) that applies to all international
persons including the U.N. As the ILC comments: "The rule outlawing
genocide ... [was] mentioned in the discussion as ... . [one] example
... of [a] rule[] whose breach is in no event to be justified on any
ground of necessity., 232 If there is any situation in which community
measures justified in the name of international peace and security be-
come, in reality, a sacrifice of one member of the community on the
altar of necessity, it is the case at hand. The maintenance of the arms
embargo amounts to such a utilitarian sacrifice because it does not
accord sufficient weight to the principle of the proportionality of the
necessities which interact within Article 51.233
Bosnia is faced with an armed attack against its territory of a special
kind, namely a campaign of aggressive genocide waged against its
population. In such a case, the principles of necessity and proportional-
ity lead to the inexorable conclusion that only concerted military inter-
vention under the aegis of the Security Council will be effective to
restore international peace and security. In the face of genocide, mere
economic sanctions or deployment of lightly armed troops for humani-
tarian purposes is manifestly ineffective and insufficient; the deployment
of armed force must bear some proportionate relationship to the threat to
Bosnia in order to oust its inherent right to self-defense.
The Security Council may balk at using armed force and choose not
to intervene.234 In so deciding, in a case of aggressive genocide, it
231. Id. at 35.
232. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
233. "[T]he interest sacrificed on the altar of 'necessity' must obviously be less impor-
tant than the interest it is thereby sought to save." Id. at 50.
234. It could be argued that the Security Council, as a representative of the international
community, is legally obligated to intervene to prevent genocide. It is arguable that the
subtext of the recent ILC discussion leaves open the question of a positive duty of the
[Vol. 16:1
A Memorial for Bosnia
cannot purport to suspend Bosnia's inherent right to self-defense by the
imposition of ineffective measures (here, an arms embargo, economic
sanctions against Serbia, and a meager deployment of lightly-armed
troops clustered around porous "safe-zones" with no mandate to protect
the general population) which are inadequate to the task.
This is not to argue that in some (if not many) cases, the imposition
of an arms embargo or economic sanctions against an aggressor state
cannot be both appropriate and effective. The principles of necessity and
proportionality are flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances. But
an arms embargo and economic sanctions are clearly an inadequate
substitute.for collective armed intervention when the threat to interna-
tional peace and security is genocide and "ethnic cleansing" and when
the bulk of the evidence indicates that the arms embargo has been far
more effectively enforced against the victim rather than the perpetrator.
In such circumstances, which are unquestionably present in this case, the
sole alternatives are effective armed intervention on behalf of the inter-
national community or, failing that, a lifting of the arms embargo so as
to enable Bosnia to exercise its inherent right to individual and collec-
tive self-defense. In the latter case, the Security Council should con-
demn the combined armed attacks and acts of genocide, reaffirm
Bosnia's right to self-defense, and request that Member States extend
assistance to Bosnia.235
5. The Legitimacy of the U.N. System of Collective Security Demands
an Interpretation of the Inherent Right of Self-Defense
Consistent with the Principles Underlying the System
The legitimacy of the U.N. system of collective security is to a
significant degree based upon its ability to secure the political and
territorial integrity of Member States. Indeed, Article 1 of the U.N.
Charter provides that among the primary purposes of the U.N. is the
maintenance of international peace and security. If the system of collec-
tive security upon which the Charter is premised cannot provide this,
then states have the right to defend themselves through the use of force.
The very preservation of the inherent right to self-defense in Article 51
makes it clear that the Member States were wary about entrusting all
international community as a whole to intervene to prevent ongoing international crimes such
as genocide. 1993 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 116, at 114-29.
235. As the Security Council did in 1984, where it condemned armed attacks by South
Africa upon Angola, reaffirmed Angola's right to self-defence, and requested that Member
States extend assistance to Angola. S.C. Res. 546, U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., Res. and Dec.
1984, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/40 (1984).
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aspects of international peace and security to the Security Council.23 6
This adds to the need for a symbiotic interpretation of a state's right to
self-defense and the Security Council monopoly on the legitimate use of
force. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that "[t]he debate over the
interpretation of Article 51 is significant because it focuses on the
relationship between the U.N. organization and the U.N. Charter. It thus
goes to the heart of the U.N. vision of world order.,
237
Among the other primary purposes of the U.N. is "promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion .... 238 It is
important to view the promotion of human rights as a coprimary princi-
ple which must inform the Court's interpretation of the right to
self-defense, particularly self-defense against aggressive genocide, the
very aim of which is the ultimate denial of all other human rights.
Through Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter, states entrust primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to
the Security Council.2 9 Significantly, however, Article 24(2) provides
that "[i]n discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
When the purpose of the maintenance of international peace and security
and the purpose of the promotion of human rights and self-determination
are read together, they cover precisely the situation at hand: genocidal
aggression .2z The interpretation of Articles 24 and 51 and Chapter VII
as a whole thus must account for this specific situation.
A broader view which takes the structure of the U.N. system of
collective security into account must consider that the right to
self-defense is suspended only when the Security Council takes actions
equivalent to collective self-defense by the Member States on behalf of
the state in question 4.2 1 Effectiveness is essential. Another central con-
236. NIGEL BENTWICH & ANDREW MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 106 (1950) (arguing that the self-defense clause "was a measure of [the]
lack of confidence in the perfection of the system of collective security based upon the
Charter"); NGUYEN Quoc DINH, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 757 (1975).
237. N. Rostow, supra note 185, at 418.
238. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3).
239. Id. art. 24(1). "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations,
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security" and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsi-
bility the Security Council acts on their behalf. Note that the responsibility is "primary" but
not "exclusive." Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1962 I.C.J. 151,
163 (July 20).
240. See G.A. Res. 48/88, supra note 26.
241. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 123. These authors state that "[t]he only way of
interpreting article 51 without undermining the Charter edifice is to interpret it to mean that
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sideration is that the collective security regime of the Charter must not
have the effect of making Member States worse off than if they were
not Member States.242
III. PERMISSIBILITY OF AN ICJ JUDGMENT ON THE
STATUS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES
A. The Provisions and Structure of the U.N. Charter and the ICJ
Statute Permit, and in Matters of Jus Cogens Require, the ICJ to Pass
Judgment on the Lawfulness of Security Council Resolutions
1. The ICJ Is Not Precluded from Addressing a Dispute or Situation
Which Is Simultaneously Before the Security Council
a. There Are No Provisions in the U.N. Charter or in the ICJ Statute
Which Preclude the Two Organs from Simultaneously
Addressing the Same Matter
The ICJ Statute states in Article 38(1) that it is the function of the
Court "to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as
are submitted to it . ... 14' Further, Article 36(1) states that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it
and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force." 2" Neither the ICJ
Statute nor the Charter contains any provisions which expressly or
impliedly limit these jurisdiction-conferring articles. The Court's power
to address a dispute over which it otherwise has jurisdiction cannot be
only those measures which can effectively take the place of potential actions in self-defence
can be said to suspend the right. If the measures prove ineffective, then the right of
self-defence must revive." Id. at 102 (emphasis added). A corollary of the emphasized words
must of course be that until the measures prove effective the right of self-defense does not
lapse.
242. ASRAT, supra note 172, at 207 ("[T]he scope of self-defence under the Charter and
the construction of Art. 51 should be guided by the Charter's policy on the international use
of force. That policy is manifestly the implementation of the UN purpose of effectively main-
taining international peace and security by providing, among other things, for the regulation
of the unilateral use of force. That regulation was presumed to give States more security. If
an interpretation of Art. 51 would result in putting States in a more vulnerable situation
vis-,-vis different types of illegal use of force, and hence less secure in their international
relations, it would be a disservice to the Charter's policy on the international use of force"
(footnotes omitted)).
243. ICJ STATUTE art. 38(1).
244. Id. art. 36(1).
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limited simply because the same matter is simultaneously before the
Security Council.
Chapter V of the U.N. Charter delineates the functions and powers
of the Security Council. In Article 24, U.N. Members confer on the
Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security .... ,'4' As already noted, it is significant that the
Council's responsibility is primary and not exclusive.246 The fact that the
issue before the Council concerns the maintenance of international peace
and security, therefore, does not exclude the power of the Court to
fulfill its judicial function by interpreting the legality of Charter-delegat-
ed acts taken by the Security Council.
Furthermore, the Security Council is specifically instructed in Arti-
cle 36(3) of the Charter to remain cognizant of the judicial function: "In
making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should
also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule
be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court."247 It is clear from
these Charter provisions that the Security Council is not in any sense
"superior" to the Court in addressing matters concerning the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. There is no hierarchical
structure in the Charter as between the Council and the Court; therefore,
the appropriate conceptual paradigm for understanding judicial involve-
ment in disputes or situations with which the Security Council deals is
one of concurrent authority rather than one of either "judicial suprema-
cy" or "executive supremacy." That the Court is understood to have an
interpretive function to play with respect to the constituent instruments
of international organizations is confirmed by Article 34(3) of the ICJ
Statute, which requires the Court to notify the relevant organization
"[w]henever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public
international organization ... is in question in a case before the
Court."24' Given that the Court is one of the organs of the U.N. and
given its recognition as the "principal judicial organ" of the U.N. sys-
tem, it would be odd to interpret Article 34(3) as referring to all constit-
uent treaties but the U.N. Charter.
The framers of the Charter explicitly limited the recommendatory
powers of the General Assembly during any period when the Security
Council is exercising the functions assigned to it under the Charter in
245. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
246. On this point vis-,i-vis the General Assembly, see Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at .163.
247. U.N. CHARTER art. 36(3).
248. ICJ STATUTE art. 34(3).
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respect of any dispute or situation. 249 No similar provision exists to
constrain the jurisdiction of the Court, and together with the other
provisions referred to above, this clearly points to the intent of the
framers to enable the primary political organ (primary vis-d-vis the
matters at hand) and the primary judicial organ to exercise their jurisdic-
tion concurrently with respect to the same dispute or situation.
The municipal law doctrine of litispendence prevents two organs
from exercising concurrent jurisdiction where there exists: (a) an iden-
tical question; (b) pending between the same parties; and (c) before
organs which possess jurisdiction of identical or similar character. It is
primarily a rule of convenience to avoid duplication of litigation and
contradictory results in the municipal context. It does not imply any
sense of hierarchical ordering of functions. This doctrine is not a general
principle of international law and has no application to the organs of the
U.N.
Professor Shabtai Rosenne suggests that the doctrine should be
adopted in international law to prevent a dispute from being recom-
mended for .both judicial and political settlement concurrently.25 How-
ever, the doctrine is incapable of application as between the organs of
the Security Council and the ICJ because of the different nature of their
functions. Litispendence is applicable only to cases with which organs of
an identical or similar character simultaneously deal. The Security
Council is a political organ and the ICJ a judicial one. Although both
jurisdictions overlap, their functions are not identical.
The practice of the ICJ and its predecessor the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) establishes categorically that the doctrine
does not apply to the U.N. The PCIJ observed that:
[T]wo or more international organs which have been seized of the
same matter may follow independently their own procedures, touch
on the merits, and possibly arrive at different conclusions as to the
contested facts, the applicable law, the admissible evidence, and
the most appropriate way for the resolution of the pending dis-
pute.
251
249. U.N. CHARTER art. 12(1) ("While the Security Council is exercising in respect of
any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General
Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless
the Security Council so requests").
250. SHABTAi ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986 86
(1989).
251. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 20
(Aug. 25). For further elaboration of the case law, clearly establishing the fact that a dispute
might be simultaneously seized by both the I.C.J. and a political organ of the U.N., a state of
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The other condition of the doctrine of litispendence - that the ques-
tion before the two organs is identical - arguably cannot arise in re-
spect of matters submitted simultaneously before the Security Council
and ICJ. Interstate questions most often have both political and legal
aspects. Thus, questions before various international organs may be
identical from one point of view, yet different from another, and the
condition of identity of questions may not be as self-evident as in
municipal law.
In submitting to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under ICJ
Statute Article 36(2), some states have specifically reserved the right to
suspend proceedings before the ICJ where the Security Council is exer-
cising its functions in respect of the same matter.252 This suggests that
unless a reservation specifically excludes the concurrent jurisdiction of
the ICJ, there is no requirement inherent in the Charter that the Court
defer to the Council. Moreover, it should be noted that even if a state
reservation specifically sought to preclude simultaneous jurisdiction, the
Court would still retain the inherent authority to interpret the scope of
the matters covered by the reservation in light of its overriding duty to
consider matters of jus cogens.
b. The Jurisprudence of the ICJ Clearly Establishes Not Only Its
Competence But Also Its Willingness to Exercise Its Jurisdiction in
Respect of Disputes or Situations Which Are Simultaneously
Before the Security Council
In Aegean Sea Continental Shelf,253 the Court was cognizant of the
fact that, simultaneously with the provisional measures proceedings
before it, the Security Council was seized of the matter; nevertheless,
the Court did not decline to exercise its jurisdiction. 4 In a separate
opinion, the late Judge Lachs wrote that "[t]he pronouncements of the
Council did not dispense the Court, as an independent judicial organ,
from expressing its own view on the serious situation in the disputed
area." 255 Similarly, in Tehran Hostages, the Court held unanimously that
it was competent to entertain the U.S. request for an indication of provi-
affairs which cannot in itself be regarded in either organ as a bar for its further action, see
infra part II.A.l.b and Ill.A.l.c.
252. Dan Ciobanu, Litispendence Between the International Court of Justice and the
Political Organs of the United Nations, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 209, 210 (L. Gross ed. 1976) (advocating the application of the litispendence doctrine
between the political organs of the U.N. and the I.C.J. to prevent concurrent jurisdiction).
253. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 1 (Sept. 11).
254. Id. at 12-13.
255. Id. at 21 (separate opinion of Judge Lachs).
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sional measures even though the Security Council was "actively seized
of the matter. 256 Again in Nicaragua (Jurisdiction),257 the Court defini-
tively stated that "the fact that a matter is before the Security Council
should not prevent it being dealt with by the Court and that both pro-
ceedings could be pursued pari passu."
258
c. The Court, as the "Principal Judicial Organ" of the U.N., Is
Competent to Deal with All the Legal Issues Duly Put
Before It, Irrespective of the Political Implications of Its
Analysis or Decision for Security Council Proceedings
With Respect to the Same Dispute or Situation
According to the distribution of roles between the Council and the
Court in the Charter framework, their respective missions are on two
distinct, albeit reinforcing, planes. The Council, as the only political
organ with the power to bind the entire membership of the organization,
is concerned primarily with the "political" or policy aspects of the
dispute. The Court, as the "Principal judicial organ of the United Na-
tions, " ' the guardian of international law, and the only permanent
judicial institution to which all states have potential access, is under an
obligation to attend to all the "legal" aspects of the dispute. Included in
this obligation on' the part of the Court is its duty to set the parameters
for the situations in which it will prefer, adopt, or defer to the legal
interpretations of other U.N. organs; that is to say, even when the Court
limits the circumstances when it will offer a judicial opinion on the
requirements of law, it is the Court itself which decides those limits in
light of the kind of normative and factual situation presented to it.
260
The essential point is that while it is inevitable that "legal" matters will
have a political character, and "political" matters will have legal impli-
cations, that fact cannot operate as a dispositive fetter on the compe-
tence of either organ to fulfill its mission. The jurisprudence of this
Court is definitive on this issue:
256. Tehran Hostages, 1980 I.C.J. at 21.
257. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26)
[hereinafter Nicaragua Jurisdiction].
258. Id. at 433.
259. U.N. CHARTER art. 12.
260. Thus, for example, the Court may decide as a matter of judicial policy and inter-
institutional comity that the interpretive practice of other U.N. organs (interacting with the
acquiescence of states) shapes the law on one kind of question (for example, whether absten-
tions count as a "concurring votes" under art. 27(3) of the Charter). See Namibia, 1971 I.C.J.
at 22. On another kind of question (such as presents itself here) involving the bedrock norms
of the entire legal system, such a quasi-renvoi to the interpretation of other organs will not be
justified.
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It is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Na-
tions, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between
parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal questions by
the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in
promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute.26'
Moreover, by acting in such a manner, the Court is not to be seen as
fettering the ability or duty of the Security Council to act within the
powers that the Charter delegates to it. Nor is the Court to be seen as
ousting the Council's powers to interpret the constraints placed by law
on those powers (both by the text of the Charter itself and by relevant
background norms external to the Charter). Rather, the Court need only
be recognized as having, within the Court's institutional legal realm,
competence to give its opinion, as a cointerpreter of the U.N. Charter,
on the nature of these constraints, on whether such constraints have in
the opinion of the Court been transgressed, and on the legal conse-
quences of any finding of transgression for proceedings before the
Court. Thus, the concurrent or parallel jurisdiction of the Security
Council and the ICJ is not only temporal, in that each can simulta-
neously be seized of the same dispute, but it is also concurrent with
respect to subject matter, in that overlap between what is "political" and
what is "legal" does not divest either organ of its competence to carry
out its functions in accordance with its interpretations of that compe-
tence.
Thus, the fact that the legal decision requested by the applicants in
the present case is intertwined with "political" matters in no way re-
lieves the Court of its duty to exercise its judicial function. The Court
has definitively stated as much in Certain Expenses of the United Na-
tions:
It has been argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined
with political questions, and that for this reason the Court should
refuse to give an opinion. It is true that most interpretations of the
Charter of the United Nations will have political significance, great
or small. In the nature of things it could not be otherwise. The
Court, however, cannot attribute a political character to a request
which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, namely,
the interpretation of a treaty provision.262
261. Tehran Hostages, 1980 I.C.J. at 22.
262. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 155.
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The request for the rendering of a judicial opinion on the lawfulness of
the maintenance of the arms embargo which Bosnia is today putting
before the Court involves not only issues of treaty interpretation of the
Charter and of the Genocide Convention but also the quintessentially
legal-judicial issue of jus cogens. In most instances and certainly in this
case, the severability of the legal from the political is impossible and
consequently cannot be a condition precedent to this Court's valid
exercise of its jurisdiction.
d. Although the Security Council and the ICJ Are Both Devoted
to the Purposes and Principles of the U.N. and Should Fulfill
Their Mandates in a Complementary Manner, It Is Possible That
in the Exercise of Their Respective Jurisdictions, the
Two Organs Could Reach Conflicting Results
While both Council and Court are independent and sovereign in
their own domain, they are also part of a single, overarching U.N. legal
system, and both owe their existence to the pursuit of the same purposes
and principles enshrined in the preamble and the first two articles of the
U.N. Charter. Both organs must seek to fulfill their mandate in respect-
ful cognizance of the role that the other organ is "constitutionally"
called upon to play within the Charter regime. The majority in Nicara-
gua (Jurisdiction), for example, stated that "[t]he Council has functions
of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court exercises purely
judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their separate but
complementary functions with respect to the same events. '263
Bosnia is asking the. Court, as the judicial organ of the U.N., to
address from a strictly juridical point of view the question of whether
Bosnia's inherent rights under international law have been infringed and
the legal significance of the status of the prohibition and prevention of
genocide and aggression as jus cogens norms from which no derogation
is permitted. It is incumbent upon the Court to address these questions,
all duly brought before it, irrespective of political consequences, to the
extent that its disposition of the case does not preclude the Security
Council from fulfilling its mandate. Only if the Court's disposition of
the dispute before it frustrates or renders impossible or impracticable the
Security Council's exercise of its jurisdiction can it be said that the
limits of the Court's powers will have been reached. Even at this point,
what the Charter demands of the Court is best understood not as defer-
263. Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), 1984 I.C.J. at 435.
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ence but as the pursuit of comity, or, to use the language of the Nicara-
gua (Jurisdiction) judgment, "complementar[ity]."
It necessarily follows from the ICJ's consistent jurisprudence re-
garding the differing missions of the two organs that the ICJ accepts the
possibility that the Security Council and the Court will reach. conflicting
conclusions with respect to the same disputes. To quote again from
Judge Lachs in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, "both organs are compe-
tent each in its own sphere to deal with the matter submitted to it and
come to its own conclusions thereon. ''2 6 Clearly, then, the Security
Council is not '"superior" to the Court, a fact that this Court most recent-
ly made clear in Lockerbie.265
2. The ICJ Has the Authority Under the Charter to Consider the
Validity of Security Council Resolutions if This Is
Required in Order to Fulfill Its Judicial Mandate
a. The Travaux Prdparatoires of the U.N. Charter Establish that
Security Council Resolutions Which Violate Jus Cogens
Are Not "Generally Acceptable" and Are "Without Binding
Force," and the Court Is Preeminently Qualified
to Make This Determination Where the Jurisdiction of the
Court Is Otherwise Established
The interpretive significance of the failure of the Charter to address
expressly, let alone in detail, the question of the ICJ's power to pass
judgment on Security Council conduct must be addressed. At the U.N.
Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. in 1945, the
delegation of Belgium submitted the following proposal as an amend-
ment to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the precursor to the present
U.N. Charter:
Any State, party to a dispute brought before the Security Council,
shall have the right to ask the Permanent Court of International
Justice whether a recommendation or a decision made by the
Council or proposed in it infringes on its essential rights. If the
Court considers that such rights have been disregarded or are
threatened, it is for the Council either to reconsider the question or
to refer the dispute to the Assembly for decision.2
264. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1976 I.C.J. at 28.
265. Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. at 114.
266. Doc. 2, G/7(k)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 335, 336 (1945) (emphasis added).
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It is of significance that this language of "essential rights" comes close
to the language associated with the concept of jus cogens.
In elaborating the reasons for which Belgium submitted this propos-
al, its delegate stated:
Next to political security, comes juridical or legal security. Several
Delegations have expressed concern lest influence or political
pressure might induce the Security Council to impose on a State
modifications of essential rights which are derived, in the case of
that State, from the general rules of international law or from
treaties. 7
These concerns are as pressing and substantial today as they were in
1945. Having finally broken free from its Cold War shackles, the rein-
vigorated Security Council is, for the first time in its history, finally able
to fulfill its mandate. The Council's ability effectively to maintain
international peace and security hinges directly upon the consolidation
of its still precarious legitimacy. It would be a lamentable stage in the
evolution of the U.N. if the Council, freed from legal scrutiny, were
able to disregard fundamental international law in the process of binding
states to the positive law content of its resolutions. If Member States
cannot turn to the Court when their essential jus cogens'rights have been
breached by Council action, then there is' no "rule of law" within the
U.N. system. These concerns, first raised by Belgium in 1945 by refer-
ence to all legal rights of states whether or not jus cogens may well
continue to become more acute as the corpus of international law devel-
ops.
As to what the Court should do when confronted with claims that
the Security Council has breached the essential rights of states, Belgium
was of the opinion that: "If the Court should consider that such rights
have in fact been threatened or disregarded, it would be the duty of the
Council either to reconsider the question and maintain or modify its
conclusions, or to refer the matter to the Assembly. 268 The Belgian
amendment met with opposition from all the major powers, including
eventual Permanent Members of the Security Council (the United States,
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom), and was ultimately defeat-
ed. The U.S. delegate, in response to Belgium's concerns, emphasized
that the Council is already required by the terms of the Charter to act
267. Id.
268. Id. at 336-37. Note as well how the Belgian proposal was clearly assuming a more
authoritative role for the U.N. General Assembly than was expressly included in the U.N.
Charter text.
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"in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization"2 69
and referred explicitly to the Council's obligation to act in accordance
with principles of international law.270 It becomes apparent from this
negotiating history that the drafters did want to ensure the legality of
Council action but did not want to encumber unduly the Council's
ability to act swiftly by granting states an automatic or routine right of
appeal to the Court from Security Council decisions. Thus, the ultimate
defeat of the Belgian amendment is in no way indicative of a desire to
free the Council from normative controls; rather, the travaux show
conclusively that this amendment was rejected on the understanding that
the Council was bound to act within the limits imposed by principles of
international law. The difficult interpretive question is whether the
travaux dictate the conclusion that the drafters intended to free the
Council from any form of direct or indirect judicial control.
Upon being assured by the U.S. and U.K. delegates that the word
"recommend" in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (now Article 36 (Chap-
ter VI) of the U.N. Charter) entailed no compulsion or enforcement,
Belgium withdrew the amendment. 27' However, it introduced a similar
amendment in the Commission on Judicial Organization, 2 which was
also defeated because states were of the view that it was not a practica-
ble procedure. However, the Statement on Interpretation of the Charter,
which was ultimately adopted by the Committee on Legal Problems as a
result of Belgium's proposals, provided that each U.N. organ would, in
the first instance at least, interpret the parts of the Charter applicable to
its functions itself. In the event that two organs expressed or acted upon
different interpretations of the Charter, they could ask for an advisory
opinion of the Court or set up an ad hoc committee of jurists to exam-
ine the question. Most importantly, the Committee concluded that "[i]t is
to be understood, of course, that if an interpretation made by any organ
of the Organization or by a committee of jurists is not generally accept-
able it will be without binding force."'273 It is beyond doubt that an
interpretation of the Charter which contravenes jus cogens norms cannot
be "generally acceptable" and was thus understood by the framers of the
Charter to be without binding force. This language parallels the words
used in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which states that a
269. Virtually identical language to this would, of course, eventually appear in art. 24(2)
of the U.N. Charter.
270. Doc. 433, 111/2/15, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 49 (1945).
271. Doc. 498 111/2/19, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 65-66 (1945).
272. Doc. 873 IV/2J37(1), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 653-54 (1945).
273. Doc. 933 IV/2/42(2), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 710 (1945) (emphasis added).
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peremptory norm of general international law is a norm "accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted .... What nonetheless
remains unclear from the travaux is how, institutionally, it is to be
determined whether a given interpretation of the Charter is not generally
acceptable.
b. It Falls upon the ICJ, as the Guardian of Legality in the U.N.
System and the Only Permanent Judicial Institution to
Which All States Have Potential Access, to Determine
the Conditions Under Which Security Council
Action Is "Generally Unacceptable"
One is forced to conclude from an analysis of the travaux
priparatoires of the Charter that the framers were certain of the need to
circumscribe the powers of the Security Council within the normative
parameters of international law but did not unambiguously record their
understanding of how, institutionally, it would be determined whether a
particular interpretation of the Charter was not "generally acceptable."
Professor G. R. Watson concludes from this that "the text and negotiat-
ing history of the relevant U.N. instruments do not rule out all forms of
judicial review. Instead, they suggest that any U.N. organ, including the
Court, should ignore a 'generally unacceptable' interpretation of the
Charter by another organ., 275 The applicants submit that the following
propositions are fair conclusions to draw from the travaux preparatoires
of the Charter. First, the Court does not have powers akin to that of a
constitutional court in a system based on a model of judicial supremacy
to pass directly binding or routine judgment on the legality of Security
Council action. The Court was quite definitive on this matter in
Namibia, stating that "[u]ndoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers
of judicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the
U.N. organs concerned.
2 76
The applicants also do not dispute the proposition, affirmed most
recently by this Court in Lockerbie,2" that the Court is bound, as part of
274. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 53.
275. G. R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 14 (1993); see also infra note 304 (concerning ICJ consideration of the validity
of Council resolutions as being analogous to an "act of state" situation for domestic courts).
Significantly, Watson's language regarding ignoring other organs' interpretations suggests that
the appropriate way to conceptualize the effect of an ICJ determination that a Council
resolution is contrary to jus cogens is to think of the ICJ as treating the resolution as void
rather than as voiding the resolution.
276. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 33.
277. Judge Lachs stated in his separate opinion in Lockerbie that "[w]hile the Court has
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its vocation of applying international law, to respect as part of that law
the binding decisions of the Security Council. However, just as Security
Council decisions comprise part of the corpus of international law that
this Court must apply, so too, indisputably, do jus cogens norms of
international law, which, by definition, cannot be superseded by contrary
Security Council action.
The applicants also accept the proposition that all U.N. organs are
empowered, in the first instance, to interpret for themselves the relevant
provisions of the Charter and that the interpretation must in some pre-
sumptive sense be respected by other U.N. organs, including the Court.
The Court stated in Certain Expenses of the United Nations that
"[p]roposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ulti-
mate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of
Justice were not accepted ... As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each
organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. 278
However, judicial obeisance to the Security Council's interpretation of
its powers under the Charter is not without limits. It is permissible only
so long as it does not encroach upon or fetter the Court's institutional
role within the U.N. system. To this extent, the independence and sover-
eignty of all U.N. organs must be respected. 279
Whenever it is plausibly argued that an organ of the U.N. acts in
such a way as to violate a jus cogens norm, there is a prima facie
engagement of the jurisdiction of the Court. If the concept of jus cogens
is to have any meaning at all, the Council must not be permitted to be
the exclusive interpreter of when jus cogens norms are in play and
the vocation of applying international law as a universal law, operating both within and
outside the United Nations, it is bound to respect, as part of that law, the binding decisions of
the Security Council." Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. at 138 (separate opinion of Judge Lachs).
278. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 168 (emphasis added).
279. Judge De Castro stated, in his separate opinion in Namibia:
Each of these [three U.N. organs] has the power to interpret the provisions of the
Charter verbis et factis. Such interpretation must be respected by the other organs
provided it does not encroach upon their jurisdiction. Any other solution would be
inconsistent with the independence and sovereignty of each organ. On this view of
the matter, the Court does not have the powers of a constitutional court to pass
judgment on the validity or the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security
Council.
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 180 (separate opinion of Judge De Castro). In this passage, Judge De
Castro is recognizing only that the Court does not enjoy a direct power of review and that all
U.N. organs must enjoy a presumption of validity, a proposition with which this Memorial
does not quarrel. As for the responsibility of the Court to uphold the law within its own
sphere, it is worth noting that the view that any Security Council action which violates jus
cogens is a prima facie encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Court comports with Judge
De Castro's own recognition elsewhere in his opinion that principles of fundamental law must
prevail over considerations of inter-institutional comity. Id. at 180-85.
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infringed. When another U.N. organ attempts to derogate from such
norms, in the enforcement of which all states have the most fundamental
of interests, it naturally falls upon this Court to ensure that the rule of
law is respected within the U.N. system. Matters of everyday interpreta-
tion of much nonfundamental U.N. law may well be conceded by the
Court to fall largely within the ambit of the U.N. political organs, but
fundamental law must be the jealous preserve of the U.N.'s principal
judicial organ.
However, it is worth noting at this point that such a role for the ICJ
does not entail a power to render- of no force or effect a Security Coun-
cil resolution in the sense analogous to the power of domestic courts to
strike down laws and regulations from the statute books.28 ° This would
suggest a model of institutionalized judicial supremacy which would be
as inappropriate to the textual provisions of the Charter and Statute as to
the structure of the current international legal system. Rather, it entails a
power in the Court to declare that the legal effect of jus cogens is to
make the resolution unenforceable within the Court's juridical realm in
that the Court may (indeed, must) treat the resolution as having no
legal force or effect for the purposes of its legal determination. This is
compatible with a model of concurrent authority. Given the absence of
any mention of jus cogens in the Article 103 paramountcy clause,
combined with the Committee on Legal Problem's reference in its
Statement on Interpretation to "interpretation[s] ... not generally ac-
ceptable," such a role for the Court was not foreclosed by the rejection
of the Belgian amendment and is justified by the Charter and the evolu-
tion of the U.N. since 1945.
c. The Development of the Charter Through the Practice of U.N.
Organs Since 1945 Establishes the Power of the Court to
Ensure that the Security Council Respect Jus Cogens Norms,
Where the Jurisdiction of the Court Is Otherwise Established
If the Court rejects the argument that the ICJ had subject matter
jurisdiction over the violations of jus cogens by U.N. organs, as a matter
of conformity with the ordinary understanding of the U.N. Charter as
reflected in and confirmed by the travaux, it is submitted in the alterna-
tive that such a power has been acquired by this Court over the course
of the evolution of the U.N. since 1945.
The 1969 Vienna Convention states in Article 31(3)(b) and (c) that
as a "general rule of interpretation" of treaties "there shall be taken into
account, together with the context... (b) any subsequent practice-in the
280. Further discussion of the legal force or effect of the arms embargo resolution(s) and
obligations stemming therefrom is found infra part IV.
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application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation; [and] (c) any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties., 28' According to Pro-
fessor Watson, "[a]ctual exercise of judicial review by the World Court,
it seems, would constitute this sort of 'subsequent practice.' Indeed,
states themselves may have established a 'subsequent practice' by their
unanimous acquiescence in the Court's de facto exercise of judicial re-
view."282 Professor Schachter makes a similar, though more general
comment, that "[i]t is understood that the world has undergone radical
transformation since 1945 and that the expectations of the governments
at that time cannot be controlling at present."'2 83
Thus, rejection of the Belgian amendment at San Francisco is by no
means dispositive of the issue whether the Court has the power to
declare Security Council actions to be in violation of jus cogens. In
1945, there was no need to provide the machinery to ensure the consti-
tutionality of acts of the political organs of the U.N.; however, today, as
pointed out by Professor Leo Gross:
It has often been observed, sometimes with regret, that the Charter
has not provided for judicial control or review of the constitution-
ality of acts of the political organs of the United Nations. There
was no need for it when the Organization was set up. This is a
matter which has assumed major significance with the rapid devel-
opment of the United Nations and the increasingly dynamic con-
ception of its role. The United Nations desires to promote the rule
of law in the life of nations. It is perhaps not too soon to start
thinking whether and in what form and in what circumstances such
a control or review could be established.8 4
As early as 1949, the Court recognized in Reparations to United
Nations Servants that the U.N., and by implication its constituent or-
gans, "[m]ust be deemed to have those powers which, though not ex-
pressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. 285 It is
essential to the performance of the Court's duties and the exercise of its
jurisdiction to decide in all legal disputes over which it properly has
281. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 31(3)(b)(c).
282. Watson, supra note 275, at 14.
283. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1994).
284. 2 LEO GROSS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 925 (1984).
285. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory
Opinion), 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparations to United Nations Servants].
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jurisdiction "any question of international law,, 286 that it have the power
to uphold the integrity of jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms are the
most vital part of the international legal order which the Court is duty-
bound to uphold.
The Court was willing to consider the validity of General Assembly
and Security Council resolutions in Namibia, even though this was not
the subject matter of the request for an advisory opinion.287 However,
perhaps the most oft-cited case of judicial exercise of a review power is
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, referred to by Professor Gross
as a "landmark" in the jurisprudence of the Court and the evolution of
the U.N.288 Professor Watson concludes from his analysis of this case
that:
The Court did not deny that it might have some authority to inter-
pret the Charter - only that it did not have the ultimate authority•
to do so. It left open the possibility, in other words, that its inter-
pretation might be binding only on the parties before it, just as its
decisions in contentious cases .... If each organ must determine
its own jurisdiction "in the first place at least", it seems plausible
that some other organ might pass on jurisdictional questions after a
political organ makes a prima facie determination that it has juris-
diction to act.289
In matters concerning jus cogens, the most appropriate "other organ," it
has been argued throughout this Memorial, must be the ICJ.
Complementarity requires the Security Council to exercise its judgment
in matters of international peace and security and for the ICJ to pass
judgment where jus cogens norms are implicated (whenever the oppor-
tunity presents itself in advisory or contentious proceedings that are
independently jurisdictionally well founded).
The most recent case in which the Court was required to consider
directly the relationship between the Council and the Court was
Lockerbie. Several commentators read that case as presaging a willing-
286. ICJ STATUTE art. 36(2)(b).
287. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 45:
The question of the validity or conformity with the Charter of General Assembly
resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not form the
subject of the request for advisory opinion. However, in the exercise of its judicial
function and since objections have been advanced the Court, in the course of its
reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal consequences
arising from those resolutions.
288. 2 GROSS, supra note 284, at 901-07; see also Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 151.
289. Watson, supra note 275, at 16.
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ness of the Court to play the role argued for in this Memorial. Accord-
ing to Professor Watson:
[T]he Libya decision marked the first time a significant portion of
the World Court intimated it could exercise a power of judicial
review in contentious cases .... The decision implies that the
international community is moving toward a broader acceptance of
judicial review than the framers of the U.N. Charter perhaps envi-
sioned - that subsequent practice under the Charter may have
altered its interpretation.2 90
In his case comment on the Lockerbie decision, Professor Franck also
observes:
The legality of actions by any U.N. organ must be judged by
reference to the Charter as a "constitution" of delegated powers. In
extreme cases, the Court may have to be the last-resort defender of
the system's legitimacy if the United Nations is to continue to
enjoy the adherence of its members. This seems to be tacitly ac-
knowledged judicial common ground.29'
Jus cogens, the effects of which the Court was not required to consider
in Lockerbie, sits atop the hierarchy of legal norms which the Court
must apply, and any allegation that it has been violated is most defi-
nitely an "extreme case."
3. The Contention that the ICJ Has No Authority Within the "Constitu-
tional" Framework of the U.N. to Pass Any Judgment on the
Legal Vires or Effects of Security Council
Resolutions Cannot Be Sustained
A contrary strain of argument to that articulated in the preceding
subsections has been encapsulated in a recent article by a leading publi-
cist, Professor Michael Reisman.292 Such arguments must be addressed.
a. Are the Internal Checks on the Security Council
a Sufficient Constraint on Its Conduct?
Professor Reisman's central thesis appears to be that the Charter
itself imposes sufficient intrainstitutional constitutional limitations on
290. Id. at 27.
291. Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardian
of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 523 (1992).
292. W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 83 (1993).
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Council conduct to obviate the need for any judicial role in most cir-
cumstances. Specifically, he points to the existence of the veto, and the
expansion of the nonpermanent seats in the Council in 1963 from six to
ten, to show that these political checks and balances are an adequate
constraint on Council conduct. 293 Driving the Reisman analysis is the
overriding concern that the Council be free to act as it sees fit in dis-
charging its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and
security. In his opinion, if states could object to Council conduct based
on treaty or custom-based rights, the entire Charter scheme for the
maintenance of international peace and security could fail. The existing
internal checks, such as they are, ensure the requisite freedom of action
for the Council, and it is this degree of freedom which, in the Reisman
view, is essential to the fulfillment of the Council's "primary role. 2 94
Putting aside issues of jus cogens for the time being, an initial
objection to the Reisman view is the implication that the Security Coun-
cil is in some sense "superior" to the Court as concerns the maintenance
of international peace and security. His discussion of the internal checks
and balances is premised on the existence of a Charter-mandated circle
of freedom within which the Security Council's authority is (or should
be) unfettered by external sources. As argued above, there is no general
hierarchical structure in the Charter as between the Security Council and
the Court. The operative principle is one of concurrent rather than
exclusive authority.295 If such a system is to be effective, then by defini-
tion the checks and balances which set the bounds of each organ's
authority cannot be exclusively internal to each organ. This is one of the
necessary components of inter-institutional comity and the "fruitful
interaction," to use Judge Lachs' phrase in his Lockerbie opinion,296
required between the Security Council and the Court if both are to be
effective in their respective missions.
b. Does a Judicial Role in Reviewing Security Council
Conduct Unduly Interfere with the Flexibility
Required by the Security Council?
Professor Reisman's analysis on this point starts from his reading of
Lockerbie. He expresses concern about the fact that, when the Council is
293. Id. at 83-84.
294. Id.
295. See supra part III.A.I.
296. See infra note 335 and accompanying text for the full quotation.
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acting under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, a state that is the target of
its resolutions could sidestep Council recommendations by initiating an
action in the Court based on treaty or customary law. In his view, it
would impose undue rigidity on the range of options available to the
Council if, in an effort to insulate its resolutions from ICJ treatment, the
Council were required to move more quickly to a Chapter VII decision
from its Chapter VI recommendatory mode. In his view, where the
Council is factually, rather than explicitly, in a Chapter VII mode, even
recommendations should have the effect of overriding treaty or custom-
based rights. Because the Court declined to take this route, the full
range of nuanced devices available for it to achieve its primary mission
will be harder to use according to this argument.297 Professor Reisman's
conclusion is that, since Lockerbie, "the Council will be obliged to go
directly to a Chapter VII decision if it fears that the delinquent state
may 'jump the arena' and try to rely on other preexisting, but now
inconsistent, rights it believes will be cognizable in the Court."29 While
Professor Reisman does not address the possibility of jus cogens-based
ICJ scrutiny, even once the Council has acted in its Chapter VII deci-
sion-making role, the logic of his arguments would suggest that his con-
cerns about the inhibition of flexibility would apply at least as strongly
to such a role for the ICJ.
In response, it is essential to reiterate the point that, because of the
inevitability of "legal" matters having a political character, and "politi-
cal" matters having legal implications, there will be overlap (indeed,
perhaps even tension) between the jurisdiction of the Council and of the
Court. In fulfilling its mandate and addressing the matters duly put
before it, the Court should not be seen as fettering the ability or duty of
the Security Council to act within the powers that the Charter delegates
to it. Just as the Council interprets the Charter to determine the scope of
its authority, the Court is also an interpreter of the Charter. This overlap
between what is "political" and what is "legal" does not divest either
organ of its competence to carry out its functions.299 What needs to be
recognized is that the Court is competent to give its opinion where such
opinion is necessary to determine the legal issues before it. Professor
Reisman's concerns only materialize where the Court's disposition of a
dispute before it frustrates or renders impossible or impracticable the
297. Reisman, Constitutional Crisis, supra note 292, at 89.
298. Id. at 89-90.
299. See supra part III.A.I.
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Security Council's exercise of its jurisdiction. In such an event, the
limits of the Court's powers will have been reached. 3 °
It must be reiterated that Professor Reisman does not address the
issue of the Court's role when confronted with possible action by the
Security Council which produces a conflict with jus cogens norms. This
is clearly not a situation, by definition, in which internal political checks
and balances can be effective. In this respect, the nonjudicial dimensions
of the Security Council's institutional character need to be squarely kept
in mind. The ILC has recently put the matter in terms that draw atten-
tion to the problems of insulating the Council from ICJ "review":
The question arose whether the Security Council - with a restrict-
ed composition in which some members enjoy a privileged status
- should be vested with the competence to act for the "interna-
tional community as a whole" in ... matters ... [related to the
determination of the existence, attribution and consequences of
international crimes of States]. As a political body, the Council was
entrusted with the essentially political function of maintaining
peace, so that-it operated with a high degree of discretion; it acted
neither necessarily nor regularly in all the situations that would
seem to call for action; it operated, on the contrary, in a selective
way. The Council was not bound to use uniform criteria in seem-
ingly similar situations; crinies of the same kind and gravity could
be treated differently or not be treated at all. Indeed, serious crimes
could be ignored. Lastly, the Council was under no duty to state
the reasons for its decisions or its action or inaction....
Whatever the position regarding aggression, the propriety of rely-
ing too much on political bodies for the implementation of State
responsibility for crimes was highly questionable with regard to the
other delinquincies contemplated in subparagraphs (b), (c) [which
includes genocide], and (d) of paragraph 3 of article 19 [of Part I
300. Such a situation might arise where State X sues State Y for breach of treaty before
a Security Council resolution produces any conflict of obligation. If X were to seek an
indication from the Court, by way of provisional measures, that Y must not seek a Chapter
VII decision from the Council or must not vote on a particular kind of resolution (if Y is a
Member of the Council), this may be the kind of action by the Court which could be viewed
as frustrating the Council by virtue of making it unlawful, within the Court's realm, for a
state to participate in a Council act which art. 103 would suggest is within the Council's
jurisdiction. This is where a "mere" treaty obligation is at issue. Where jus cogens norms
would be detrimentally affected by a potential resolution, it may be that it would be a
frustration of the Court's jurisdiction to expect that it never issue provisional measures. (Note
that, even on the first scenario, the Court might not be viewed as frustrating the Council if
provisional measures are viewed, as a general matter, as nonbinding on the state(s) addressed
or if, in the particular case, the Court took care to phrase its order as recommendatory only).
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of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility] which should be met
by judicial means .... [Tihe Security Council did not seem to
meet the requirements of criminal justice or indeed those of justice
in general.3"'
Genocide as a concrete phenomenon and jus cogens as a juridical con-
cept are uniquely suited to judicial interpretation and to a recognition
that the ICJ has a special role in such matters. For the Court to declare
its opinion on the matter, with the de facto result that the issue is sent
back to the Council for further consideration in light of the Court's
ruling, fosters a process consistent with the model of concurrent au-
thority that Bosnia sees as deriving from the Charter.
c. Does the Charter Give the Court Competence to Review
Chapter VII Actions by the Council?
Professor Reisman seems to take the view that if there are any
substantive controls available to the Court, they must be found in the
Charter itself. He discounts the process of "implying" restraints from the
Charter and points instead to the lack of substantive and procedural
standards for review of Chapter VII actions in the Charter as telling of
the intention of the framers. In his view, "[t]heir very absence, in a
context where so much power is assigned to the Council, is telling. A
judicial review function, viewed in the formal Charter regime, seems
somewhat difficult. ' 30 2 It is arguable that Professor Reisman moves from
the unassailable argument that the Court possesses no direct review
powers over the Council akin to domestic law judicial review to the
conclusion (at least the implicit conclusion) that the Court can exercise
nothing in the way of indirect review through its contentious jurisdiction
with respect to the obligations of states (as well as through its advisory
opinion jurisdiction).
Bosnia has sought to argue that while the drafters did not build into
the Charter or the ICJ Statute a species of direct review of the Security
Council, the drafters left entirely open the power of the Court to engage
in forms of indirect review if the status of a Security Council resolution
is a necessary part of the legal issues properly before the Court. Absent
an explicit textual qualifier, the Court must be taken to have been
granted full powers to give advisory opinions, when properly requested,
that necessitate deciding jus cogens issues raised by Security Council
resolutions. It must also be assumed that in contentious cases, where the
301. 1993 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 116, at 120-21.
302. Reisman, Constitutional Crisis, supra note 292, at 94.
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determination of states' obligations is dependent on deciding the prior
question of the legal status or effect of a Security Council resolution, the
Court has the power to decide whether or not to give effect to that
resolution in deciding the case at hand. In neither scenario (contentious
jurisdiction or advisory jurisdiction) will the Security Council be placed
in a position of being a party before the Court or being formally bound
by the judgment of the Court." 3
It is in this sense that any judgment by the Court of Security Coun-
cil conduct can only have an indirect effect on the Security Council.
Any "binding effect" of the view taken by the Court as to the status of
a resolution will be dictated by general principles of good faith and
principles of comity between coequal organs.3°
Keeping in mind these limitations on binding effect produced by the
Court's limited formal jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that it possesses
303. It may well be arguable that any U.N. organ or agency that puts a question to the
ICJ is bound in good faith to respect the answer given. Even if this is not the general
situation for advisory opinions, opinions on matters of jus cogens may represent a special
case. Normative authority for such an effect might be bolstered by the provision in the 1986
Vienna Convention, which provides that any organ of an international organization that
requests an advisory opinion to resolve ajus cogens issue surrounding a treaty provision must
treat the I.C.J. 's answer as "decisive." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
66(2)(e), 251 I.L.M. 543 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Vienna Convention].
304. Of course, in a contentious case, all states before the Court will be bound by the
Court's judgment, including the view it has taken on the status of a Council resolution. For
example, in a case brought under the Genocide Convention challenging a state's active
participation in an arms embargo that is implicated in genocide, the state sued is bound by a
Court decision, for example, that the duty to prevent genocide in art. I of the Genocide
Convention is an ongoing obligation unaffected by a Security Council resolution that conflicts
with jus cogens.
In order to grasp the conceptual structure of situations in which the validity of Security
Council resolutions may be reviewed in a contentious case between states, there would appear
to be a direct analogy to the standard "act of state" problem faced by domestic courts. In such
"act of state" cases, by the very decentralized nature of the international system, the courts of
one state exist in a coordinate, not hierarchical, relationship with official organs of other
states. Even when a court appeals to international law in order to judge the validity of an
official act of another state, there is no question of one state's courts being able to pass
judgment on the acts of another state in a way that has direct legal effects in that foreign
state's legal system. However, within its sovereign realm, the domestic courts of one state
may nonetheless be called upon to decide the validity of acts of a foreign state as a necessary
step in deciding the rights and obligations of the two (usually private) parties before that
court. When that court decides not to recognize the foreign act as having the legal effects that
it purports to have and decides thereby that it is without legal effect (whether the label used
is "void," "invalid," "inoperative," or "unenforceable"), the foreign state, not being a party, is
not bound to the judgment, and the status of its official act in its own legal system is not
changed as a direct legal effect of the court's decision. The private parties before the court,
however, are bound to the substantive determination of their rights and, within the legal
system where the litigation is occurring, the validity of the foreign official act is as deter-
mined by the court before .whom they are appearing.
For "domestic court," "foreign state," "foreign official act of state," and "private
parties," substitute, respectively, "the ICJ," "the Security Council," "a Council resolution,"
and "states parties," and the analogy should make itself clear.
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some power to pass judgment on acts of the Security Council, even if,
to reiterate, that "review" is indirect. It has been conceded that this
Court does not exercise direct review or appellate jurisdiction analogous
to that which exists in many municipal legal systems; however, where
deciding a matter "in accordance with international law" (per Article 38
of the ICJ Statute) requires determining the validity or legal effects on
the obligations of states of Security Council action, the Court must
undertake this evaluation. To do otherwise would be for the Court to
abdicate its role as the "principal judicial organ" of the U.N. This senti-
ment was well expressed by Judge Onyeama, in his separate opinion in
Namibia, where he stated:
The Court's powers are clearly defined by the Statute, and do not
include powers to review decisions of other organs of the United
Nations; but when, as in the present proceedings, such decisions
bear upon a case properly before the Court, and a correct judgment
or opinion could not be rendered without determining the validity
of such decisions, the Court could not possibly avoid such a deter-
mination without abdicating its role of a judicial organ." 5
In coming to a similar conclusion in his separate opinion in Bosnia v.
Serbia II, Judge Lauterpacht concluded that the Court, "as the principal
judicial organ of the U.N., is entitled, indeed bound, to ensure the rule
of law within the United Nations system and, in cases properly brought
before it, to insist on adherence by all United Nations organs to the
rules governing their operation.
On the theme of the rule of law, it should finally be noted that
Professor Reisman's argument regarding the sufficiency of the internal
checks and balances on the Security Council ignores the evolving body
of higher law which has developed alongside the Charter before, during,
and since the 1963 amendment to the Security Council membership and
voting rules upon which he places near-dispositive reliance. It is a
stream of law which demands for its interpretation and application a
special role for the% ICJ, and the quintessential example of this is geno-
cide. The proper approach to the Court's role, while respecting the
Council's need for freedom of action, is much more nuanced than the
type of judicial review which spawns Professor Reisman's fears. To use
Professor Reisman's own juridical language, the "authority signals" that
the international community has been sending cannot be concentrated -
and frozen - in one historical and textual moment, namely 1963. It is
305. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 131-32 (separate opinion of Judge Onyeama).
306. Bosnia v. Serbia 11, 1993 I.C.J. at 439 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
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to these special "authority signals" of the international community
regarding the special authority of the ICJ in matters of both genocide
and jus cogens that the argument now turns.
B. The ICJ Has Special Authority to Pass Judgment on the Actions
of All International Actors, Including Organs of International
Organizations, that Are Related to the Genocide
Taking Place in Bosnia
1. Analogies with the Role of Municipal Courts in Promoting a
Constitutional Rule of Law Argue for an Authoritative Role
for the ICJ in Judging Whether Acts of International
Organizations, and Not Simply the Acts of States,
Conflict with Jus Cogens Norms
[Jius cogens is ipso jure a legal, not a political question," and so it
exists in the primary domain of the judicial branch of the U.N.307 At the
very least, such matters fall within the coordinate domain of the ICJ and
Security Council, but no less firmly within the ICJ's domain for that.
Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention support an under-
standing of just such a role for the Court as they suggest certain analo-
gies with higher, constitutional norms in national legal systems.
Analogized in this way, it becomes clear that the ICJ is the institution in
the international system best placed to interpret the scope of these norms
and their legal effects on the actions of participants in the "constitutional
order."30 8
The Court is institutionally situated to breathe substance into the all-
too-abstract doctrine of jus cogens. If U.N. institutions, such as the
Security Council, do err in defining permissible action in the context of
genocidal aggression, the ICJ stands as the only viable mechanism by
which such errors may be rectified (at minimum, judicially remarked
upon) before the impugned conduct reaches catastrophic proportions.
A fundamental policy consideration for the Court to bear in mind is
that "constitutionalism" should not be relegated solely to the realm of
analogy. The progressive deepening of the rule of law in international
affairs is a crucial value for the Court to seek to promote in assessing its
role in elaborating the content and consequences of jus cogens norms.
307. Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 447.
308. The relevance of the 1969 Vienna Convention goes beyond analogies, however,
when one notes the existence of art. 66(a), which allows unilateral submission of disputes
concerning the application or interpretation of arts. 53 or 64 to the ICJ. For an argument that
the Court has a clearly mandated extraordinary role to play regarding jus cogens norms, see
infra part III.B.
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Once such a law-promoting role for the Court is entrenched in the
international system, common standards of behavior will be made more
explicit and expectations on the part of international actors will be
established. Future behavior will be influenced accordingly. It is, as
Professor Suy puts it, imperative that if "public international law is to
transform itself ... into a highly organized and effective legal system,
international jus cogens must develop." 3°9 It is this constant evolution
that is the true character of a legal order.
2. Proper Interpretation of the Genocide Convention Suggests a
Broad Power for the ICJ to Judge the Legality of
Acts of the Security Council in This Situation
The Introduction to this Memorial argued that the ICJ has a wide
jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention that can be
unilaterally initiated by a single State. Of equal significance are the
signals sent by Articles VIII and IX - not simply about formal jurisdic-
tion but also about justiciability once jurisdiction has been established
- about how far the Court should feel empowered, indeed obligated, to
determine the requirements of international law. In other words, where,
as here, another authoritative actor in the U.N. system, the Security
Council, has adopted positions contrary to those argued before the
Court, what level of deference should the Court show to these Council
positions? Such deference could take the form of either refusing to
address certain questions or of according a certain margin of discretion
to the Council's views of matters.
It is clear that the Genocide Convention's provisions are incompat-
ible with any interpretation other than one which accords the Court a
prominent, if not preeminent, role in setting out the precise require-
ments, as the Court determines them, of jus cogens norms and of Geno-
cide Convention obligations and rights. The most obvious point in this
regard is that Article IX of the Convention clearly singles out the ICJ as
the organ of choice to resolve disputes of several kinds ("relating to ...
interpretation, application or fulfillment") and places no procedural
hurdles at all in the way of the Court's being seized of such broadly
defined matters by one party. A survey of multilateral treaties will
reveal how very rare compromissory clauses of this sort are. According
the Court such a supreme jurisdictional role is wholly incompatible with
the Court's subsequent adoption of a deferential review stance once
jurisdiction has been established.
309. Suy, supra note 50, at 71.
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Another point to keep in mind is the wording of Article VIII, which
refers to "competent organs of the United Nations ... tak[ing] such
action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appro-
priate for the prevention and suppression of' genocide.310 It is of course
possible to read Article VIII conservatively as effecting nothing more
than a renvoi to the competences of organs such as the ICJ as they are
spelled out under the U.N. Charter, of which the ICJ Statute may be
considered an integral part. It is equally possible to read Article VIII as
conferring a broader jurisdiction on the Court than it would otherwise
possess to deal with issues under the Convention. For instance, a very
liberal interpretation would allow the Court, simply on the basis of
being "call[ed] upon" by a single state, to invoke its role under Article
92 of the U.N. Charter as the "principal judicial organ" of the U.N. in
order to pass judgment as it considers "appropriate" on the acts of other
U.N. organs. It may be conceded that such an interpretation would
probably stretch the principles of interpretation of human rights treaties
too far, especially given the presence of Article IX, which specifically
addresses the jurisdiction of the ICJ. However, what must be given the
fullest possible interpretation is Article IX's directive to act "as [the ICJ]
consider[s] appropriate." This is a purely subjective phraseology which
at minimum must be taken to mean that, in the common enterprise of
combatting the scourge of genocide, judicial reticence in asserting the
legal point of view (interpretive and/or remedial) is unjustifiable.
Of course, Article VIII equally applies to other organs of the U.N.,
such as the Security Council and the General Assembly, and what one
organ considers "appropriate" another might consider "inappropriate."
Article VIII alone cannot resolve the clash of institutional subjectivities
of U.N. organs. However, read in tandem, Articles VIII and IX, which
so clearly place genocide in the framework of law and judicial consid-
eration, establish in the clearest of textual terms that the ICJ's role in
relation to genocide goes beyond its characterization in the U.N. Charter
as the "principal" judicial organ. The ICJ is clearly treated in the text of
the Convention as having a special authority to play an active role once
its formal jurisdiction has been established.
While recourse to travaux should be viewed with suspicion in
interpreting human rights documents where such recourse seeks to cut
back on a purposive and effectivist interpretation of the document, it is
worth noting that the travaux confirm the above interpretations based on
text tied to purpose. There is ample support for the view that the origi-
310. Genocide Convention, supra note 11, art. VIII (emphasis added).
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nal signatories to the Convention equally perceived the Court to be the
most institutionally suitable organ of the U.N. to perform this grave
function. In the discussion of the Draft Convention, it is crucial to note
that it was proposed that the Security Council be given express jurisdic-
tion to deal with cases of genocide. This proposal was rejected for a
number of reasons, including that voiced by Mr. Maurtua of Peru who
stated that the Security Council was a political organ and that primary
jurisdiction over genocide should reside in a judicial body."' The U.S.
representative, Mr. Matkos, also "expressed the fear that politically
influential States might bring or refer allegations of genocide to the
Security Council rather than to the ICJ in order to ensure that the con-
troversy was adopted on political rather than on legal grounds. 3t 2 It is
evident, therefore, that the Convention provides for active judicial
involvement in the elaboration of duties that flow from a jus cogens
violation and in the examination of concrete allegations.
3. The 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties
Represent the International Community's Recognition of the
ICJ as the Principal Judicial Authority for Passing Judgment
on D isputes Involving Jus Cogens Norms
The Court's fundamental role in reviewing disputes involving jus
cogens norms affecting the entire international community is also em-
phasized in the 1969 Vienna Convention and more recently in the 1986
Vienna Convention.
Article 65 of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides a procedural
framework which states and international organizations must follow with
respect to invalidity, termination, withdrawal from, or suspension of the
operation of a treaty to which they are parties. If one state party to a
convention raises an objection to another party's action within the
context of Article 65, Article 65(3) stipulates that "the parties shall seek
a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of
the United Nations."3 3 In Article 66, where "no such solution has been
reached within a period of 12 months following the date on which the
objection was raised" and the dispute concerns "the application or the
interpretation of article 53 or 64," the dispute may be unilaterally
311. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 101st mtg. at 410 (1948).
312. Matthew Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B. U. INT'L L.J. 1, 56 (1985).
313. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 65(3); 1986 Vienna Convention, supra
note 303, art. 65(3).
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submitted to the Court for review pursuant to Article 66(a) "unless the
parties by common consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration.
314
Considering the existence of Article 66, Bin Cheng goes so far as to
assert that "under general international law at the auto-interpretative
level, there can be no jus cogens ... for the Vienna Convention pro-
vides for jus cogens only at the arbitrable and ultimately at the judicial
level."3 '1 Danilenko similarly asserts that "it is possible to claim that the
peremptory law-making process cannot be finalized by states alone: jus
cogens effectively crystallizes only with the Court's imprimatur.' '316 He
further adds that:
In the absence of a precise definition of the concept, the ICJ is
presented with an ideal opportunity not only to develop the actual
content of the corpus of jus cogens norms, but also to shape the
basic constitutional requirements relating to the creation and ap-
plication of the "higher law" of the international community.
31 7
Article 66 of the 1986 Vienna Convention duplicates the procedure
found in Article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, where the parties to
a dispute are both (or all) states, 3'8 but it provides different procedures
for such disputes involving international organizations. This difference
in treatment was due to the fact that international organizations do not
have standing before the Court under the ICJ Statute. Therefore, to have
provided for unilateral initiation of contentious proceedings for disputes
involving international organizations might not have been technically
possible due to the procedural barriers contained in the Statute. In
particular, where a state is party to a dispute to which one or more
international organizations are also parties, either the state (by virtue of
Article 66(2)(b)) may seek to initiate the normal U.N. process for an
advisory opinion31 9 or the international organization (by virtue of Article
314. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 66(a). Note that, according to art.
66(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a State Party may choose instead unilaterally to set in
motion a conciliation procedure for any dispute concerning the articles in Part V (which
includes arts. 53 and 64), the details of which are set out in an Annex to the 1969 Vienna
Convention. It is worth noting that the conciliators are specifically required by para. I of the
Annex to be "qualified jurists." Thus, both alternatives to the ICJ, arbitration and conciliation,
are explicitly legal or juridical in nature.
315. Bin Cheng, On the Nature and Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 203, 232 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982).
316. GENNADII M. DANILENKO, LAW MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 264
(1993).
317. Id. at 265.
318. See 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 66(a); 1986 Vienna Convention,
supra note 303, art. 66(2)(a).
319. International organizations which are not authorized under art. 96 of the ICJ Statute
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66(2)(c)) may directly request an advisory opinion of the Court in
accordance with Article 65 of the ICJ Statute. 320 According to Article
66(2)(e), any advisory opinion that issues "shall be accepted as decisive
by all the parties to. the dispute concerned," a phraseology that avoids
the word "binding" but which suggests that the ICJ Statute's state-
centeredness has been substantially supplemented by the 1986 Vienna
Convention. In effect, a de facto contentious procedure involving not
just states and involving a "decisive" legal effect has been created, and
in this way the state-state procedures of the 1969 Vienna Convention
have all but been duplicated. The only cause for hesitation with respect
to the foregoing is the failure of Article 66(2)(b) to require explicitly
that the intermediary international organs (through which a state must
funnel a request for an advisory opinion) act on the request and forward
the request for the advisory opinion to the ICJ. However, on the basis of
a principle of equality of international persons in a treaty relationship,
an implied duty to pass on the request for an advisory opinion could be
read into the provision. Some hints that such a duty is indeed implicit
can be found in Article 66(2)(f), which states that if a request for an
advisory opinion, including under Article 66(2)(b), is "not granted" (by
the Court itself), then any party may unilaterally initiate an arbitration
procedure (again involving only "qualified jurists") set out in the Annex.
The situation where competent bodies refuse to pass on a state's request
for an advisory opinion appears not to have been contemplated, which
suggests an interpretation whereby such a situation cannot arise due to
there being an implied duty to pass on the request.
to ask for advisory opinions follow the same procedure as states in order to seek an advisory
opinion. See 1986 Vienna Convention, supra note 303, art. 66(2)(d).
320. The 1986 Vienna Convention provides:
With respect to a dispute concerning the application or the interpretation of article
53 or 64...
(b) if a State is a party to the dispute to which one or more international
organizations are parties, the State may, through a Member State of the
United Nations if necessary, request the General.Assembly or the Securi-
ty Council or, where appropriate, the competent organ of an international
organization which is a party to the dispute and is authorized in accor-
dance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, to request an
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in accordance with
article 65 if the Statute of the Court;
(c) if the United Nations or an international organization that is authorized
in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations is a
party to the dispute, it may request an advisory opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in accordance with article 65 of the Statute of the
Court.
1986 Vienna Convention, supra note 303, art. 66(2).
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The textual provisions which provide for a.virtually novel procedure
for the ICJ to decide cases involving international organizations confirm
and, if anything, enhance the centrality of the ICJ in matters related to
jus cogens. The alternative procedure envisaged, that of arbitration, is
itself a clearly juridical procedure, which only can come about if the
parties give their common consent or if the ICJ itself does not grant the
request for the advisory opinion. It must be emphasized that the text of
the 1986 Vienna Convention makes strikingly clear that the ICJ should
have the authority not only to pass judgment on the conduct of interna-
tiOnal organizations, including the U.N., but also to issue legal opinions
that are "decisive." The signals sent about the special authority of the
ICJ in matters of jus cogens add strength to those emitted by Article 92
of the U.N. Charter, by the combination of Articles VIII and IX of the
Genocide Convention, and by Article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion.
The drafting history of Article 66 of the 1986 Vienna Convention
further suggests how widespread and deeply rooted is the international
community's acceptance and recognition that the Court is the principal
judicial body which should review disputes involving jus cogens
norms."' It is crucial to note that the ILC, in its 1980 report proposing
draft language for Article 66 of the 1986 Vienna Convention, provided
for disputes involving international organizations only to go to a concili-
ation procedure like that found in the annex to the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention'. The ILC saw no problem extending the preeminent role of the
ICJ in state-state treaty disputes from the 1969 to the 1986 Vienna
Conventions and indeed emphatically noted in its 1980 report to the
General Assembly that the 1969 Vienna Convention "intended to give
the supreme world tribunal the principal responsibility for deciding mat-
ters of such gravity as the existence, the interpretation or the appli-
cation of a peremptory norm. '322 The reason given by the ILC for not
seeking to make the ICJ as central outside of state-state treaty disputes
was elliptical:
[The Commission] discarded the idea of referring to the possibility
of requesting an advisory opinion and at the same time conferring
binding force on that opinion. The possibility of setting in motion
an advisory opinion procedure seemed to be fraught with too many
uncertainties for a binding character to be attached to the opinion
thus obtained.323
321. See generally, Moritaka Hayashi, The Dispute Settlement Clause of the 1986 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 327; SHABTAI ROSENNE,
supra note 250, at 296-336.
322. 1980 Draft Vienna Convention, supra note 31, at 87 (emphasis added).
323. Id.
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Significantly, states themselves were bolder than the ILC and took issue
with the tentative ILC approach. In their responses to the 1980 Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, especially Draft Article 66, states
showed that the concept of jus cogens and its alliance with a special role
for the ICJ was firmly embedded in the collective international juridical
conscience. For example, the U.K. Government, in a report analyzing
the ILC's 1980 Draft Article 66, criticized the ILC's initial rejection of
advisory procedures and stated that "jurisdiction over jus cogens ques-
tions should specifically be conferred on the International Court of
Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, in view of
the fundamental nature of jus cogens claims and the severe repercus-
sions of claims to nullify treaty obligations on this ground. 32 4 The
actual text adopted by the conference of states in 1986 was, as outlined
above, much more creative than the draft advanced by the ILC and took
more seriously than the ILC itself the ILC's own view that the Court
should be accorded "principal responsibility" in matters of jus cogens.
The significance of Article 66 of both the 1969 and 1986 Vienna
Conventions goes well beyond the creation of jurisdiction-conferring
provisions. The collective opinio juris represented by these texts and
their related travaux generates the parameters for understanding the
preeminent interpretive role that the ICJ must play once its jurisdiction
is secured, including in cases where the ICJ is called upon to judge the
conformity of acts of international organizations, and not only states,
with the dictates of jus cogens.
Language used by the Court has suggested its principal role in
developing international law as a general matter.2 5 However, the very
special role of the Court in matters of jus cogens requires a stance of
creative confidence in pursuing the opportunities presented to it (rare as
they may be) in order to clarify the content and effects of jus cogens
norms. The dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez in Reservations to the
Genocide Convention presages the approach which the Court should
adopt:
In appraising multilateral conventions - and specifically that on
genocide - in the future, we shall be forced to abandon traditional
324. Comments and Observations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth
Session, [1982] 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 134, 135, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41350/Add.9 (1982).
325. See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 92 (Feb. 24). Danilenko
suggests that art. 62 of the ICJ Statute (which gives a third party state the right to intervene)
demonstrates recognition of the Court's influence on developing international law beyond the
parties involved in a dispute. DANILENKO, supra note 316, at 256.
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criteria, because we are now confronted with an international
situation very different from that which existed before the last
social cataclysm; the latter has caused profound and rapid evolu-
tion of facts and ideas in the international sphere ... it is neces-
sary that the Court should determine the present state of law in
each case which is brought before it and, when needed, act con-
structively in this respect, all the more so because in virtue of
Resolution 171 of the General Assembly of the United Nations of
1947, it is at liberty to develop international law, and indeed "to
create law," if that is necessary, for it is impossible to define exact-
ly where the development of this law ends and its creation begins.
To proceed otherwise would be to fail to understand the nature of
international law, which must always reflect the international life
of which it is born, if it is not to be discredited.
The method I have just indicated is that applied to domestic con-
stitutional law .... After the social cataclysm which we have just
passed through, a new order has arisen and, with it, a new inter-
national law. We must therefore apply and interpret both old and
new institutions in conformity with both this new order and this
new law.326
In a similar vein, Professor Franck concluded in a recent article that
"[i]n the inevitably rough spots ahead, it is reassuring to note that the
Court has carefully, and quietly, marked its role as the ultimate arbiter
,,327of institutional legitimacy. In the present case, not only is the institu-
tional legitimacy of the entire U.N. directly at issue but also the effec-
tiveness (and, by extension, the normative legitimacy) of the doctrine of
jus cogens. If the Security Council is permitted by the Court to derogate
from such norms, then institutional reticence (on the part of the institu-
tion most associated in the juridical conscience of the international
community with defending and elaborating jus cogens norms) will help
foster an understanding that the norms themselves have only an illusory
peremptory status.
326. Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. at 50-51 (dissenting opinion
of Judge Alvarez) (emphasis in original).
327. Franck, supra note 291, at 523.
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C. Appropriate Treatment of the Arms Embargo Resolutions and
Obligations Generated by Them Within the Court's Juridical
Order in Light of a Presumption of Validity of the
Resolutions of the U.N. Political Organs
It is conceded by the applicant that resolutions of the Security
Council must enjoy an initial presumption of validity. This Court has
definitively stated that "[a] resolution of a properly constituted organ of
the United Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ's rules
of procedure, and is declared by its President to have been so passed,
must be presumed to have been validly adopted., 328 However, such a
presumption can be no more than a starting point and cannot relieve the
Court of its Charter-based duty to address the legal aspects of the dis-
pute brought before it. The presumption of intra vires which the Securi-
ty Council enjoys in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not indicative of a
desire by the framers to place Council conduct beyond the reach of the
Court. Rather, as Judge Lauterpacht has argued in his scholarly capacity,
it actually reflects, rather than rejects, the importance of legality in the
U.N. system:
[The ICJ] did not seek to avoid the proposition that every act must
be justified by reference to the powers of the Organisation. Instead,
it stated merely that there is a presumption that an act is within the
powers of the Organisation if it is done for the purposes of the
Organisation.329
Professor Lauterpacht went on to observe of the presumption of intra
vires that "[t]his presumption is not an irrebuttable one; and its weight
may vary according to the context in which it is being applied. 33°
In the case at bar, context is everything. Context must include, inter
alia, the jurisdictional context, including the stage of proceedings of a
contentious case; the nature of the juridical opinion or relief being
requested; the nature of the norms at issue and the extent to which the
organs whose legal acts are in question considered the applicability of
the norms; and the facts, including their degree of proof before the
Court as well as the susceptibility of the facts to relevant changes. But it
has been the burden of Bosnia's arguments to make the case for one
328. Namibia, 1971 1.C.J. at 10.
329. Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations,
in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 88,
110 (1965).
330. Id. at 117.
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contextual consideration with which all other contextual variables must
contend. Whatever standards of judgment and associated curial defer-
ence may be appropriate to the "ordinary" task of interpreting the intri-
cate text of the Charter, these standards are manifestly inappropriate
where the context is a challenge to Security Council action or its effects
based on conflict between that action or the conduct it requires of states
and peremptory norms, especially those related to genocide. As put by
the ILC, the body with the "principal responsibility for deciding matters
of such gravity as the existence, the interpretation or the application of
a peremptory norm" is the ICJ.33 ' The travaux prdparatoires of the
Charter and the emphasis therein on the notion of "general acceptabili-
ty," the history and text of the Genocide Convention, the normative
signals sent by the two Vienna Conventions, and the general principles
of interpretation applicable where human rights and the natural law
strain in international law intersect - all speak to the very special role
to be played by the Court in contexts such as that at bar. The result is
that the weight to be given to the presumption of validity must be
appropriately tailored (i.e., significantly lessened) where jus cogens
norms are implicated.
In several cases decided by the Court over the years, judges in
separate opinions have suggested tests for when the presumption should
be overcome. What they tend to have in common is extreme deference
to the political organs of the U.N. Judge De Castro suggested a possible
dividing line in his separate opinion in Namibia:
To challenge the validity of a resolution, it is not sufficient merely
to allege that it is possible to find a better interpretation; a resolu-
tion can only be criticized if it is demonstrably absolutely impossi-
ble to find any reason whatsoever, even a debatable one, upon
which an interpretation favourable to the validity of the resolution
may be based.332
Judge Morelli in Certain Expenses of the United Nations referred to
"manifest excs de pouvoir" as the governing standard.333 And Judge
Fitzmaurice in the same case stated that there must be a strong prima
facie presumption of validity of General Assembly expenses resolutions;
331. 1980 Draft Vienna Convention, supra note 31, at 87.
332. Namibi, 1971 I.C.J. at 173 (separate opinion of Judge De Castro). Note that this
phrasing is often read as setting out a highly deferential standard of review, an interpretation
which will be assumed for purposes of the current discussion. However, the passage may also
be consistent with a more scrutinous judicial role according to which the active search for an
interpretation that avoid invalidity reinforces the "constitutional" role of the court. See infra
part IV.B.3 for a discussion of the doctrine of "reading down."
333. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 223 (separate opinion of
Judge Morelli).
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in his view, the presumption does not arise, however, where invalidity
of the expenditure is apparent on its face and too manifest to be open to
reasonable doubt.334 None of these judges had jus cogens norms in mind
nor would they, at the historical junctures in question, have appreciated
the very special role that the international community has come to
expect the Court to play in respect of such norms. Interpreting questions
surrounding the U.N. budget at issue in the Certain Expenses of the
United Nations case is categorically distinct from the issue of the in-
volvement of the U.N. and its members in support, albeit unintended, of
genocide.
The applicant has, however, never sought to argue for the exclusive,
let alone the hierarchically supreme, competence of the Court in these
matters. Concurrent authority necessarily entails overlap, but it also calls
for attention to differentiation of function in a way that respects the
specific institutional capabilities and legitimacies of the relevant organs.
In carving out its own function, due respect must therefore be paid by
the Court to the place of the Security Council in the overall U.N. sys-
tem. Although the Court must zealously guard the integrity of the judi-
cial function, it must also recognize it is a coequal organ of the U.N.
and, as such, exists to achieve the same general objectives as the Securi-
ty Council. The complementarity of the judicial and political roles must
be recognized. According to Judge Lachs:
The framers of the Charter, in providing for the existence of sev-
eral main organs, did not effect a complete separation of powers,
nor indeed is one to suppose that such was their aim .... In fact
the Court is the guardian of legality for the international communi-
ty as a whole, both within and without the United Nations. One
may therefore legitimately suppose that the intention of the found-
ers was not to encourage a blinkered parallelism of functions but a
fruitful interaction.335
The- form that inter-institutional differentiation of functions and
cooperative dialogue should take in order to realize this vision of fruitful
interaction are questions to be worked out with the passage of time and
as concrete cases and specific advisory questions present themselves.336
334. Id. at 204-05 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
335. Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. at 138 (separate opinion of Judge Lachs) (emphasis added).
336. This will necessarily involve laying down principles to distinguish the appropriate
judicial response at the Provisional Measures stage as opposed to the Merits stage of a
contentious case. It is worth noting that the Provisional Measures stage represents somewhat
of a paradox for the Court. On the one hand, in the context of genocide, the need for immedi-
ate and effective relief (i.e., from the effects of an arms embargo) suggests an active,
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However, the following parameters suggest themselves as within the
range of options for the Court in the current case. All of what follows
assumes as established the Court's very special legitimacy in inserting
itself into situations involving possible breaches of jus cogens. Any
cutting back on how far the Court can go in any instance will therefore
be less a function of the counterbalancing institutional legitimacy of the
Security Council's involvement than it will be a function of both re-
specting and enhancing the comparative institutional capacities of the
two organs. In particular, the Court will need to give due effect to the
particular capabilities of the Council in the realm of fact determination
and fact assessment in ongoing and therefore fluid situations. The Court
will also need to recognize fully that the Council must be accorded the
space to act flexibly and effectively, even in contexts in which the Court
insists that legal considerations must be better integrated into Council
decision-making if the Court is to be expected to give legal effect to the
resulting decisions.
It is submitted that the Court has full authority to carry out the fol-
lowing without fear that it is compromising the specific functions of the
Council: (1) determine and declare the precise contours of those norms
that enjoy jus cogens status; (2) determine and declare the legal conse-
quences of a breach of jus cogens norms; (3) apply extant norms to a
putative fact situation (in a contentious case, notably at the Provisional
Measures stage) or hypothetical fact situation (in some advisory opin-
ions) in order to determine and declare what breaches and legal conse-
quences would result if those facts proved to be true or, if true, re-
mained unchanged; and (4) based on full factual argument and proof,
judge the conformity of past conduct of the Security Council with
peremptory norms and judge what the legal effects of any lack of con-
formity were for the period in question.
In all of the above situations, in the interests of complementarity,
the Court must give full consideration to the Council's evaluation of the
factual situation (including the Council's appreciation of whether causa-
tion is proved in terms of a cause-effect relationship between conduct
mandated or precluded by a Council resolution and breach of a peremp-
tory norm). However, also in the interests of complementarity, the Court
must not shy away, especially in the context of provisional measures
applications, from addressing itself to the Security Council in order
specifically to ask the Council to consider whether or not it is in breach
of international law in light of the Court's enunciation of the applicable
nondeferential role for the Court. On the other hand, problems of proof of facts (due to
difficulty of obtaining accurate information, the short time frame in which facts must be
sufficiently proved before the Court, and the knowledge that facts may be changing signifi-
cantly and quickly) may suggest more that a stance of deference to the Council's appraisals of
the requirements of the situation is appropriate.
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law and in light of the Court's own appreciation of the facts (however
preliminary).
It may be the case that the Court may not feel in a position at the
Provisional Measures stage, when facts are not yet fully established, to
treat a resolution as unenforceable before it by way of granting a provi-
sional remedy. However, the words of Article VIII of the Genocide
Convention, empowering all U.N. organs to "take such action ... as
they consider appropriate," suggest at minimum that the Court can
expressly inform the Council of the Court's provisional appraisal of the
legal situation and encourage reconsideration. 337 And, furthermore, the
possibility cannot and should not be excluded of the Court's gradually
assuming the power, even in the provisional measures context, to treat a
resolution as being of no force and effect before it, if three conditions
are satisfied: (1) that the law of jus cogens has become clarified and
articulated by the Court sufficiently for the Security Council to have
been fully aware of the relevant law; (2) that the factual situation is
manifestly clear and manifestly grave; and (3) that the causal link be-
tween obligations placed on states by a Council resolution and breach of
a peremptory norm is itself proven to the satisfaction of the Court.
IV. LEGAL STATUS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OBLIGATION OF STATE
PARTIES TO THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION TO PREVENT
GENOCIDE AND FOR THE RIGHT OF BOSNIA TO ENGAGE
IN SELF-DEFENSE ASSISTED BY OTHER STATES
A. Resolution 713 and Resolutions Reaffirming It May Be
Conceptualized as Ultra Vires Juridicial Acts of the
Security Council to the Extent that They Are Not in
Accordance with the Jus Cogens Prohibition of
Genocide or with the Inherent Right of Self-Defense
1. The Principle of Jus Cogens Renders Unlawful All Purportedly'
Juridical Acts, Including Acts' of Organs of International
Organizations, such as the U.N., and Does Not Merely
Invalidate Treaties or Treaty Provisions
Which Derogate from It
Given that jus cogens principles exist at the apex of international
legal prescriptions, be they defined as inviolable principles of morality
337. Which is by and large the route chosen by Judge Lauterpacht in Bosnia v Serbia 11,
1993 I.C.J. at 441 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht); see also supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
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or as eternal elements of public order common to all legal systems, 338 it
is only logical that their nonderogability should extend to all internation-
al juridical acts and not simply to treaties. Whether as self-standing
natural law edicts, as prescriptions embedded in general principles of
international law, or as the highest form of customary international
law, 339 jus cogens norms "exist and are enforceable independently of
treaties, and are immune from many judicial doctrines that have frus-
trated redress. ' 3 °
Literally, the term means "cogent law," "compelling or having the
power of compelling or constraining. 34' Framed as such, it is a pre-
scriptive rule that aims to regulate the behavior of international actors in
order that the international system itself may function according to
minimum dictates of order as well as justice. It is therefore not incon-
sistent with its 'literal meaning that the principle of jus cogens gathers up
all purportedly lawful or juridical acts in its sweep. Furthermore, the
behavior of all international persons must be constrained or compelled if
jus cogens norms are to play the pervasive and foundational role inher-
ent in the concept itself.
As the ILC noted in 1975, the international legal personality of the
U.N. and its organs has "a particularly firm foundation" in the reasoning
338. These two characterizations of jus cogens and their mutually reinforcing quality are
perhaps best captured by the Mexican delegation at the U.N. Conference on the Law of
Treaties, which argued that "[tihe rules of jus cogentv [are] those rules which derive from
principles that the legal conscience of mankind deemts] absolutely essential to coexistence in
the international community." Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 414; see also MERON,
supra note 58, at 221-222.
339. D'Amato, for instance, characterizes jus cogens norms as functioning essentially as
"very strong rule[s] of customary international law." Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 417.
Alternatively, Lauterpacht and Verdross attribute the norm's origins to a continuing natural
law strain in international law. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 49, at 113-14; Verdross, supra
note 49, at 58.
Shabtai Rosenne, relating the general principles of international law to the notion of
natural law, has observed that art. 38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute "places this element on a
footing of formal equality with the two positivist elements of custom and treaty, and thus is
positivist recognition of the Grotian concept of the co-existence, implying no subordination,
of positive law and the so-called natural law of nations (in the Grotian sense)." See SHABTA!
ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 610 (2d ed. 1985).
Rosenne goes on to observe that "[iun the Reservations [to the Genocide Convention] case...
the Court took the General Assembly's Resolution 96(1) of 11 December 1946 on the crime
of Genocide, and the Genocide Convention itself, as leading to the consequence that the
principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations
as binding on States, even 'without any conventional obligations." Id. (emphasis added).
Judge Lauterpacht states simply that "[t]he concept of jus cogens operates as a concept
superior to both customary international law and treaty." Bosnia v. Serbia 11, 1993 I.C.J. at
440 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
340. Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 417 (emphasis added).
341. Id. at 414-15.
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of the ICJ in Reparations to United Nations Servants.342 The legal
personality of international organizations more generally (at least as it
pertains, to their capacity to be parties to treaties) has been reconfirmed
in the 1986 Vienna Convention.343 Significantly, the 1986 Vienna Con-
vention precisely replicates the wording of three of the four articles
from the 1969 Vienna Convention that deal with jus cogens (Articles 53,
64, and 71) and numbers them identically. 3"
While no treaty to which an international organization is party is in
issue in the current proceedings, the 1986 Vienna Convention nonethe-
less constitutes strong evidence not only that the concept of jus cogens
is an indelible part of the modern international legal fabric but also that
this concept is no less applicable to the conduct of international organi-
zations than it is to the conduct of states. The ILC took the view that
the 1969 Vienna Convention (dealing only with state-state treaties) had
taken a preexisting legal concept and had given it "both a precision and
a substance which made the notion [of jus cogens] one of [the 1969
Vienna Convention's] essential- provisions. 3 45 For that reason, the ILC
"had no hesitation" in mapping Articles. 53,, 64, and 71 of the 1969
Vienna Convention directly onto Articles 53, 64, and 71 of the ILC's
1980 Draft Vienna Convention.346 It appears that between the time that
the ILC adopted these Draft Articles 53, 64, and 71 in 1980 and the
adoption by states of the 1986 Vienna Convention, states did not take
issue with the fact that the concept of jus cogens applied equally to
international organizations. 347 Thus, there is no controversy with respect
to the applicability of the norms of jus cogens to international organiza-
tions.
The same reasons which justify the expansion of the concept of jus
cogens to the acts of international organizations apply with equal force
to moving the applicability of jus cogens beyond the realm of interna-
tional treaties. Although the 1986 Vienna Convention imports the con-
342. State Responsibility in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
its Twenty-Seventh Session, [1975] 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 47, 89 n.197, U.N. Doc.
CN.4/SER.A/1975/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1975 Draft Articles on State Responsibility];
see also Reparations to United Nations Servants. 1949 I.C.J. at 174.
343. 1986 Vienna Convention, supra note 303, arts. 53, 64, and 71.
344. The differences as well as similarities in dispute settlement procedure between art.
66 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions were discussed supra part III.B.3.
345. 1980 Draft Vienna Convention, supra note 31, at 84.
346. Id.
347. See, e.g., Paul Reuter, Question of Treaties Concluded Between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or Between Two or More International Organizations, [1981] 2(t) Y.B.
Int'l Comm'n 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/341. Indeed, States insisted that the 1986 Vienna
Convention should be as true as possible to the 1969 Vienna Convention.
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cept of jus cogens only into the sphere of treaty relations of interna-
tional organizations, if the function of jus cogens is to express "moral
fundamentals and public welfare' 348 or to fix "the most important moral-
political demands of the ruling social forces," 349 then it is no more
defensible to limit the concept's scope to only one kind of juridical act
(i.e., treaties) than it Would have been to limit its applicability to a
single kind of international person (i.e., states).3"
In keeping with the view that jus cogens assists in the development
of an objective international legal order that governs the behavior of all
international persons, Professor Suy notes that "it is not only forbidden
to conclude treaties contrary to these Uus cogens] principles, but any
other act or action whose object or aim is not in conformity with these
principles must also be considered as being without effect." '351 Professor
Murty similarly observes that a "course of uniform behaviour in the
past" may also be repugnant to jus cogens and that governments could
legitimately claim that it is not obligatory to follow the impugned con-
duct.
352
It would be, therefore, unduly formalistic to restrict the breadth of
jus cogens to the context of treaty lawfulness simply by virtue of the
fact that, to date, it has only been formally codified in the two Vienna
Conventions. As the concept of jus cogens predates the Vienna Con-
ventions by many decades,353 as its association with treaty law can be
348. 3 FREDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 35
(1849).
349. Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law,
172 R.C.A.D.I. 223, 241 (1981-Ill).
350. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 173, at 9 ("Arts. 53 and 64 [of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion] prescribe the invalidity of treaties which conflict with peremptory norms. It can be asked
why, logically, the same effect should not be prescribed for violations of peremptory norms
by means other than treaties"). The point to be drawn from this is that jus cogens as a matter
of systemic logic must apply to juridical forms and acts other than treaties. Hannikainen goes
on in the next sentence to state that, while norms of jus cogens logically apply beyond
treaties, the specific legal effect of invalidation need not be the universal result. For a
discussion of legal effects other than invalidation (i.e., making or treating as void), see infra
part IV.B.
351. Suy, supra note 50, at 60 (emphasis added). It might be noted, in passing, that the
use by Suy of the phrase "without effect" is a suitable umbrella phrase for a range of possible
specific effects that result from jus cogens-based unlawfulness. As will emerge from the
discussion in part IV, expressions such as "unlawful" or "having no force or effect" should be
used in lieu of using the language of invalidation or voidness, which language does not
necessarily have a general applicability.
352. Murty, supra note 71, at 79.
353. While in theory the term jus cogens has appeared only recently (since the beginning
of the 1930s), ideas of compulsory rules of law of a higher nature has existed in the doctrine
of international law for centuries, in the works of Francisco de Vitoria, Alberico Gentili, and
Hugo Grotius among others. See Alexidze, supra note 349, at 228. As indicated earlier, its
deeper historical roots are attached to the still relevant natural law tradition. See Bosnia v.
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seen as simply a specific instance of a more general application, and as
the very definition of a "peremptory [i.e., jus cogens] norm" in Article
53 of both Vienna Conventions in no way limits the concept to the
treaty context, it would be faulty to deduce that jus cogens norms shall
serve only to restrict state conduct in matters of treaty formation (Article
53) and treaty continuation (Article 64). As guiding principles of mini-
mally acceptable conduct in the world order, peremptory norms must
equally proscribe noncontractual international acts that would otherwise
be permitted by international law, including acts such as resolutions of
organs of international organizations that would themselves have juridi-
cal consequences if treated as valid. Indeed, in the area of human rights,
which comprises a large part of the substantive rules of jus cogens, and
where gross violations:
almost always result from unilateral acts of states rather than from
international agreements, the nontreaty aspect of the problem is far
more important than the treaty aspect. Even scholars who reserve
jus cogens to treaty law tend to agree with the elementary proposi-
tion that international public order, public order of the international
community and international 'public policy do not allow states to
violate severally such norms as they are prohibited from violating
jointly with other states.354
This position is echoed by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice who, in his course at
the Hague Academy, adopted the position that "[t]here are cases in
which overriding rules of jus cogens produce a situation of irreducible
obligation and demand that illegal actions be ignored or not allowed to
affect the obligations of other States." '355
That the concept of jus cogens is relevant to the entire field of
international obligations, not just to treaty obligations, is authoritatively
confirmed by the manner in which the ILC has treated "peremptory
norms" as an integral component of its Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility.356 Article 17 of Part I of the Draft Articles makes clear that state
responsibility is incurred whenever an international legal obligation is
breached "regardless of the origin, whether customary, conventional or
Serbia 1, 1993 I.C.J. at 23 (reiterating the characterization of genocide as "contrary to the
moral law," first made in Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 I.C.J. at 23, which
adopted the reference from G.A. Res. 96(1)).
354. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 19 (1986).
355. Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered
from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 122 (1957-I1) (emphasis added).
356. 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 32, at 30.
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other, of that obligation. '357 Article 18(2) sets out a modification of
normal principles of intertemporal law in its contemplation of the avail-
ability of a retroactive defense if conduct that was in breach of interna-
tional law at the time of the conduct subsequently becomes obligatory
according to a newly arisen peremptory norm. 351 It is then further clari-
fied that there are some obligations (customary, conventional, or other)
which are to be conceptualized as giving rise to "international crimes"
as opposed to less serious "international delicts" when they are
breached; the formulation of such obligations in Article 19 bears a close
resemblance to the concept of jus cogens.359 Perhaps most significantly,
the notion of "peremptory norms," defined in identical terms to the
definition in Article 53 of the both Vienna Conventions, appears as a
limiting condition in the enunciation of certain defenses ("circumstances
precluding wrongfulness") available to states that will relieve them of
state responsibility for acts that would otherwise be illegal.360 Finally,
although at a far less advanced stage of development by the ILC, it is
likely that Part 2 of the Draft Articles will seek to follow through on the
distinction between international crimes and delicts by attaching addi-
tional consequences to breach of an international criminal norm.
36
'
Just as the applicability of jus cogens to international organizations
was seen by the ILC and by the community of states as a direct exten-
sion of the applicability of the concept to states, there seems to be no
barrier to a similar direct extension of the relevance of jus cogens from
357. Id. at 32.
358. Art. 18(2) states that:
[a]n act of the State which, at the time when it was performed, was not in confor-
mity with what was required of it by an international obligation in force for that
State, ceases to be considered an internationally wrongful act if, subsequently, such
an act has become compulsory by virtue of a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law.
id. It should be noted that art. 18(2) is -clearly premised on the view that peremptory obliga-
tions prevail over nonperemptory obligations in situations of conflict of obligation.
359. Art. 19(2) reads: "An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by
a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of
the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a
whole constitutes an international crime." Id.
360. See id. at 33 (art. 29(2)) (defining peremptory norm). Neither the defense of
"consent" (art. 29(1)) nor of "state of necessity" (art. 33(1)) can be invoked if the obligation
(breach of which would be otherwise precluded by the availability of the defenses) arises out
of a peremptory norm. See id.; see also discussion of state of necessity supra part II.B.4.
361. Se Riphagen, supra note 117, at 3-4. Mr. Riphagen has been replaced by Mr.
Arangio-Ruiz. There are some hints in both the reports of Mr. Arangio-Ruiz and the response
to them by the ILC that the Draft Articles proposed for Part 2 by Mr. Riphagen may not
survive ILC scrutiny, at least in their present form. Ongoing events, including the reinvigora-
tion of the-Security Council, have clearly injected a new dimension into the ILC's approach
to and consideration of Part 2.
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the field of the responsibility of states to the field of the responsibility
of international organizations.3 62 The conduct and juridical acts of in-
ternational organizations (such as resolutions purporting to have legal
effect) cannot be in a privileged position when compared to the rele-
vance of jus cogens to all conduct and juridical acts of states. As Pro-
fessor Brownlie explains:
The correlative of legal personality and a capacity to present inter-
national claims is responsibility .... General international law
provides criteria according to which an organization may be held
to be unlawful in conception and objects, and, apart from this,
particular acts in the law may be void if they are contrary to
the principle ofjus cogens.363
Therefore, even though the act disputed in the current case before
the Court is a Security Council resolution, this should have no bearing
on the assessment of its lawfulness according to jus cogens norms. The
above argument has shown that a juridical act needs to be neither a
treaty provision nor the act of a state in order for jus cogens to operate.
However, to the extent that assessing the obligations of international
organizations must largely proceed by reasoning from principle, logic,
and analogy due to a dearth of practice or doctrinal opinion, it must also
be noted that scrutinizing Security Council resolutions in light of jus
cogens norms is very close to scrutinizing treaty provisions themselves.
The personalities of the U.N. and its various organs are themselves
treaty-constituted and, more immediately, the formal validity of all
Security Council resolutions is traceable to treaty-conferred procedures
and powers. Most significantly, the legal obligation of states to obey
Security Council resolutions is treaty-dependent, existing only by virtue
of Articles 2(5), 25, and 48 of the U.N. Charter. If treaty provisions
must conform to jus cogens duties, it seems indisputable, as a matter of
both principle and a fortiori logic, that treaty provisions cannot autho-
rize or delegate authority to engage in juridical acts that would be
treated as void according to the law of treaties if they were directly
spelled out in the treaty itself.
Indeed, it would be reasonable to take the position that Article 53 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention must include, by necessary implication, not
362. On the legally uncertain dividing line between state responsibility in relation to the
activities of international organizations and the direct responsibility of international organiza-
tions for the conduct of their organs (e.g. the U.N. Security Council), see 1975 Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, supra note 342, at 86-91.
363. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 49, at 701(emphasis added).
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just treaty provisions but also sub-treaty (i.e., treaty-delegated or treaty-
authorized) rules. As made clear in Reparations to United Nations
Servants, the U.N.'s personality is clearly objective and separate from
that of Member States. But this is not to deny that such personality is
simultaneously intimately bound up in the interstate treaty that is the
U.N. Charter. Thus, while there is no question that Article 53 of the
1969 Vienna Convention does not apply directly to the U.N. (since the
Convention creates treaty obligations only for ratifying states), the
objective legal order of customary or general international law that
parallels Article 53 must be reasoned to merge two sets of prohibitions:
the prohibition against states' adopting treaty-authorized rules thatcon-
flict with jus cogens norms and the prohibition against nonstate actors
whose personality and specific capacities are constituted by a state-state
treaty from doing what the states parties could not do themselves.
The discussion to this point has assumed situations in which the
conflict of a treaty-delegated act with jus cogens norms is both pur-
poseful and immediate. However, such an act can still potentially be
repugnant to jus cogens if the conflict of obligation occurs due to the
effect of the norm or act or only after the passage of time. Hersch Lau-
terpacht reasoned in a similar vein, although he was not expressly
addressing the status of treaty-authorized acts. In a 1953 report to the
ILC, he stated that "[a] treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if its
performance involves an act which is illegal under international law
... . ,,364A treaty which on its face is lawful may therefore be rendered
unlawful by virtue of illegal effects to which it subsequently gives rise.
In part IV.B infra, the question of whether a legal instrument, notably a
treaty-delegated instrument such as a resolution, need necessarily be
rendered void as a result of an effects-based conflict with jus cogens
norms will be addressed. While it will be contended that voidness is
neither necessary nor always desirable as a legal effect, it will be taken
for granted that the lawfulness of a resolution of an international organi-
zation is affected in some way when that resolution requires perfor-
mance that conflicts with other obligations held by those to whom the
resolution is addressed.
364. Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties, in [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 154,
U.N. Doc. AICN.4/63.
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2. For the Resolutions of the Security Council to be Treated as Having
Legal Force and Effect, the Council Must Act in Accordance with the
U.N. Charter Which Incorporates by Reference Principles of
Justice and International Law Which, in Turn, Are at
Minimum Comprised of Jus Cogens Norms
a. By the Combined Operation of Articles 24(2), 1(1), and 25 of the
U.N. Charter, the Charter Must be Interpreted to Incorporate
Jus Cogens Norms as an Integral Part of U.N. Law
The provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention relating to principles
of treaty interpretation have assumed the status of customary internation-
al law and thus apply to the interpretation of the Charter.365 The "ordi-
nary meaning" of the Charter requires the Security Council to act in
accordance with international law in order for its decisions to have
binding force. Article 24(2) of the Charter requires that the Security
Council, in discharging its duties, "act in accordance with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations." These purposes and principles,
found in the first two articles of the U.N. Charter, include the directive
in Article 1(l) that the U.N. maintain international peace and security
"in conformity with the principles of justice and international law." As
the concept of jus cogens is indisputably simultaneously a "principle of
justice" and an aspect of "international law," it is uniquely apt to be
included within the phrase contained in Article 1(1) and thereby incor-
porated by reference into Article 24(2). Consequently, the Security
Council is at minimum required by these articles to act in accordance
with jus cogens norms. It may be that, as a matter of the best interpreta-
tion of the Charter, the Security Council is also bound to respect, or at
least consider, other principles of international law that have not
achieved the status of jus cogens. However, it is only necessary to the
case at bar to accept the overriding relevance of jus cogens, norms. Once
this interpretation is established, it is further necessary to accept that the
Court is institutionally suited366 to judge the scope of such norms and to
365. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 31.
366. See supra part 11I.B (discussing the various normative indicators, notably the univer-
sal treaties such as the Genocide Convention, the 1969 Vienna Convention, and 1986 Vienna
Convention, which clearly situate the Court in this way).
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offer its opinion of what kinds of circumstances occasion a breach of
these norms.367
(i) An Analysis of Article 1(1) Reveals that the Security Council Must
Act in Conformity with "Principles of Justice and International
Law" in the Context of Maintaining the Arms Embargo on Bosnia
As the wording of Article 1(1) goes to the heart of both normative
and institutional issues at stake in this case and because the placement
of the words "principles of justice and international law" in Article 1(1)
produces some ambiguity in terms of what those words modify, it is
necessary to look at the travaux preparatoires for Article 1(1).368 Article
1(1) of the Charter enunciates the fundamental purpose of the U.N. and
reads in its entirety:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and interna-
tional law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
It appears that there is a two-fold purpose in Article 1(1): (1) the
taking of effective collective measures against threats to the peace and
(2) the adjustment or settlement of disputes before (an initial or further)
breach of the peace occurs.369 One reading of Article 1(1) suggests that
the requirement of acting "in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law" modifies only the second of these purposes. Thus,
367. As has been acknowledged supra part IllB, the Court and Council are probably
best thought of as coequally suited to pass judgment on whether or not conformity with those
norms has been achieved in a particular factual situation. Within this shared responsibility, the
Court has a particular responsibility to judge the conformity of past conduct with jus cogens
in light of facts proven before it and the Council has a particular responsibility to judge
conformity of ongoing or contemplated conduct with jus cogens in light of a fluid factual
situation.
368. A detailed account of the travaux debates on the wording and on the specific
location of this phrase within art. 1(1) can be found in JOSE MARIA RUDA, THE PURPOSES
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PREAMBLE, ARTICLE I AND ARTICLE 2) 108-27 (1983). For ease of reference and as testimo-
ny to the thoroughness of Ruda's digesting of the travaux, all subsequent references are to
both Ruda and the primary source in question.
369. Indeed, at one stage in the drafting of art. 1(1), the paragraph was divided into
subparagraphs to draw a distinction between these two elements of this purpose. However, the
indentation and punctuation was later modified by the Co-ordination Committee. See RUDA,
supra note 368, at 95-96.
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on this superficial reading, Security Council actions do not need to con-
form with international law if they involve the taking of collective
measures against threats to the peace.
Of course, the absence of a provision requiring conformity with
international law does not amount to an exemption from the need to
conform with these principles. Indeed, if the Security Council and other
U.N. organs were not required to respect international law in the exer-
cise of their duties, one would expect that a provision specifically to this
effect would have been included in the Charter. 370 The absence of such
a provision indicates that, at the very least, a narrow interpretation of
the extent to which the Security Council may deviate from accepted
norms of customary international law should be applied by the Court. At
a minimum, Article 1(1) must require the Security Council to respectjus
cogens norms. Also, since the eventual settlement of an underlying
dispute must be resolved in conformity with principles of justice and
international law, the Security Council must avoid taking collective
measures which would significantly prejudice fundamental rights impli-
cated in the dispute. In this respect, it is important to note that the arms
embargo has been maintained as part of a strategy for producing a
(peacefully) negotiated settlement to the underlying dispute. Viewed in
this way, the need for conformity of the arms embargo with "principles
of justice and international law" is directly triggered even on an inter-
pretation that limits that phrase to only the latter part of Article 1(1).
Admittedly, the requirement that Security Council action conform
with international law was the subject of significant debate in the
travaux prdparatoires of the Charter. At several stages in the drafting of
Article 1(1), the issue arose of whether and where to refer to the prin-
ciples of justice and international law. The initial draft of Article l(1)
provided by the Four Powers made no reference to either justice or
international law. In the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals produced by the
Four Powers, Article 1(1) read as follows:
To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means
370. Art. 103 does not provide such an exemption; rather, it is a paramountcy provision
which requires a valid obligation to exist under the Charter before it operates to exclude non-
Charter obligations. It thus does not inform the question of whether conformity with justice
and international law is required before an obligation can be created by the Security Council.
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adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead
to a breach of the peace.37 '
Many states favored stronger language regarding respect for justice and
international law. In order to address these concerns, several revisions
were proposed, of which there were two main variants: (1) to amend the
first clause to read "[t]o maintain international peace, security and
justice;" '372 and (2) to amend the first clause to read "[t]o maintain
international peace and security in accordance with the principles of
justice and international law ....
As an initial attempt to meet the concerns of the delegates, the Four
Powers submitted an amendment to insert the words "with due regard to
the principles of justice and international law" following the words "by
peaceful means" that appear in the original Dumbarton Oaks proposal,
which amendment was adopted by Subcommittee Ill/A.374 However, a
number of other states were concerned that the phrasing suggested that
international law would not be determinative in the settlement process.
As Ruda has noted:
In their opinion, it was not sufficient to mention "justice" as a
means of achieving a purpose. They felt that the prevailing opinion
at the Conference had been that the chief purpose of the Organiza-
tion must be accomplished in accordance with some rules, and that
there was an inference that the Organization did not intend to
follow the rule of justice. They feared that its omission might mean
that the Organization intended to impose a peace of expediency,
rather than a peace founded on justice.375
In light of these concerns, the subcommittee unanimously held that "in
conformity with" should replace "with due regard to. 37 6
371. Doc. 1, G/Il, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 2 (1945).
372. RUDA, supra note 368, at 112; Doc. 2, G/7(a)(l), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 34 (1945).
373. Words to this effect were proposed by several states, with some variance in
phrasing. See, e.g., Doc. 2, G/7(o), 3 U.N.C.I.O. 383 (1945) ("in conformity with right and
justice" (France)); Doc. 2, G/14(e)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. 484 (1945) ("in conformity with right and
justice" (Turkey)); Doc. 2, G/14(i), 3 U.N.C.I.O. 531 (1945) ("with due respect for contractu-
al obligations and the generally accepted principles of international law, justice and morality"
(Greece)); Doc. 2, G/14(m), 3 U.N.C.I.O. 554 (1945) ("on the basis of right, justice and the
principles of international law" (Iran)); Doc. 2, G/7(c)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. 178 (1945) ("within a
system of law, justice and equity" (Mexico)); Doc. 2, G/14(r), 3 U.N.C.I.O. 582 (1945)
("under the rule of justice" (Bolivia)). See also RUDA, supra note 368, at 109-12.
374. RUDA, supra note 368, at 114; Doc. 384, I/I/A/5, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 657 (1945).
375. RUDA, supra note 368, at 115.
376. Id. at 115; Doc. 723, I/I/A/19, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 702 (1945).
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This alteration did not, however, meet all of the concerns of the
delegates to Committee I/1. Other amendments were proposed which
would, if adopted, strengthen even further the requirement of conformity
with international law. A motion to alter the first clause of Article 1(1)
to read "[t]o maintain international peace, security and justice" was put
forward, although a similar proposal had been rejected by Subcommittee
I/l/A. 377 Delegates to Committee I/1 voted 19-12 in favor of the propos-
al, but it was not adopted since it lacked the necessary two-thirds major-
ity.378 A further amendment was proposed in Committee I/1, to change
the first clause of Article 1(1) to the following: "To maintain interna-
tional peace and security in accordance with the principles of justice and
international law." This amendment received a majority of votes in
Committee I/l, but did not receive the two-thirds majority necessary to
Carry.
3 79
The Rapporteur of Committee I/l in his report to Commission I
noted the distinction between collective measures to stop a breach of the
peace and the subsequent settlement of the underlying dispute giving
rise to the breach of the peace and discussed the impact of this distinc-
tion upon the requirement of the organization to act in conformity with
international law:
When the Organization has used the power given to it and the
force at its disposal to stop war, then it can find the latitude to
apply the principles of justice and international law, or can assist
the contending parties to find a peaceful solution.
The concept of justice and international law can thus find a more
appropriate place in context With the last part of the paragraph
dealing with disputes and situations. There, it can find a real scope
to operate, a more precise expression and a more practical field of
application.8 '
The Rapporteur noted that the concern with placing "justice" within the
first clause of Article 1(1) would be to provide a "loophole for question-
377. RUDA, supra note 368, at 115. The Rapporteur of Subcommittee I/l/A noted in his
report to Committee 1/1 that "it was held by the subcommittee that adding 'justice' afterIsecurity' brings at that juncture a notion which lacks clarity after the more clear notion of
peace and security, and would thus charge the text by welding together the two notions."
Doc. 723, I/1/A/19, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 701-02 (1945).
378. RUDA, supra note 368, at 116; Doc. 742, 1/1/23, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 318 (1945).
379. The Committee voted 19-15 in favor of the proposal. RUDA, supra note 368, at
116; Doc. 742, I/1/23, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 318 (1945).
380. RUDA, supra note 368, 118-9; Doc. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 394 (1945).
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ing any specific actions, and a possibility for delaying measures and
procedure while discussing abstract definitions," which would detract
from the ability of the Security Council to promptly stop any breach of
the peace.3"'
At Commission I, the Egyptian delegation again proposed an
amendment to insert the phrase "in accordance with the principles of
justice and international law" following "peace and security" in the first
clause.382 Arguing in support of the amendment, the Egyptian delegate
noted:
We were also told later that the adoption of our proposal might
result in delaying or even preventing action by the Security Coun-
cil. We were told that common sense and reason would suffice to
make it imperative for the Security Council to take action if and
when necessary. But we feel that the Council, the Security Council,
will really play the part of the political court of law and it is indis-
pensable that the principles of justice and law should always be
present in its deliberations. 38
3
Egypt's concern that a state's legal rights might be prejudiced if the
Security Council were not required to act in accordance with justice and
international law was shared by the delegate of Uruguay, who emphati-
cally noted:
We firmly support a drastic system of effective security measures,
but we conceive it only on the basis of justice and in conformity
with the rules of international law .... The day when there occurs
anew the illusion that by sacrificing the rights of the weak in the
face of threats by the strong the peace would be saved, on that day
the fuse will have been lighted which sooner or later would set off
the explosion of war. Injustice is not a propitious atmosphere for
peace.3"
In responding to the amendment, the U.K. delegate noted that the
original wording would ensure "that the actual business of maintaining
peace and of preventing the guns beginning to go off, should not, in any
381. Doc. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 394 (1945). These are the kinds of concerns that
Prof. Reisman has expressed, see supra part III.A.3. It is worth emphasizing, however, that
Prof. Reisman accepts that the Council is bound by international law, directing his concern
only to the institutional question of whether the Council alone can judge whether and to what
extent international law is relevant.
382. RUDA, supra note 368, at 119; Doc. 1006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 21 (1945).
383. RUDA, supra note 368, at 121; Doc. 1006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 24 (1945).
384. RUDA, supra note 368, at 125; Doe. 1006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 33 (1945).
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circumstances, be delayed., 385 The U.K. delegate stressed that, on the
original wording, the actual settlement of disputes would occur in accor-
dance with justice.386 Likening the Security Council's role to that of a
police officer, the delegate noted: "He does not stop at the outset of
what he does to inquire where exactly lies the precise balance of justice
in their quarrel. He stops it, and then, in order to make adjustment and
settlement, justice comes into its own." '387 On the U.K.'s view, there was
no need for the amendment, since the rights of the states involved would
not be affected by the exercise of the Security Council's "police" func-
tion: the Council would take immediate steps to effect a ceasing of
hostilities, at which point a peaceful settlement in accordance with law
and justice could be reached. Commission I was divided 21 in favor and
21 against. Thus, the amendment did not obtain the two-thirds majority
necessary to carry.
388
It is apparent from the travaux prdparatoires that a majority of
states did not support the position that the Security Council may act
without conformity to justice and international law. However, amend-
ments to clarify this understanding did not gain the necessary super-
majorities required under the drafting procedures. At this point, a com-
ment on the interpretive weight to be given to the travaux is called for.
When interpreting the significance of failed amendment votes, due
weight must be given to the following considerations: (1) the baseline,
indeed status quo, text to which changes were proposed was drafted by
a very few states (the Four Powers); (2) even the combined will of well
over fifty percent of the participating states was insufficient to change
the text; and (3) original meaning must itself be subservient to an evolu-
tionary interpretation. States opposing the various proposed amendments
did so not because they opposed the rule of justice but because they
were concerned that inclusion of the concept of "justice" within the
exercise of the Security Council's "police" function might impede the
Council's ability to take prompt and effective measures to end hostili-
ties.389 Given the problem of extending into the 1990s the narrow view
asserted by the most powerful states who controlled the initial draft text,
and given the evolution in signals sent by the international community
on the all-pervasive significance of jus cogens, any interpretation of
385. RUDA, supra note 368, at 123; Doc. 1006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 25 (1945).
386. Doc. 1006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 25 (1945).
387. Id.
388. RUDA, supra note 368, at 126; Doc. 1006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 34 (1945).
389. RUDA, supra note 368, at 117-18.
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what in Article 1(1) is modified by the words "principles of justice and
international law" should be limited to this narrow concern.39
In any case, broad interpretations based on Article 1(1) of the scope
of unfettered power for the Council rely on dichotomizing the Security
Council's role into a "police function" and a "settlement function." Even
those states that opposed an explicit requirement in Article 1(1) of
conformity with justice and international law with respect to the exercise
of the police function did not suggest that the eventual settlement of a
dispute which gave rise to a threat to the peace should not be based on
the principles of justice and international law. This suggests that a
narrow interpretation of the extent to which the Security Council may
take collective measures without regard to justice or international law is
appropriate. By requiring that all disputes be settled according to the
principles of justice and international law, the framers of the Charter
recognized that a state's legal rights should not be impaired by the
collective enforcement measures taken by the Security Council. This
requirement reveals, at the same time, that the police/settlement dichoto-
my is a false one, at least in the context of the present dispute.39'
(ii) Article 25 of the Charter Does Not Make Resolutions Binding if
Their Adoption or Maintenance Is Not in Accordance with Article
](1)'s "Principles of Justice and International Law"
390. In turn, this concern is addressed mostly, if not entirely, to institutional issues,
notably that of whether states can act unilaterally based on their interpretation of the confor-
mity of a resolution with "justice and international law" and the extent to which another
institution, like the General Assembly or the ICJ, can judge conformity with these principles.
The concern does not go to the purely normative issue of whether Security Council actions
are governed via art. 1(1) by these principles. This Memorial addresses neither unilateral
action nor General Assembly powers, but the discussion of the role of the ICJ supra part III
explicitly acknowledged the relevance of questions of inter-institutional comity, particularly
avoidance of frustration of the jurisdiction of the other organ.
391. If the Security Council were entitled to limit through collective measures Bosnia's
ability to protect itself from aggressive genocide, Bosnia's rights under international law
would be fundamentally prejudiced. Bosnia's right to insist upon settling the dispute in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law would indeed be a hollow one.
The immeasurable human suffering caused by the ongoing genocide against the population of
Bosnia cannot be settled or adjusted ex post facto.
It is arguable that Bosnia's right to territorial integrity is not implicated in a similar
manner, because the legal borders which are the subject of a dispute can be adequately
adjusted through peaceful means following the cessation of hostilities. At a minimum,
however, the Security Council must respect jus cogens' norms regarding the protection of
human populations, since breaches of these norms cannot be redressed at the settlement stage.
Even if one accepts the unlikely possibility that a declaration of responsibility and compensa-
tion for genocide against Bosnia's population could constitute elements of a peaceful settle-
ment, it is untenable to suggest that such relief would constitute a just substitute for Bosnia's
right to be free of genocide.
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Article 25 clearly circumscribes the powers of the Security Council.
Council decisions, if they are to have binding effect, must be "in accor-
dance" with the Charter: "The Members of the U.N. agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter." Clearly, Article 25 does not operate so as to make all
Security Council decisions binding. Otherwise, the words "in accordance
with the present Charter" would be superfluous. 392 Together, Articles 24
and 25, based on their ordinary meaning, establish compliance with
international law, notably jus cogens, as the sine qua non for binding
and valid Security. Council action. These articles provide the Court with
a legal basis for treating as inoperative any Security Council decision
that, in its judgment, conflicts with peremptory norms. This is of partic-
ular importance in the present case because the international legal norms
at hand are themselves the quintessential examples of "principles of
justice" that have attained the status of being "accepted and recognized
by the international community as a whole" (per Article 53 of the two
Vienna Conventions) as peremptory legal standards. The effect of Arti-
cle 1(1) of the Charter is to bring jus cogens norms, which arise "out-
side" the Charter, within the corpus of U.N. law (broadly characterized)
that the Security Council must obey. The fact that the Council may have
complied with all other provisions of the Charter cannot validate con-
duct which derogates from jus cogens.393
A caveat is in order. The above reasoning is not strictly necessary to
the case as it is contended that jus cogens obligations can prevail over
obligations created by the Security Council as a matter of general inter-
national law. In other words, Bosnia's case does not depend on an
interpretation of jus cogens norms as part of the positive legal ("con-
stitutional") order of the Charter through an incorporation by reference
through Article 1(1) and a renvoi from there to Article 24. The argu-
ment has been made that it is consistent with both the concept of jus
cogens and the nature of the U.N. legal order to treat the fundamental
precepts of jus cogens to be part of internal Charter law. The alternative,
always available, is to treat Security Council resolutions that do not
conform with jus cogens as intra vires the Security Council but subject
to the higher law of jus cogens which comes from "outside" the Charter
392. See Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 293 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice) ("If,
under the relevant chapter or article of the Charter, the [Security Council] decision is not
binding, Article 25 cannot make it so. If the effect of that Article were automatically to make
all decisions of the Security Council binding, then the words 'in accordance with the present
Charter' would be quite superfluous.").
393. In the case at bar, the failure to conform with art. 51 and the failure to conform
with jus cogens norms are interconnected. See supra part II.B.I and 11.B.2.
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either to render a resolution directly unlawful or to deprive of legal
force and effect the obligations that it purports to generate for states.394
b. Article 103 of the Charter Does Not Relieve the Security
Council of Its Duty to Comply with Jus Cogens Norms
Article 103 provides: "In the event of a conflict between the obli-
gations of the Members of the United Nations underthe present Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. '395 Read together,
Articles 25 and 103 require Member States to "accept and carry out" all
Security Council decisions that are "in accordance with the present
Charter," even if there are contrary obligations under an international
treaty other than the Charter. 396 It was due to this Article 103
paramountcy clause that the ICJ declined to grant Libya provisional
measures in Lockerbie.
ICJ President Oda stated in Lockerbie that he did "not deny that
under the positive law of the United Nations Charter a resolution of the
Security Council may have binding force, irrespective of the question
whether it is consonant with international law derived from other sourc-
es. 397 If Judge Oda intended by these words to imply that the "positive
law" of the Charter ends the legal issues surrounding Article 103, such
an interpretation of the Charter would ignore completely the "ordinary
meaning" of the Charter's words, which expressly require U.N. organs
to act in accordance with international law. 398 As Article 103 oily refers
explicitly to "international agreements," it is arguable that the
overarching language in Article 24(2) referring to the purposes and
principles of the U.N. and the reference in Article 1(1) to "international
law" preserves customary international law and general principles of
394. See infra part IV.B (canvassing the possibilities with respect to voidness,
inoperativity, and interpretive reading down).
395. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
396. Note that Judge Bedjaoui, in his dissenting opinion in Lockerbie, argued that art.
103 is aimed only at "obligations," not at "rights," so that Charter-imposed obligations trump
other obligations but not rights that derive from other sources of international law. Lockerbie,
1992 I.C.J. at 143-159 (dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). Whether Judge Bedjaoui's
distinction stands up to analysis cannot be dealt with here; no other authority for this proposi-
tion has been found. However, assuming, arguendo, its validity, it could be argued that
Bosnia's right to the means to prevent genocide under art. I of the Genocide Convention
remains unfettered despite .the operation of arts. 25 and 103.
397. Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. at 129 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
398. Id. at 131. Note that such an interpretation need not be given to Judge Oda's words.
While concurring in the treatment of the Security Council resolution as dispositive due to the
effect of art. 103, he indicated that the Court might be called on to pass judgment on the
conformity of the resolution with international law if it were, in another case, argued that a
state has been deprived of what he called "sovereign rights."
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international law (i.e., non-conventional sources of law) as constraints
on the Security Council.
However, once again, it is not necessary to the applicant's argument
that the Court must find that the Council has a duty to comply with all
nontreaty international law. The Court could accept the proposition that
a resolution of the Security Council may have binding force irrespective
of its consonance with international law and still find a narrower basis
for decision in the case at bar, namely that the situation is qualitatively
different where jus cogens norms are involved.
As has been argued at length earlier, jus cogens norms of interna-
tional law are, by definition, norms from which no derogation is per-
mitted, even by the Security Council. Thus, to the extent that Article
103 analogizes Charter obligations to domestic law constitutional obli-
gations, that analogy must be modified so as to accord jus cogens norms
a constitutional status vis-A-vis Charter-delegated decisions of U.N.
organs. It would be contrary to the rule of law for the Council to be
completely insulated from legal scrutiny. The Security Council is! not
infallible, and, when it errs, the Court, as the guardian of the legality of
the U.N. system, must not decline to make a legal judgment. If the
phrase "principles of justice and international law" in Article 1(1) is to
have any concrete meaning within the U.N. system, then at a minimum
the Council must not be permitted to derogate from such fundamental
legal norms as those with the peremptory status of jus cogens.
It is of utmost significance that Article 103 makes no explicit ref-
erence to the status of Charter obligations that conflict with customary
international law or, at the very least, with jus cogens. Jus cogens norms
such as those related to the prohibition of genocide (whether understood
as a higher form of custom or as fundamental general principles of law)
clearly do not fall within the paramountcy effect of Article 103. Accord-
ing to Professor Watson:
The omission makes more sense, however, when one considers the
doctrine of jus cogens - the rule that states cannot agree by treaty
to violate certain peremptory norms of customary international law.
Indeed, the framers of the Charter seem to have had such a limita-
tion in mind when they wrote that an interpretation of the Charter
that was "generally unacceptable" would be "void" [see discussion
infra]. It is quite reasonable to conclude that the U.N. Charter,
itself a treaty, does not authorize acts that violate peremptory
norms of international law.3 9
The status of jus cogens norms as a body of law superior to both cus-
tomary international law and treaty law requires, as a matter of the
399. Watson, supra note 275, at 37.
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hierarchy of legal norms which the Court must apply, that Article 103
provides no relief where Council conduct conflicts with jus cogens. As
Judge Lauterpacht incisively stated in his separate opinion in Bosnia v.
Serbia 1I:
The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security
Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an
operative treaty obligation cannot - as a matter of simple hierar-
chy of norms - extend to a conflict between a Security Council
resolution and jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to state the oppo-
site proposition thus - that a Security Council resolution may
even require participation in genocide - for its unacceptability to
be apparent.4X
The continued enforcement and application of Security Council
Resolution 713 is not "in accordance with the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations" (Article 24(2)) and is thus also not "in accor-
dance with the present Charter" (Article 25) because it violates the jus
cogens prohibition against genocide. Consequently, Member States are
not obliged by the operation of Articles 2(5), 25, or 48 to "give ...
every assistance in," to "accept," or to "carry out" this Security Council
decision. Thus, there is no legal obligation deriving from the Charter to
which to accord paramount effect under Article 103.
In Lockerbie, a majority of the Court relied heavily on the operation
of Article 103 to reach the conclusion that obligations imposed upon
Libya by the Security Council trumped any contrary rights Libya might
have pursuant to the Montreal Convention. However, to summarize by
way of reiterating the foregoing argument, Article 103 is clearly not
determinative of Bosnia's case. According to its ordinary meaning,
Article 103 provides that Charter obligations prevail over "other interna-
tional agreements." It does not provide that Charter obligations can
prevail over jus cogens norms,40 1 such as those embodied in the Geno-
cide Convention. It is clear that Article 103 has no application to provi-
sions of international agreements which have jus cogehs status. The
reason is that the operation of Article 103 is conditional on the under-
lying validity of the Charter obligation. In the present case, the opera-
tion of jus cogens prevents such an obligation from arising in the first
place. The peremptory status of the norms found in the Genocide Con-
400. Bosnia v. Serbia 1!, 1993 I.C.J. at 440 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
401. Professor Watson states that "Article 103, relied on so heavily by the majority [in
Lockerbie], provides that Charter obligations prevail over 'other international agreements'; it
does not provide that Charter obligations prevail over jus cogens and other forms of custom-
ary international law." Watson, supra note 275, at 25.
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vention, in the guise of either customary norms or general principles of
law, nullifies the obligation on Members to abide by contradictory
Council resolutions. Furthermore, one cannot avoid this result by point-
ing to the wording in Article 103 of "any other treaty obligation" as a
way to allow the Security Council to trump the Genocide Convention.
Given that the obligation to abide by the Council resolution does not
legally exist, no question of conflict arises, and Article 103 accordingly
is not triggered. Thus, by virtue of the fact that jus cogens norms found
in a treaty have a simultaneous existence outside the treaty, a zone of
immunity from the application of Article 103 is carved out for treaty
provisions such as that in Article I of the Genocide Convention.4 2
3. Resolutions 713 and 727 as Maintained Against Bosnia
Contravene Article 51 and Are Not "in Accordance
with the Charter" Under Article 25
The preceding sections argued that Security Council resolutions that
do not conform to jus cogens norms are ultra vires according to the
internal legal order of the Charter. As a result, no binding Article 25
obligation. emanates from such a resolution as long as it is ultra vires
and, as a further result, Article 103's paramountcy effect is not even
triggered. The same reasoning applies with respect to Article 51 and
self-defense: the Security Council must act with a view to Articles 24
and 25. Articles 24 and 25 mean that the Security Council's power of
interpretation of the validity of a state's claim to self-defense under
Article 51, or determination as to whether "measures necessary" have
been taken under Article 51, while not reviewable on a prospective
basis, is not immune from normative constraint. Their effect is to ensure
that the collective security system benefits not only from a political
body's decision to act (thereby valuing timeliness and effective action)
but also from the fact that such decisions must be made within a legal
framework. The decision to suspend a state's right to self-defense
through the imposition of an arms embargo must be implemented quick-
ly in order to be effective. At the same time, the Security Council's
"primary responsibility for international peace and security," premised
upon the practical political need "to ensure prompt and effective action,"
must cohere with considerations of legality of the imposition of the
embargo under the U.N. Charter.
Article 24(2) dovetails with Article 25; as noted in the preceding
section, the binding nature of Security Council decisions per Article 25
402. Of course, if a resolution has no legal force because of a conflict with a jus cogens
norm, any treaty obligation, whether or not itself a jus cogens obligation, which would
otherwise conflict with the resolution, is immune from the paramountcy effect of art. 103.
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is qualified by a phraseology ("in accordance with the present Charter")
which parallels the language of Article 24(2) ("in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations"). While the purposes and
principles can be explicitly appealed to as one basis for challenging the
force and effect of a Security Council resolution, the argument in the
current section is simply that the Security Council has not acted "in
accordance with" Article 51 and thus cannot be said to have acted "in
accordance with the present Charter" within the meaning of Article 25.
For the present argument related to Article 51, there is no need to rely
on the Article 24(2) test of whether the Security Council resolutions are
also not "in accordance with the purpose and principles" of the U.N.
(except to the extent that such purposes and principles aid in the inter-
pretation of the parameters of Security Council powers under Article
51).
The objective approach adopted for the interpretation of the words
"measures necessary" in Article 51 necessitates a limited review role for
the ICJ, or at least a joint role in codetermining whether the objective
test of "measures necessary" has been met.4 3 The Security Council
makes the initial determination of whether the objective criteria had
been met, with the Court's showing requisite deference to the Council
where fluid factual evaluations are at issue. But even in such fluid
situations, the ICJ retains a residual role as the arbiter of legality. Cer-
tainly, the Court has not in the past shrunk from a determination of the
legality of the use of force, including in situations involving Permanent
Members of the Sedurity Council.' There is no reason to believe that it
could not fulfill this role here.
B. Legal Effects of Resolution 713 and Resolutions that Reaffirm
It and Thus Maintain the Embargo Against Bosnia
1. Should Resolution 713 Be Treated as Void?
As Hannikainen has noted, there is a tendency to see jus cogens as
a rather blunt instrument in terms of legal effects. 4°5 This is a result, it
would seem, of over-assimilating the effects mandated by the law of
treaties to the entire law of jus cogens.406 The only nuances acknowl-
403. See supra parts II.B.3 and 1I.B.4 (discussing Security Council limitations on self-de-
fense).
404. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 14; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr.
9).
405. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 173, at 9.
406. See 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 45, arts. 53 and 64.
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edged by the two Vienna Conventions are with respect to treaties that
become void not from the moment of formation but only after the
passage of time due to the advent of a new jus cogens norm with which
the treaty only then comes into conflict; in this instance, only continuing
effects of the formerly valid treaty must be eliminated and, furthermore,
the offensive provision may be separated (severed) from the rest of the
treaty rather than bringing down the entire treaty as a result of its con-
flict with higher law.4 7 This tendency to assimilate the unlawfulness
produced by jus cogens conflicts to voidness can arguably be seen in the
reasoning of Judge Lauterpacht:
What legal consequences may flow from this analysis? One possi-
bility is that, in strict logic, when the operation of paragraph 6 of
Security Council Resolution 713 began to make Members of the
United Nations accessories to genocide, it ceased to be valid and
binding in its operation against Bosnia-Herzegovina; and that
members of the United Nations then became free to disregard it.
Instead, it would seem sufficient that the relevance here of jus
cogens should be drawn to the attention of the Security Council, as
it will be by the required communication to it of the Court's Order,
so that the Security Council may give due weight to it in future
reconsideration of the embargo.4°s
Judge Lauterpacht seems to have opted for a softer approach than a
straightforward declaration of voidness only as a remedial choice in
light of considerations related to proof of facts, institutional relations,
and jurisdictional context. Thus, he still thought in terms of voidness as
the normative effect whatever the Court's institutional position to make
that declaration. Others have seen voidness as the only possibility in
even more assured terms. Citing only Judge Lauterpacht for support,
Professor Gowlland-Debbas has stated simply that "[flinally, nullity ab
initio would be the result of any violation of a peremptory norm.
' ' 09
407. See id. art. 71.
408. Bosnia v. Serbia II, 1993 I.C.J. at 441 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
409. V. Gowiland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the international Court of Justice
and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643, 673(1994). Gowlland-Debbas also considers, as a general matter, whether Security Council
resolutions should be considered voidable as opposed to void. No resolution is reached, but it
is worth noting that a similar argument is made as being the effect of art. 66 of the two
Vienna Conventions, i.e., that jus cogens has no independent normative existence other than
specific rulings produced through dispute settlement procedures. Shabtai Rosenne, however,
has noted that the ICJ's own practice:
does not lend support to the view that as a matter of positive international law as
expressed in the Vienna Conventions, the substantive rules regarding invalidity and
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Yet, as Hannikainen notes:
[T]here is little basis for the invalidation of the effects of any and
all violations of peremptory norms. A sufficient reason should be
that the presumption of "invalidity" [as a result of such violations]
is not a suitable sanction to apply in any and all kinds of viola-
tions. There is little point in declaring "void" concrete violative
acts which may have produced all their results by the time the
validity is challenged, for example, concrete violations of human
rights. International law has not formulated any specific effect for
concrete violations of peremptory norms beyond the finding of
unlawfulness and the consequent assignment of responsibility.:
It is possible to make the case that arms embargo resolutions are
void from the moment that a conflict with jus cogens occurred or from
the moment that the right of self-defense was impaired in an ultra vires
way. This requires acceptance of the proposition that a legal instrument
that has the effect of mandating unlawful conduct is permanently flawed
as a result. The arguments for this position are evident: the need for the
strongest sanction known to international law; the fact that the arms
embargo produces effects that resonate well into the future in terms of
assisting in producing the position of strength from which Bosnian Serbs
"negotiate"; and the fact that the unwillingness of the U.N. to act collec-
tively in a way that would adequately substitute for Bosnia's own ability
would seem to mean that the effects produced by Resolution 713 are
permanent and irreparable. However, Bosnia's arguments need not go
this far. Given that the arms embargo resolutions are not in conflict with
jus cogens on their face and that the conflict is produced only over time
and with the existence of certain factual circumstances, it may be open
to the Court to consider other possible ways to conceptualize the legal
effects of the unlawfulness of the arms embargo resolutions, particularly
if the Court would see such alternatives as more compatible with pro-
ducing fruitful interaction between the Court and Council in a way that
protects the fundamental rights at stake without frustrating the beneficial
termination and their procedural complement [i.e. art. 66] are inherently linked in
the sense that the invocation of the rule must follow the prescribed procedure or
equivalent.
ROSENNE, supra note 250, at 351. The most important thing to note is the following: (1)
whether an IC ruling only makes voidable as opposed to void an act of a U.N. political
organ is a false problem to a large degree in light of the fact that the ICJ can, in any case,
never be in a binding jurisdictional relationship that allows its acts to void acts of other or-
gans; and (2) if Rosenne's observation is followed, recourse to the ICJ would not be neces-
sary in order to argue for effects of clashes with jus cogens other than that of voidness.
410. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 173, at 9. Note the use of the generic term "unlawful-
ness." See discussion supra note 351.
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policies that an arms embargo was initially designed to serve and could
possibily still serve. In particular, it will be suggested that the resolu-
tions might be considered not as void but as inoperative or inapplicable-
under a doctrine of reading down.4 n
2. Should Resolution 713 Be Treated as Inoperative?
It is arguable that one should focus on the contingent nature of the
unlawfulness produced by Resolution 713. That unlawfulness is neither
necessary nor necessarily permanent. The unlawfulness depends on the
development of a state of affairs which ,places obligations to maintain
the arms embargo in direct conflict with both obligations against geno-
cide and rights of self-defense. If the international community were to
act in such a way as to cut the connection between the embargo and
these effects, notably by intervening in an effective way which would
remove the need for the Bosnian Government to prevent genocide or
engage in self-defense on its own, then the unlawful effects.would have
ceased. Ultimately, any unlawfulness of Resolution 713 and resolutions
that reaffirm it stems from the conflict of obligations that the resolutions
create for states. So long as such conflict exists, the obligation stemming
from jus cogens norms must be taken to prevail over the obligation
stemming from the Security Council resolution(s). In that period, it
would seem to make sense to say that the resolution that generates the
obligation is made inoperative because the jus cogens obligation is
paramount. However, if and when such a conflict disappears or is ac-
tively removed through other action taken under the aegis of the Coun-
cil, then the obligations to obey the resolution would revive or bounce
back into place. Whether jus cogens is considered part of internal Char-
ter law or as prevailing upon Council-generated obligations from "out-
side," the same contextualized and contingent approach can make con-
ceptual sense. Similarly, where the unlawfulness in the resolution is
treated in terms of the effects it has on self-defense, that unlawfulness
itself is also contingent; the inoperativeness of the resolution exists so
long as there is an unfulfilled necessity for Bosnia to receive arms in
order to defend itself against genocidal aggression. The moment at
which the international community takes "measures [truly] necessary" to
protect Bosnia from armed attack is the moment at which the arms
embargo resolutions can begin to operate again according to their origi-
411. See KENT ROACH, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN CANADA (1994) for a compara-
tive U.S.-Canada discussion of the range of remedies that North American constitutional
jurisprudence has created that do not entail immediate and automatic invalidation.
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nal legitimate purposes.412 The doctrine of inoperativity is a way in
which to harmonize the law of state responsibility and the effects of
treaty-based juridical acts whose unlawfulness stems from placing states
in breach of higher obligations . 3
3. Should Resolution 713 Be Treated as Inapplicable to
Bosnia Under a Doctrine of Reading Down?
In municipal constitutional law, it is not uncommon for courts to
have recourse to what is sometimes called the doctrine of reading
down. 4 This doctrine calls for a technique of interpretation whereby a
potentially unconstitutional statute or regulation is construed in such a
way as to make it consistent with higher legal norms. In this way, a
court thus avoids the need to find the statute or.regulation (or provision
thereof) to be unconstitutional. Such an interpretive approach requires a
legal text that is sufficiently general or otherwise ambiguous so as to
allow the courts to choose an interpretation that avoids placing the
statute or regulation in conflict with constitutional norms over an inter-
pretation that results in such a conflict of norms. As Kent Roach has put
it:
Although interpreting a statute is not technically a remedy for a
constitutional violation, it is, in a functional sense, an alternative to
invalidation of a potentially unconstitutional law .... [Rleading
down ... is an alternative to a declaration of invalidity and is
more often driven by judicial concerns about constitutionality than
by concerns about legislative intent and purposes."'
This constitutional law doctrine resembles another well known inter-
pretative principle of many municipal legal systems. This principle calls
upon the judiciary to interpret municipal statutes and regulations consis-
tently with international legal obligations where at all possible (i.e.,
within limits of the reasonable range of contending interpretations that
the text in question can bear). What each of these interpretive doctrines
has in common is a judicial policy of giving effect to the superior status
of higher legal norms through the workings of an interpretive presump-
412. It might be said that the effects in question could be analogized to those produced
by art. 103 of the Charter, which, it is generally accepted, does not render void obligations
with which it conflicts but rather "prevails" without invalidating. See HANNIKAINEN, supra
note 173, at 14-15.
413. Recall especially art. 18(2) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. See supra
note 358.
414. See ROACH, supra note 411, at pages 14-17.
415. Id. at 14-17 and 14-18.
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tion that the lawmaker in question did not intend to infringe the higher
law. Accordingly, if an interpretation will result in putting a statutory or
regulatory norm in conflict with a higher norm, an alternative inter-
pretation that would avoid the conflict may, all things being equal, be
preferred.
An analogous judicial policy should be adopted by the ICJ as one
arrow in its remedial quiver. From the perspective of interinstitutional
comity, the strength of the doctrine lies in its simultaneous grounding in
several desirable premises: (1) thatjus cogens (the highest "constitution-
al" norms of the international system) apply to the Security Council; (2)
that the Security Council should not easily be presumed to have meant
to produce a conflict between the obligations emanating from its deci-
sions and jus cogens norms; and (3) that the ICJ should select, all things
being equal, the least intrusive remedy in order to avoid as much as
possible any sense that, even indirectly, the Court is exercising judicial
review powers over the Security Council.
As noted in the Introduction, Bosnia has consistently maintained that
the arms embargo should not be interpreted to apply to Bosnia. This
argument has always, of course, been accompanied by the further argu-
ment that, if the resolutions are interpreted to apply to Bosnia, then
obligations to obey the arms embargo obligations are of no force or
effect because of conflict with fundamental norms related to genocide
and self-defense. There may be an understandable tendency to view the
applicability arguments as technical and unpersuasive in light of what
might seem to be a de facto consensus in the Security Council to treat
the arms embargo as applicable to Bosnia.416 However, it is contended
that the "technical" nature of the arguments dissipates in direct propor-
tion to the extent to which those interpretations are located in imperative
"constitutional" policy rather than in simple semantic analysis. It is in
this sense that it may be useful to think of interpretive inapplicability as
following from all the foregoing arguments about how the Security
Council arms embargo obligations would have to be found not to con-
form to higher law if the resolutions were to be interpreted as applying
to Bosnia. Thus, it is through the lens of the desirability of avoiding
placing the Security Council at the center of violations of both the U.N.
Charter and independently existing jus cogens norms, that the two fol-
lowing arguments on applicability should be evaluated.
416. Indeed, even Judge Lauterpacht in Bosnia v. Serbia 11 interpreted a defeated draft
resolution as a failed effort to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia (entailing a logical acknowl-
edgement that there is something to lift) and not as an attempt to clarify an existing state of
affairs (which would indicate that the embargo has not applied and does not apply). Bosnia v.
Serbia 1H, 1993 I.C.J. at 438 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht); see also supra note 10
(quoting the relevant text).
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a. The Legal Circumstances: the Arms Embargo Did Not Apply as
Against Bosnia After Its Admission as a Member of the U.N.
Any application of the arms embargo to Bosnia could only have
come about through Resolution 727.417 It is inaccurate to view Resolu-
tion 727 as extending definitively the arms embargo to the independent
states emerging from the former Yugoslavia.
It is essential that recognition as a state under international law be
distinguished from admission to the U.N. Bosnia was admitted as a
member of the U.N. on May 22, 1992.418 While this constitutes a form
of collective, centralized recognition, 419 Bosnia existed 420 and was recog-
nized42' as a state prior to its admission to the U.N.; indeed, as one
criterion for admission to the U.N. is statehood,422 the decision to admit
Bosnia is premised upon Bosnia's already existing as a state, which is
itself a status partially brought about by the cumulative effect of wide-
spread recognition by other states. As of May 22, 1992, therefore,
Bosnia possessed the "inherent right of self-defence" as set out in Arti-
cle 51 of the U.N. Charter. The facial interpretation of Resolution 727 is
that it applies the arms embargo to those areas of the former Yugoslavia
417. S.C. Res. 727, supra note 7 ("decides that the embargo applies in accordance with
paragraph 33 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23363)"). The relevant paragraph of that
report reads, in part:
To all interlocutors, during his recent fifth mission to Yugoslavia, Mr. Vance
pointed out that the arms embargo imposed by the Council in resolution 713 (1991)
and reinforced by resolution 724 (1991), continues in force and will retain its
application unless the Security Council determines otherwise. Indeed, Mr. Vance
added that the arms embargo would continue to apply to all areas that have been
part of Yugoslavia, any decisions on the question of the recognition of the indepen-
dence of certain republics notwithstanding.
Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991),
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/23363 (Readex 1992) (emphasis added).
418. G.A. Res. 46/237, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 86th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/237 (Readex 1992) (upon recommendation of S.C. Res. 755, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3079th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESI755 (Readex 1992)).
419. See generally DUGARD, supra note 115.
420. According to the criteria set out in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and
Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, reprinted in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 75,
75 (art. 1) (Supp. 1934). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES §201 (1986).
421. Recognized by the European Community on April 7, 1992. See, e.g., Review of the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/158 (Readex 1992); Letter from the Permanent Represen-
tatives of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23793 (Readex 1992).
422. U.N. CHARTER art. 4. See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the
United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1948 I.C.J. 1, 57 (May 28).
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which had not yet become independent states, or having become inde-
pendent state.3, had achieved a measure of recognition but had not yet
been admitted to membership in the U.N. ("any decisions on the ques-
tion of the recognition of the independence of certain republics notwith-
standing"). A simple reading of the provision suggests that it was not
intended to continue to apply the arms embargo imposed upon Yugosla-
via to Bosnia, notwithstanding Bosnia's admission to the U.N., a status
which, as was argued above, is distinct from recognized independence.
After Bosnia's admission to the U.N., no resolution of the Security
Council ever purported independently to apply an arms embargo against
Bosnia. On the contrary, the numerous resolutions which have followed
merely reaffirm Resolutions 713 and 727.
As was already noted, the admission of Bosnia to the U.N. means
that it enjoys the rights accruing to a Member of the U.N. under the
Charter. Among these rights is the "inherent right to self-defence" under
Article 51. No resolution of the Security Council passed after the admis-
sion of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the U.N. has ever
purported to suspend its right to self-defense. The Security Council
cannot suspend an inherent right of a Member State by implication or
inference; if it is to apply an arms embargo to a Member State, it must
do so specifically and explicitly. In light of the purpose and operation of
the doctrine of reading down, Resolutions 713 and 727 should accord-
ingly be read down so as not to apply to Bosnia.
b. In the Alternative, the Failure of the Security Council to Adopt
Resolution 727 Under Chapter VII Means That the Purported
Extension of the Arms Embargo in That Resolution Is, as
an Interpretive Matter, Only a Recommendatory Measure
As discussed in the preceding section, the Security Council has itself
confirmed that Resolution 713 does not automatically apply to all of the
former Yugoslav republics. Otherwise, the need to adopt Resolution 727
could not be explained.
Resolution 727 reaffirms the embargo contained in Resolution 713,
as do a number of subsequent Security Council resolutions. However,
Resolution 727 then goes on, as a separate step, to decide, by reference
to the report of the U.N. Secretary-General, that the embargo should be
extended to "all areas that have been part of Yugoslavia," a phrase
which shall be assumed to include Bosnia for purposes of this alterna-
tive applicability argument. From this vantage point, Resolution 727
would therefore not amount to a procedural means of clarifying the
situation. Rather, it would contain a substantive decision which purports
to establish an arms embargo covering Bosnia.
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Because the possible restriction of the right of self-defense touches
on the very survival of the target state of an embargo and its population,
the U.N. Charter has established an elaborate procedure for the imposi-
tion of mandatory sanctions resolutions. The importance of these proce-
dures can only be enhanced when norms related to genocide enter the
picture in interaction with the inherent right of self-defense. In its prac-
tice over the decades, the Security Council has consistently adopted
mandatory sanctions resolutions either with a formal reference to Chap-
ter VII or a formal invocation of Article 41. The need for such a formal
invocation cannot be dismissed as a mere technicality. It is a crucial
component of a structure of legal signals that the Security Council not
only is justified in acting but also wishes to place mandatory obligations
upon Member States.
The decision of the Council concerning the extension of the arms
embargo to the former Yugoslav republics was not adopted under Chap-
ter VII. Particularly in light of the consistent practice of the Security
Council since '1946, the failure to send this signal must be taken to be of
crucial interpretive significance for understanding what the Council as a
collectivity intended by Resolution 727. The necessary interpretive
implication is that Resolution 727's extension of the arms embargo to
Bosnia must be taken to be a recommendatory rather than a mandatory
measure. This interpretation follows from giving interpretive weight to
the Council's own consistent practice with respect to adopting manda-
tory as opposed to recommendatory measures. The interpretation can
only be bolstered in light of the presumption that the Council is not to
be taken to have intended to adopt a binding resolution that would either
be ultra vires the Charter or in conflict with jus cogens norms. It is
submitted that where an interpretation that would avoid placing acts of
the Security Council in a position of unlawfulness also coincides with
consistent practice of the Council, then the adoption of that interpreta-
tion by the ICJ is clearly a legitimate judicial course of action in lieu of
finding either invalidity or inoperativity.
SUBMISSIONS
On the basis of the presumed evidence, on the basis of multiple
jurisdictional contexts relevant to this Memorial, and on the basis of the
legal arguments presented in this Memorial, the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
Requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
1. That State Parties to the Genocide Convention that have
engaged in maintenance of the arms embargo on Bosnia
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have been in breach of their respective obligations under
Article I of the Convention to prevent genocide in Bosnia;
2. That Security Council resolutions that purport to apply and
maintain an arms embargo against Bosnia have fettered
Bosnia's right to self-defense in a manner ultra vires the
Security Council's powers under the U.N. Charter;
3. That Security Council resolutions that purport to apply and
maintain an arms embargo against Bosnia are, as a matter
of both general international law and the law of the U.N.
Charter, of no legal force and effect to the extent of their
conflict with jus cogens norms related to the prohibition
of genocide;
4. That it is within the authority of the Court to treat Security
Council resolutions that are ultra vires the Charter or
which produce conflicts with jus cogens norms as being
invalid, inoperative, or inapplicable within the jurisdiction-
al order of the Court.
5. That the Court is under a duty not to recognize or other-
wise give legal effect within its jurisdictional order to
obligations flowing from Security Council resolutions that
are ultra vires the Charter or produce conflicts with jus
cogens norms and, to that extent, the existence of such
obligations would not constitute a legally effective circum-
stance precluding wrongfulness in a contentious case valid-
ly brought under the Genocide Convention.
6. That, assuming their applicability to Bosnia, Security
Council resolutions seeking to impose an arms embargo
are neither inherently in conflict with jus cogens norms
related to genocide nor inherently ultra vires the jurisdic-
tion of the Security Council to impair the right of self-
defense, and, if accompanied by effective measures to
protect Bosnians from both genocide and genocidal ag-
gression, such resolutions and the obligations flowing from
them would be recognized as having legal force and effect
within the jurisdictional order of the Court.
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